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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The responsiveness of entrepreneurs to working time regulations

  • Frank H Stephen
  • Urbano, David|||0000-0001-7600-8656
  • Hemmen, Stefan Félix van|||0000-0003-1452-166X
In this article, we analyse the impact of enforcement practices (proxied by judicial formalism) and the regulation of working time on entrepreneurial activity by opportunity. We find that higher enforcement formalism mitigates the negative impact exerted by rigid working time regulations on the number of entrepreneurs. While it is agreed that regulatory rigidities may increase labour transaction costs, we show that entrepreneurs are less sensitive to labour regulations the higher the level of enforcement formalism in which they operate. Higher formalism is associated with lower enforcing efficiency and lower probability of being punished for transgressing laws. A policy implication is that encouraging labour flexibility might not improve conditions for entrepreneurial activity in procedurally formalist countries. This is due to the fact that, in those countries, flexibility de facto characterises employment relations, no matter what the law says.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Debt, diversification and earnings management

  • Rodríguez Pérez, Gonzalo|||0000-0003-2348-7029
  • Hemmen, Stefan Félix van|||0000-0003-1452-166X
In this article we use panel-estimation techniques to calculate discretionary accruals (DAC) and to produce a better understanding of the nature of the relation between debt and earnings management Consistent with the transparency hypothesis (which suggests that diversification increases the complexity of firms' activities and reduces their transparency to outsiders), we find that for less-diversified (more transparent) firms, debt reduces positive discretionary accruals, whereas in relatively more-diversified (less transparent) firms the impact of debt becomes positive Our paper shows that marginal increases in debt provide the incentives for managers to manipulate earnings, and diversification provides the needed context for this accounting practice to be possible. We have also found that only in the sub-sample of aggressive firms, those that manage discretionary accruals with enough magnitude to increase income, do lenders exert their control Some firms, however. take advantage of diversification to avoid this control Out findings are robust to several earnings-management measures and methodologies.