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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 8
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identifed by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, e¢ cient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy- proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satis es the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satis es the increasing intersection property we de ne an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

A model of protests, revolution, and information

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Jackson, Matthew O.
A collective action or revolt succeeds only if sufficiently many people participate. We study how potential revolutionaries' ability to coordinate is affected by what they learn from different sources. We first examine how people learn about the likelihood of a revolution's success by talking to those around themselves, which can either work in favor or against the success of an uprising, depending on the prior beliefs of the agents, the homogeneity of preferences in the population, and the number of contacts. We extend the analysis by examining the effects of homophily on learning: people are more likely to meet others who have similar preferences, undercutting learning. We introduce variants of our model to discuss other ways of learning about the support for a revolution. We discuss why holding mass protests before a revolt provides more informative signals of people's willingness to actively participate than other less costly forms of communication (e.g., via social media). We also show how outcomes of revolutions in one region can inform citizens of another region and thus trigger (or discourage) neighboring revolutions. We also discuss the role of governments in avoiding revolutions and learning about their citizens' concerns; in particular, by observing the strength of protests and counter-protests.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

'Information doesn't want to be free', informational shocks with anonymous online platforms

  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
Anonymous information platforms (e.g. Airbnb) provide information about experience goods while keeping agents' identity hidden until the transaction is completed. In doing so, they generate heterogeneity in the information levels across consumers. In this paper, I show that such platforms induce a weak increase of fine prices and that only low-valuation goods are cheaper online than offline. Platforms always lead to an increase in profits. In terms of consumer welfare, the platform equilibrium is Pareto superior for low-and high-valuation goods, while for intermediate ranges some buyers benefit while others lose from the presence of the platform.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Does the winner take it all?, redistributive policies and political extremism

  • Daniele, Gianmarco
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Sas, Willem
The impact of federal policies often depends on fixed regional differences (economic, historical, geographical). Certain regions can therefore be seen as permanently benefiting from the federation and others as losing. We show that this distorts voting behaviour in two ways. First, voters strategically elect federal representatives that are extremely protective of regional interests. Second, they suboptimally invest in locally funded goods. This distortion is U-shaped in expected federal benefits. Lastly, we do not observe the usual race to be included in the federal coalition, which would reduce the distortion. We test these predictions on national and European Parliamentary elections since 1990, and find that extreme voting is indeed U-shaped: winning and losing states distort more than those in the middle. We conclude that federal political structures foment political polarisation, especially when federal decisions require large consensus. Loosening the ties between representatives and their constituency may mitigate this problem.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

  • Bonifacio, Agustín G.
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods economy

  • Chatterji, Shurojit
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.