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DISEÑO DE REGLAS DE REPARTO Y MEDICION DE LAS DESIGUALDADES LABORALES

ECO2014-52616-R

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Funding agency acronym MINECO
Program Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Call Proyectos I+D+i Retos de Investigación
Call year 2014
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Management unit Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD DE VIGO

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 18
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

The shapley rule for loss allocation in energy transmission networks

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo
  • González Díaz, Julio
  • González Rueda, Ángel Manuel
We consider the problem of loss allocation in energy transmission networks. We introduce the Shapley rule defined as the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game. We study the properties satisfied by the Shapley rule. We compare this rule, in terms of the principles mentioned in the EU regulations, with the rules studied in [1]. Finally we apply this rule to the Spanish gas transmission network and carry out a simulation analysis to explore new connections between the different allocation rules.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Loss allocation in energy transmission networks

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo
  • González Díaz, Julio
  • González Rueda, Ángel Manuel
  • Fernández de Córdoba, María P.
In this paper we study a cost allocation problem that is inherent to most energy networks: the allocation of losses. In particular, we study how to allocate gas losses between haulers in gas transmission networks. We discuss four allocation rules, two of them have already been in place in real networks and two others that are defined for the first time in this paper. We then present a comparative analysis of the different rules by studying their behavior with respect to a set of principles set forth by the European Union. This analysis also includes axiomatic characterizations of two of the rules. Finally, as an illustration, we apply them to the Spanish gas transmission network.
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mixed rules in multi-issue allocation situations

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Chamorro Rivas, Jose María
  • Lorenzo Picado, Leticia
  • Lorenzo Freire, Silvia Maria
Multi-issue allocation situations study problems where an estate must be dividedamong a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amountclaimed by each agent on each issue. We present a two-stage rule. First, we dividethe estate among the issues following the constrained equal awards rule. Second,the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents in proportion to theirdemands on this issue. We apply the rule to two real-world problems: the distributionof natural resources between countries and the distribution of budget for educationand research between universities., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, Xunta de Galicia| Ref. ED431G/01 2016-2019, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C2016-015, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014, Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia | Ref. 19320/PI/14
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Lorenzo Picado, Leticia
A planner wants to carry out a project involving several firms. In many cases the planner, for instance the Spanish Administration, includes in the contract a penalty clause that imposes a payment per day if the firms do not complete their activities or the project on time. We discuss two ways of including such penalty clauses in contracts. In the first the penalty applies only when the whole project is delayed. In the second the penalty applies to each firm that incurs a delay even if the project is completed on time. We compare the two penalty systems and find that the optimal penalty (for the planner) is larger in the second method, the utility of the planner is always at least as large or larger in the second case, and the utility of the firms is always at least as large or larger in the first. Surprisingly, the final delay in the project is unrelated to which penalty system is chosen., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. GRC 2015/014, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. 19320/PI/14, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia | Ref. 19320/PI/14
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

River flooding risk prevention: A cooperative game theory approach

  • Álvarez Bermúdez, Xana
  • Gómez Rúa, María
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
Socio-economic development combined with changing hydrological factors represents a challenge for extending flood protection. In particular, land owners should be encouraged to use their land in a way that improves its water retention capacity. However, problems of fairness may arise because a landowner can benefit or lose out depending on the use of other lands. This paper sets out to study the possibility of applying game theory through a cooperative game to solve this problem. Specifically, we look for a sharing rule function to help the planners to distribute the total benefit among landowners, taking into account a principle of stability. We concentrate on enhancing upstream water retention and focus on the role played by forests as natural water retention features. This is a methodological contribution that analyzes land use management for flood retention. Land planners, governments and landowners could use cooperative games as a flood risk management tool. With this method, compensations and benefits could be established to raise awareness and encourage land owners to cooperate., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Ministerio de Economia, Industria y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. 2015/014, CA16209 - Natural Flood Retention on Private Land | Ref. LAND4FLOOD
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Comments on: Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications

Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Assessing the moisture transports associated with nocturnal low-level jets in continental South America

  • Braz, Dejanira Ferreira
  • Ambrizzi, Tércio
  • Da Rocha, Rosmeri Porfírio
  • Algarra Cajide, Iago
  • Nieto Muñiz, Raquel Olalla
  • Gimeno Presa, Luis
Given the crucial role of low-level circulation in convective events, this study presents a climatological characterization of the moisture sources and sinks associated with the occurrence of nocturnal low-level jets (NLLJs) in South America. Six selected NLLJ cores are identified according to the jet index that considers a vertical wind speed shear of the lower troposphere at 00:00 local time (LT). The Lagrangian FLEXible PARTicle (FLEXPART) model was used to provide the outputs for tracking atmospheric air masses to determine the moisture sources and sinks for the NLLJ cores (Argentina, Venezuela, and the regions of Brazil: south—Brazil-S, southeast—Brazil-SE, north—Brazil-N, and northeast—Brazil-NE). The analysis is based on 37 years (1980–2016) of the ERA-Interim reanalysis. We found that the NLLJ index is stronger in the warm periods of a year (austral spring and summer) for the six selected regions. The NLLJ frequency is also higher in the warm months of the year, except in Brazil-NE where it is very frequent in all months. In Brazil-NE, the NLLJ also persists for 8 or more days, while the other NLLJs frequently persist for 1–2 days. The NLLJs occupy a broad low-level layer (from 1000 to 700 hPa) and exhibit a mean speed between 7 and 12 ms–1, which peaks mostly at 900 hPa. The moisture transport for each NLLJ shows that in addition to the intense local moisture sources, the NLLJs in Argentina and Brazil-S receive moisture from the tropical-subtropical South Atlantic Ocean and the Amazon basin, while the tropical-subtropical South Atlantic Ocean is the main moisture source for the NLLJ in Brazil-SE. Both moisture sources and sinks are stronger in the austral summer and fall. The NLLJ in Brazil receives moisture from the tropical South Atlantic (TSA) Ocean, which has weak seasonality. The moisture sources for the NLLJs in Brazil-N and Venezuela come from the tropical North Atlantic (TNA) Ocean in the austral summer and fall, while the TSA Ocean appears as an additional moisture source in the austral winter. This research contributes to improving our understanding of the NLLJs and their role in transporting moisture and controlling precipitation over the continent according to the seasons of a year, helping to improve seasonal climate forecasting., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. RTI2018-095772-B-I00, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. CGL2015-65141-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2017/64
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Navarro Ramos, Adriana
We consider minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources. We propose a cost allocation rule based on a painting procedure. Agents paint the edges on the paths connecting them to the sources. We prove that the painting rule coincides with the folk rule., Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (Mexico) | Ref. 438366, Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia | Ref. 19320/PI/14, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

One-way and two-way cost allocation in hub network problems

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
We consider a cost allocation problem arising from a hub network problem design. Finding an optimal hub network is NP-hard, so we start with a hub network that could be optimal or not. Our main objective is to divide the maintenance and/or building cost of such network among the nodes. We consider two cases. In the one-way flow case, we assume that the cost paid by a set of nodes depends only on the flow they send to other nodes (including nodes outside the set), but not on the flow they receive from nodes outside. In the two-way flow case, we assume that the cost paid by a set of nodes depends on the flow they send to other nodes (including nodes outside the set) and also on the flow they receive from nodes outside. In both cases, we study the core and the Shapley value of the corresponding cost game., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value

  • Trudeau, Christian
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
We introduce a new family of cooperative games for which there is coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value. These so-called clique games are such that agents are divided into cliques, with the value created by a coalition linearly increasing with the number of agents belonging to the same clique. Agents can belong to multiple cliques, but for a pair of cliques, at most a single agent belongs to their intersection. Finally, if two agents do not belong to the same clique, there is at most one way to link the two agents through a chain of agents, with any two non-adjacent agents in the chain belonging to disjoint sets of cliques. We examine multiple games defined on graphs that provide a fertile ground for applications of our results., Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada | Ref. 435-2014-0140, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

  • Valencia Toledo, Alfredo
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors. The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution, as a short-cut to solving non-cooperative bargaining games. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors’ merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price., Ministry of Education of Peru | Ref. PRONABEC, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems

  • Valencia Toledo, Alfredo
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
We consider land rental problems where there are several communities that can act as lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary need all the available land. A rule should determine which communities become lessors, how much land they rent and at which price. We present a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy reassignment-proofness by merging and spliting, apart from land monotonicity. We also define two parametric subfamilies. The first one is characterized by adding a property of weighted standard for two-person. The second one is characterized by adding consistency and continuity, Ministerio de Educación, Gobierno de Perú | Ref. 2013-III, Beca Presidente de la República, PRONABEC, Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Uncertainty in cooperative interval games: how Hurwicz criterion compatibility leads to egalitarianism

  • Mallozzi, Lina
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
We study cooperative interval games. These are cooperative games where the value of a coalition is given by a closed real interval specifying a lower bound and an upper bound of the possible outcome. For interval cooperative games, several (interval) solution concepts have been introduced in the literature. We assume that each player has a different attitude towards uncertainty by means of the so-called Hurwicz coefficients. These coefficients specify the degree of optimism that each player has so that an interval becomes a specific payoff. We show that a classical cooperative game arises when applying the Hurwicz criterion to each interval game. On the other hand, the same Hurwicz criterion can also be applied to any interval solution of the interval cooperative game. Given this, we say that a solution concept is Hurwicz compatible if the two procedures provide the same final payoff allocation. When such compatibility is possible, we characterize the class of compatible solutions, which reduces to the egalitarian solution when symmetry is required. The Shapley value and the core solution cases are also discussed., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships, Strategy-proofness

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships, Internal Stability and Consistency

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. The two rules are in addition envy-free, but they differ on wether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (i) the constrained equal losses rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies justified envy-freeness on losses and (ii) the constrained equal awards rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies envy-freeness on awards.
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility

  • Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
  • Gómez Rúa, María
  • Molis Bañales, Elena
We consider the problem of cleaning a transboundary river, proposed by Ni and Wang (Games Econ Behav 60:176–186, 2007). A river is modeled as a segment divided into subsegments, each occupied by one region, from upstream to downstream. The waste is transferred from one region to the next at some rate. Since this transfer rate may be unknown, the social planner could have uncertainty over each region’s responsibility. Two natural candidates to distribute the costs in this setting would be the method that assigns to each region its expected responsibility and the one that assigns to each region its median responsibility. We show that the latter is equivalent to the Upstream Responsibility method (Alcalde-Unzu et al. in Games Econ Behav 90:134–150, 2015) and the former is a new method that we call Expected Responsibility. We compare both solutions and analyze them in terms of a new property of monotonicity., Jorge Alcalde-Unzu acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through projects PGC2018-093542-B-I00 and ECO2017-91589-EXP. María Gómez-Rúa acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through projects ECO2014-52616-R and ECO2017-82241-R and the Galician Government through projects GRC 2015/014 and ED431B 2019/34. Elena Molis acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through projects ECO2015-67519-P and PID2019-110783GB-I00, the Basque Government through project IT-568-13 and the Andalusian Government through the projects SEJ1436 and SEJ492.