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e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Strong shareholders, weak outside investors

  • Gutiérrez, María
  • Sáez Lacave, María Isabel
We consider the corporate governance challenge of protecting outside investors in listed, controlled firms. We argue that outside investors in European listed firms with controlling shareholders are poorly protected compared to US investors because the distinct European approach to the protection of investors, based on empowering active shareholders rather than shielding passive investors, is not well suited for controlled, listed firms. This approach translates into a lack of definition and development of specific fiduciary duties of the controlling shareholders towards market investors. Moreover, European jurisdictions have developed strong voice rights for active shareholders, which tend to play in favour of controlling shareholders and organised minorities but are not effective for protecting passive investors and limit their exit options. This explains why shareholder protection in European jurisdictions can be considered high, while outside investors’ protection can be considered low at the same time, generating a ‘strong shareholders, weak outside investors’ problem., María Gutiérrez acknowledges financial support from FEDER [UNC315-EE-3636], MINECO/FEDER [ECO2015-68715-R] and MINECO [ECO2012-36559]. Maribel Sáez Lacave acknowledges financial support from MINECO [DER 2014-55416-P].
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Prudential supervisors&apos, independence and income smoothing in European banks

  • García Osma, Beatriz
  • Mora, Araceli
  • Porcuna-Enguix, Luis|||0000-0002-2992-2602
[EN] We investigate the role of prudential supervisors' independence in affecting income smoothing behavior in European banks. Powerful national supervisors are predicted to influence the accounting practices of their supervised entities, shaping the properties of the accounting numbers they prepare. In particular, we study whether greater independence of powerful supervisors from the government and from the industry is associated with lower income smoothing. We use the mandatory adoption of a single set of accounting standards in Europe as a shock to the influence of prudential supervisors over national banks' accounting practice. Our results confirm that political and industry independence of the supervisor are important determinants of income smoothing. This suggests that independence of prudential supervisors is a desirable governance characteristic, with positive impacts on financial transparency., This paper received financial support from the "Conselleria de Educacio, Cultura i Esport" from Generalitat Valenciana, under project VALi+d (Resolucion 26 de junio de 2014), CAM-Fondo Social Europeo (S2015/HUM-3417 INNCOMCON-CM), FEDER (UNC315-EE-3636), and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2013-48328; ECO2013-48208-P; ECO2016-77579).