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e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The interactions of social norms about climate change: Science, institutions and economics

  • Cabrales Goitia, Antonio
  • García, Manuel
  • Ramos Muñoz, David
  • Sánchez, Angel
We study the evolution of interest in climate change among different actors within the population and how the interest of these actors affects one another. Our first contribution is to measure interest among the general public, the European Parliament, central banks, general interest science journals, and economics journals by creating a Climate Change Index (CCI) based on mentions of climate change in these domains. We also provide a game-theoretic network model of cross-influences between the actors in the economy. The model gives a prediction of the interactions between sectors related to the mutual interests embedded in the model parameters. We then estimate these parameters using a Vector Autoregression (VAR). The main results are that except for general interest science journals, the index for all other domains has started showing significant values only recently, and it tends to fluctuate considerably over time. In terms of influence, the European Parliament and the media affect one another, but the trend in science remains relatively independent of the others., We gratefully acknowledge the financial help of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 891124, and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through María de Maeztu Programme, Spain CEX2021-001181-M, as well as PID2021-126892NB-I00. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Trustors' disregard for trustees deciding quickly or slowly in three experiments with time constraints

  • Cabrales Goitia, Antonio
  • Espin, Antonio M.
  • Kujal, Praveen
  • Rassenti, Stephen
Many decisions in the economic and social domain are made under time constraints, be it under time pressure or forced delay. Requiring individuals to decide quickly or slowly often elicit different responses. Time pressure has been associated with inefficiency in market settings and market regulation often requires individuals to delay their decisions via cooling-off periods. Yet, recent research suggests that people who make reflective decisions are met with distrust. If this extends to external time constraints, then forcing individuals to delay their decisions may be counterproductive in scenarios where trust considerations are important, such as in market and organizational design. In three Trust Game experiments (total number of participants = 1872), including within- and between-subjects designs, we test whether individuals trust (more) someone who is forced to respond quickly (intuitively) or slowly (reflectively). We find that trustors do not adjust their behavior (or their beliefs) to the trustee's time conditions. This seems to be an appropriate response because time constraints do not affect trustees' behavior, at least when the game decisions are binary (trust vs. don't trust; reciprocate vs. don't reciprocate) and therefore mistakes cannot explain choices. Thus, delayed decisions per se do not seem to elicit distrust., Kujal acknowledges the financial support of ESI for the experiments. Thanks are due to Alex Bueno and Jeff Kirchner for programming, and to Jeff Kirchner and Megan Lutje for running the Study 1 experiments. Cabrales acknowledges support from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program, Marie Sklodowska Curie Individual Fellowship No. 891124. Espín acknowledges support from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 754446 and UGR Research and Knowledge Transfer Fund-Athenea3i.
Digibug. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Granada
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Trustors’ disregard for trustees deciding quickly or slowly in three experiments with time constraints

  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Espín Martín, Antonio Manuel|||0000-0003-2670-3495
Many decisions in the economic and social domain are made under time constraints, be it under time pressure or forced delay. Requiring individuals to decide quickly or slowly often elicit different responses. Time pressure has been associated with inefficiency in market settings and market regulation often requires individuals to delay their decisions via cooling-off periods. Yet, recent research suggests that people who make reflective decisions are met with distrust. If this extends to external time constraints, then forcing individuals to delay their decisions may be counterproductive in scenarios where trust considerations are important, such as in market and organizational design. In three Trust Game experiments (total number of participants = 1872), including within- and betweensubjects designs, we test whether individuals trust (more) someone who is forced to respond quickly (intuitively) or slowly (reflectively). We find that trustors do not adjust their behavior (or their beliefs) to the trustee’s time conditions. This seems to be an appropriate response because time constraints do not affect trustees’ behavior, at least when the game decisions are binary (trust vs. don’t trust; reciprocate vs. don’t reciprocate) and therefore mistakes cannot explain choices. Thus, delayed decisions per se do not seem to elicit distrust., European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program-Marie Sklodowska Curie Individual Fellowship 891124, European Commission 754446, UGR Research and Knowledge Transfer Fund-Athenea3i, ESI