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PROBLEMAS DE DISTRIBUCION EN JUEGOS COALICIONALES, REDES Y MERCADOS

PID2023-150472NB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal para Impulsar la Investigación Científico-Técnica y su Transferencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2023
Plan Estatal 2021-2023 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE BARCELONA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 5
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value

  • Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel|||0000-0002-8457-4647
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We introduce the family of games with intertemporal externalities, where two disjoint sets of players play sequentially. Coalitions formed by the present players create worth today, but the way these players organize also affects the future: their partition imposes externalities that influence the worth of coalitions formed by future players. We adapt the classic Shapley axioms and explore their implications. They are not sufficient to uniquely determine a value. We propose two solution concepts based on interpreting the Shapley value as the players' expected contributions to coalitions: the one-coalition externality value and the naive value. Our main results show that adding a single axiom to the classical Shapley axioms yields a unique value: the one-coalition externality value arises adding a principle of equal treatment of direct and indirect contributions or an axiom on necessary players, while the naive value is characterized adding equal treatment of externalities.
Repositori Obert UdL
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Assignment markets with capacitated middlemen: core and competitive equilibria

  • El Obadi, Saadia 
  • Miquel Fernández, Silvia
  • Núñez, Marina
We consider a three-sided market where each buyer-seller pair can attain a profit only if there is a middleman that connects them. This profit does not depend on the identity of the middlemen, and each buyer and seller can take part in at most one partnership while middlemen can establish multiple partnerships, up to their capacity. We show that the core is non-empty and strictly contains the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors that coincides with the set of solutions of the dual q-assignment problem, where q is the total capacity of the middlemen., Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. Funding was provided by Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Grant No. PID2023-150472NBI00/ AEI/10.130339/501100011033), Generalitat de Catalunya (ES) (Grant No. 2021-SGR-00306).
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Maximum and minimum core payoffs for supermodular multisided assignment markets with local monotonicity

  • Martínez De Albeniz, Javier
  • Rafels Pallarola, Carlos
  • Ybern Carballo, María de las Nieves
© 2025 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/)., We give formulas to obtain the maximum and minimum core payoffs for supermodular multisided assignment markets satisfying a local monotonicity condition. These formulas are obtained directly from the multisided array of data and we provide a core allocation where these bounds are attained. Similar formulas are known from Eriksson et al. (2000) for the bilateral Becker’s assortative assignment., Financial support from research grant PID2023-150472NB-I00 (Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades, AEI/FEDER, UE) is gratefully acknowledged, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant 2021 SGR 00306., Peer Reviewed
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Maximum and minimum core payoffs for supermodular multisided assignment markets with local monotonicity

  • Martínez De Albeniz, Javier
  • Rafels Pallarola, Carlos
  • Ybern Carballo, María de las Nieves
© 2025 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/)., We give formulas to obtain the maximum and minimum core payoffs for supermodular multisided assignment markets satisfying a local monotonicity condition. These formulas are obtained directly from the multisided array of data and we provide a core allocation where these bounds are attained. Similar formulas are known from Eriksson et al. (2000) for the bilateral Becker’s assortative assignment., Financial support from research grant PID2023-150472NB-I00 (Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades, AEI/FEDER, UE) is gratefully acknowledged, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant 2021 SGR 00306., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (published version)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Assignment markets with capacitated middlemen: core and competitive equilibria

  • El Obadi, Saadia 
  • Miquel Fernández, Silvia
  • Núñez, Marina
We consider a three-sided market where each buyer-seller pair can attain a profit only if there is a middleman that connects them. This profit does not depend on the identity of the middlemen, and each buyer and seller can take part in at most one partnership while middlemen can establish multiple partnerships, up to their capacity. We show that the core is non-empty and strictly contains the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors that coincides with the set of solutions of the dual q-assignment problem, where q is the total capacity of the middlemen., Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. Funding was provided by Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Grant No. PID2023-150472NBI00/ AEI/10.130339/501100011033), Generalitat de Catalunya (ES) (Grant No. 2021-SGR-00306).