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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 8
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Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

The Few-get-richer: a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Gómez, Vicenç
  • Le Mens, Gaël
Comunicació presentada a: the 2019 World Wide Web Conference (WWW ’19), celebrat a San Francisco, Estat Units d'Amèrica, del 13 al 17 de maig de 2019., Ranking algorithms play a crucial role in online platforms ranging from search engines to recommender systems. In this paper, we identify a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings: the fewer the items reporting a given signal, the higher the share of the overall traffic they collectively attract. This few-get-richer effect emerges in settings where there are few distinct classes of items (e.g., left-leaning news sources versus right-leaning news sources), and items are ranked based on their popularity. We demonstrate analytically that the few-get-richer effect emerges when people tend to click on top-ranked items and have heterogeneous preferences for the classes of items. Using simulations, we analyze how the strength of the effect changes with assumptions about the setting and human behavior.We also test our predictions experimentally in an online experiment with human participants. Our findings have important implications to understand the spread of misinformation., F. Germano acknowledges financial support from Grant ECO2017-89240-P (AEI/FEDER, UE) from the Spanish MINECO. G. Le Mens benefited from financial support from Ramon y Cajal Fellowship RYC-2014-15035 and Grant #AEI/FEDER UE-PSI2016-75353 from the Spanish MINECO, and ERC Consolidator Grant #772268 from the European Commission. V. Gómez is funded by the Ramon y Cajal program RYC-2015-18878 (AEI/MINECO/FSE,UE) and the María de Maeztu Units of Excellence Programme (MDM-2015-0502). The research leading to these results has received funding from “La Caixa" Banking Foundation. Data from the experiment are available at https://osf.io/nwjyf/.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Evaluating categories from experience: the simple averaging heuristic

  • Woiczyk, Thomas Karl Alfred
  • Le Mens, Gaël
Includes experimental data and R scripts used to create the analyses, figures, and tables of the experiments., We analyze how people form evaluative judgments about categories based on their experiences with category members. Prior research suggests that such evaluative judgments depend on some experience average, but is unclear about the specific kind of average. We hypothesized that evaluations of categories could be driven either by the ‘simple average’ of experiences with the category or by the ‘member average’ (the average of the evaluations of the category members, where the evaluation of a category member is the average of experiences with this particular member). Understanding whether evaluations of categories are driven by the ‘simple average’ or the ‘member average’ is important in settings where people obtain unbalanced numbers of observations about category members such as when people form opinions about a social group and predominantly interact with just a few members of this group. Across 9 studies (N=1,966), we consistently found that evaluative judgments about categories were better explained by the simple average than by the member average. We call the underlying cognitive strategy the ‘simple averaging heuristic.’ Collected evidence indicates that participants relied on simple averaging even in settings where normative principles required avoiding the use of this cognitive strategy, leading to systematic mistakes. Our findings contribute to several areas of social cognition such as research on redundancy biases, information aggregation, social sampling, and norm perceptions., G. Le Mens benefited from financial support from grants #AEI/FEDER UE-PSI2016-75353, PID2019-105249GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and RYC-2014-15035 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovacion y Universidades (MCIU) and the Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (AEI), ERC Consolidator Grant #772268 from the European Commission and BBVA Fundation Grant G999088Q. T. Woiczyk benefited from financial support from grant BES-2015-073750 from the Spanish MINECO.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Revisiting the competency trap

  • Denrell, Jerker
  • Le Mens, Gaël
We revisit the competency trap and reexamine when it occurs. We show that a bias against alternatives that improve with practice does not require that learning is myopic in the sense of lacking foresight or failing to explore. The same bias occurs even if learners engage in substantial exploration and have foresight. In fact, we demonstrate that even a rational and foresighted learner, who follow an optimal strategy for balancing exploration and exploitation, will learn to prefer alternatives with initially high payoffs that decrease with practice over alternatives, with identical expected values, that have initially low payoffs that increase with practice. Our results show that a bias against alternatives that improve with practice is due to an asymmetry in error correction rather than to myopic learning. The implication is that a wide range of selection systems, even optimally designed ones, will be biased against late-bloomers., G. Le Mens benefited from financial support from grants \#AEI/FEDER UE-PSI2016-75353 and Ramon y Cajal Fellowship (RYC-2014-15035), from the Spanish MINECO, and ERC Consolidator \#772268 from the European Commission.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An information sampling explanation for the in-group heterogeneity effect

  • Konovalova, Elizaveta
  • Le Mens, Gaël
Includes supplementary material: replication file., People often perceive their in-groups as more heterogeneous than their out-groups. We propose an information sampling explanation for this in-group heterogeneity effect. We note that people frequently obtain larger samples of information about in-groups than about out-groups. Using computer simulations, we show that this asymmetry in sample sizes implies the in-group heterogeneity effect under a wide range of assumptions about how experience affects perceived variability. This is the case even when perceived variability is the outcome of rational information processing, implying that the structure of the environment is sufficient to explain the emergence of the in-group heterogeneity effect. A key assumption of our explanation is that perceived group variability depends on the size of the sample observed about this group. We provide evidence in support for this assumption in two experiments. Our results considerably expand the scope and relevance of a prior sampling explanation proposed by Linville, Fischer, and Salovey (1989). They also complement other explanations that proposed that information about in-groups and out-groups is processed differently., Le Mens benefited from financial support from Southern Denmark University and Grants PSI2013-41909-P, #AEI/FEDER UE-PSI2016-75353, Ramon y Cajal Fellowship (RYC-2014-15035) from the Spanish MINECO, Grant IN[15]_EFG_ECO_2281 from the BBVA Foundation and ERC Consolidator #772268 from the European Commission. E. Konovalova was funded by Spanish MINECO Grant PSI2013-41909-P to G. Le Mens.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Revisiting the competency trap

  • Denrell, Jerker
  • Le Mens, Gaël
We revisit the competency trap and reexamine when it occurs. We show that a bias against alternatives that improve with practice does not require that learning is myopic in the sense of lacking foresight or failing to explore. The same bias occurs even if learners engage in substantial exploration and have foresight. In fact, we demonstrate that even a rational and foresighted learner, who follow an optimal strategy for balancing exploration and exploitation, will learn to prefer alternatives with initially high payoffs that decrease with practice over alternatives, with identical expected values, that have initially low payoffs that increase with practice. Our results show that a bias against alternatives that improve with practice is due to an asymmetry in error correction rather than to myopic learning. The implication is that a wide range of selection systems, even optimally designed ones, will be biased against late-bloomers., G. Le Mens benefited from financial support from grants \#AEI/FEDER UE-PSI2016-75353 and Ramon y Cajal Fellowship (RYC-2014-15035), from the Spanish MINECO, and ERC Consolidator \#772268 from the European Commission.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Evaluating categories from experience: the simple averaging heuristic

  • Woiczyk, Thomas Karl Alfred
  • Le Mens, Gaël
Includes experimental data and R scripts used to create the analyses, figures, and tables of the experiments., We analyze how people form evaluative judgments about categories based on their experiences with category members. Prior research suggests that such evaluative judgments depend on some experience average, but is unclear about the specific kind of average. We hypothesized that evaluations of categories could be driven either by the ‘simple average’ of experiences with the category or by the ‘member average’ (the average of the evaluations of the category members, where the evaluation of a category member is the average of experiences with this particular member). Understanding whether evaluations of categories are driven by the ‘simple average’ or the ‘member average’ is important in settings where people obtain unbalanced numbers of observations about category members such as when people form opinions about a social group and predominantly interact with just a few members of this group. Across 9 studies (N=1,966), we consistently found that evaluative judgments about categories were better explained by the simple average than by the member average. We call the underlying cognitive strategy the ‘simple averaging heuristic.’ Collected evidence indicates that participants relied on simple averaging even in settings where normative principles required avoiding the use of this cognitive strategy, leading to systematic mistakes. Our findings contribute to several areas of social cognition such as research on redundancy biases, information aggregation, social sampling, and norm perceptions., G. Le Mens benefited from financial support from grants #AEI/FEDER UE-PSI2016-75353, PID2019-105249GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and RYC-2014-15035 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovacion y Universidades (MCIU) and the Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (AEI), ERC Consolidator Grant #772268 from the European Commission and BBVA Fundation Grant G999088Q. T. Woiczyk benefited from financial support from grant BES-2015-073750 from the Spanish MINECO.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

The Few-get-richer: a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Gómez, Vicenç
  • Le Mens, Gaël
Comunicació presentada a: the 2019 World Wide Web Conference (WWW ’19), celebrat a San Francisco, Estat Units d'Amèrica, del 13 al 17 de maig de 2019., Ranking algorithms play a crucial role in online platforms ranging from search engines to recommender systems. In this paper, we identify a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings: the fewer the items reporting a given signal, the higher the share of the overall traffic they collectively attract. This few-get-richer effect emerges in settings where there are few distinct classes of items (e.g., left-leaning news sources versus right-leaning news sources), and items are ranked based on their popularity. We demonstrate analytically that the few-get-richer effect emerges when people tend to click on top-ranked items and have heterogeneous preferences for the classes of items. Using simulations, we analyze how the strength of the effect changes with assumptions about the setting and human behavior.We also test our predictions experimentally in an online experiment with human participants. Our findings have important implications to understand the spread of misinformation., F. Germano acknowledges financial support from Grant ECO2017-89240-P (AEI/FEDER, UE) from the Spanish MINECO. G. Le Mens benefited from financial support from Ramon y Cajal Fellowship RYC-2014-15035 and Grant #AEI/FEDER UE-PSI2016-75353 from the Spanish MINECO, and ERC Consolidator Grant #772268 from the European Commission. V. Gómez is funded by the Ramon y Cajal program RYC-2015-18878 (AEI/MINECO/FSE,UE) and the María de Maeztu Units of Excellence Programme (MDM-2015-0502). The research leading to these results has received funding from “La Caixa" Banking Foundation. Data from the experiment are available at https://osf.io/nwjyf/.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An information sampling explanation for the in-group heterogeneity effect

  • Konovalova, Elizaveta
  • Le Mens, Gaël
Includes supplementary material: replication file., People often perceive their in-groups as more heterogeneous than their out-groups. We propose an information sampling explanation for this in-group heterogeneity effect. We note that people frequently obtain larger samples of information about in-groups than about out-groups. Using computer simulations, we show that this asymmetry in sample sizes implies the in-group heterogeneity effect under a wide range of assumptions about how experience affects perceived variability. This is the case even when perceived variability is the outcome of rational information processing, implying that the structure of the environment is sufficient to explain the emergence of the in-group heterogeneity effect. A key assumption of our explanation is that perceived group variability depends on the size of the sample observed about this group. We provide evidence in support for this assumption in two experiments. Our results considerably expand the scope and relevance of a prior sampling explanation proposed by Linville, Fischer, and Salovey (1989). They also complement other explanations that proposed that information about in-groups and out-groups is processed differently., Le Mens benefited from financial support from Southern Denmark University and Grants PSI2013-41909-P, #AEI/FEDER UE-PSI2016-75353, Ramon y Cajal Fellowship (RYC-2014-15035) from the Spanish MINECO, Grant IN[15]_EFG_ECO_2281 from the BBVA Foundation and ERC Consolidator #772268 from the European Commission. E. Konovalova was funded by Spanish MINECO Grant PSI2013-41909-P to G. Le Mens.