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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. The two rules are in addition envy-free, but they differ on wether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (i) the constrained equal losses rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies justified envy-freeness on losses and (ii) the constrained equal awards rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies envy-freeness on awards.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Robust design in monotonic matching markets, a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance

  • Ehlers, Lars|||0000-0002-9521-9931
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly as for instance, for hospitals this means not being able to provide full service to its patients. A huge literature has advocated the use of stable mechanisms for clearinghouses. The interests among workers and firms are polarized among stable mechanisms, most famously the firm-proposing DA and the worker-proposing DA. We show that for the firmproposing DA ex-ante incentive compatibility and ex-post incentive compatibility are equivalent whereas this is not necessarily true for the worker-proposing DA. The firm-proposing DA turns out to be more robust than the worker-proposing DA under incomplete information when incentives of both sides of the market are important.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Ordinal relative satisficing behavior, theory and experiments

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Neme, Alejandro
We propose a notion of r-rationality, a relative version of satisficing behavior based on the idea that, for any set of available alternatives, individuals choose one of their r-best according to a single preference. We fully characterize the choice functions satisfying the condition for any r, and provide an algorithm to compute the maximal degree of r-rationality associated with any given choice function. The notion is extended to individuals whose r may vary with the set of available alternatives. We provide experimental evidence that the predictive power of our theory, measured by Seltenís index, improves upon that of alternative ones.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Immunity to credible deviations from the truth

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
We study a notion of non-manipulability by groups, based on the idea that only some agreements among potential manipulators may be credible. The derived notion of immunity to credible manipulations by groups is intermediate between individual and group strategy-proofness. Our main non-recursive definition turns out to be equivalent, in our context, to the requirement that truthful preference revelation should be a strong coalition-proof equilibrium, as recursively defined by Peleg and Sudhölter (1998, 1999). We provide characterizations of strategy-proof rules separating those that satisfy it from those that do not for a large family of public good decision problems.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Arrow on domain conditions, a fruitful road to travel

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
We stress the importance that Arrow attached to studying the role of domain conditions in determining the validity of his impossibility theorem, a subject to which he devoted two chapters of Social Choice and Individual Values. Then we partially survey recent results about the role of domain conditions on the possibility to design satisfactory aggregation rules and social choice functions, as a proof of the continued vitality of this subject, that he pioneered, as he did with so many others.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness

  • Chatterji, Shurojit
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference pro les. We show that if the social choice function satis es in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the social choice function an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the notion of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be de ned. We also provide a converse of this main nding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof social choice functions are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains.