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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 7
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e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Network formation and heterogeneous risks

  • Cabrales Goitia, Antonio
  • Gottardi, Piero
We gratefully acknowledge the financial help of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 891124
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Norms and the evolution of leaders' followership

  • Cabrales Goitia, Antonio
  • Hauk, Esther
In this paper we model the interaction between leaders, their followers and crowd followers in a coordination game with local interaction. The steady states of a dynamic best-response process can feature a coexistence of Pareto dominant and risk dominant actions in the population. The existence of leaders and their followers, plus the local interaction, which leads to clustering, is crucial for the survival of the Pareto dominant actions. The evolution of leader and crowd followership shows that leader followership can also be locally stable around Pareto dominant leaders. The paper answers the questions (i) which Leader should be removed and (ii) how to optimally place leaders in the network to enhance payoff dominant play., Esther Hauk acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación through research project PID2021-126200NB-I00. Antonio Cabrales acknowledges the financial help of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 891124. We are also grateful for the comments of seminar audiences at NEAT (Padova/Venice) and the Barcelona BSE forum
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The interactions of social norms about climate change: Science, institutions and economics

  • Cabrales Goitia, Antonio
  • García, Manuel
  • Ramos Muñoz, David
  • Sánchez, Angel
We study the evolution of interest in climate change among different actors within the population and how the interest of these actors affects one another. Our first contribution is to measure interest among the general public, the European Parliament, central banks, general interest science journals, and economics journals by creating a Climate Change Index (CCI) based on mentions of climate change in these domains. We also provide a game-theoretic network model of cross-influences between the actors in the economy. The model gives a prediction of the interactions between sectors related to the mutual interests embedded in the model parameters. We then estimate these parameters using a Vector Autoregression (VAR). The main results are that except for general interest science journals, the index for all other domains has started showing significant values only recently, and it tends to fluctuate considerably over time. In terms of influence, the European Parliament and the media affect one another, but the trend in science remains relatively independent of the others., We gratefully acknowledge the financial help of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 891124, and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through María de Maeztu Programme, Spain CEX2021-001181-M, as well as PID2021-126892NB-I00. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

The interactions of social norms about climate change: science, institutions and Economics

  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • García, Manu
  • Ramos Muñoz, David
  • Sánchez, Angel
We study the evolution of interest about climate change between different actors of the population, and how the interest of those actors affect one another. We rst document the evolution individually, and then provide a model of cross influences between them, that we then estimate with a VAR. We nd large swings over time of said interest for the general public by creating a Climate Change Index for Europe and the US (CCI) using news media mentions, and little interest among economists (measured by publications in top journals of the discipline). The general interest science journals and policymakers have a more steady interest, although policymakers get interested much later., We gratefully acknowledge the financial help of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 891124
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Trustors' disregard for trustees deciding quickly or slowly in three experiments with time constraints

  • Cabrales Goitia, Antonio
  • Espin, Antonio M.
  • Kujal, Praveen
  • Rassenti, Stephen
Many decisions in the economic and social domain are made under time constraints, be it under time pressure or forced delay. Requiring individuals to decide quickly or slowly often elicit different responses. Time pressure has been associated with inefficiency in market settings and market regulation often requires individuals to delay their decisions via cooling-off periods. Yet, recent research suggests that people who make reflective decisions are met with distrust. If this extends to external time constraints, then forcing individuals to delay their decisions may be counterproductive in scenarios where trust considerations are important, such as in market and organizational design. In three Trust Game experiments (total number of participants = 1872), including within- and between-subjects designs, we test whether individuals trust (more) someone who is forced to respond quickly (intuitively) or slowly (reflectively). We find that trustors do not adjust their behavior (or their beliefs) to the trustee's time conditions. This seems to be an appropriate response because time constraints do not affect trustees' behavior, at least when the game decisions are binary (trust vs. don't trust; reciprocate vs. don't reciprocate) and therefore mistakes cannot explain choices. Thus, delayed decisions per se do not seem to elicit distrust., Kujal acknowledges the financial support of ESI for the experiments. Thanks are due to Alex Bueno and Jeff Kirchner for programming, and to Jeff Kirchner and Megan Lutje for running the Study 1 experiments. Cabrales acknowledges support from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program, Marie Sklodowska Curie Individual Fellowship No. 891124. Espín acknowledges support from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 754446 and UGR Research and Knowledge Transfer Fund-Athenea3i.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

The effect of ambiguity in strategic environments: an experiment

  • Brañas Garza, Pablo
  • Cabrales Goitia, Antonio
  • Espinosa, M. A.
  • Jorrat, D.
We experimentally study a game in which success requires a sufficient total contribution by members of a group. There are significant uncertainties surrounding the chance and the total effort required for success. A theoretical model with max-min preferences towards ambiguity predicts higher contributions under ambiguity than under risk. However, in a large representative sample of the Spanish population (1,500 participants) we find that the ATE of ambiguity on contributions is zero. The main significant interaction with the personal characteristics of the participants is with risk attitudes, and it increases contributions. This suggests that policymakers concerned with ambiguous problems (like climate change) do not need to worry excessively about ambiguity, We gratefully acknowledge the financial help of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agree- ment No 891124; MINECO-FEDER (PID2021-126892NB-I00, PID2019-108718GB-I00); Basque Government IT1461-22
Digibug. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Granada
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Trustors’ disregard for trustees deciding quickly or slowly in three experiments with time constraints

  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Espín Martín, Antonio Manuel|||0000-0003-2670-3495
Many decisions in the economic and social domain are made under time constraints, be it under time pressure or forced delay. Requiring individuals to decide quickly or slowly often elicit different responses. Time pressure has been associated with inefficiency in market settings and market regulation often requires individuals to delay their decisions via cooling-off periods. Yet, recent research suggests that people who make reflective decisions are met with distrust. If this extends to external time constraints, then forcing individuals to delay their decisions may be counterproductive in scenarios where trust considerations are important, such as in market and organizational design. In three Trust Game experiments (total number of participants = 1872), including within- and betweensubjects designs, we test whether individuals trust (more) someone who is forced to respond quickly (intuitively) or slowly (reflectively). We find that trustors do not adjust their behavior (or their beliefs) to the trustee’s time conditions. This seems to be an appropriate response because time constraints do not affect trustees’ behavior, at least when the game decisions are binary (trust vs. don’t trust; reciprocate vs. don’t reciprocate) and therefore mistakes cannot explain choices. Thus, delayed decisions per se do not seem to elicit distrust., European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program-Marie Sklodowska Curie Individual Fellowship 891124, European Commission 754446, UGR Research and Knowledge Transfer Fund-Athenea3i, ESI