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The impact of Information on Political Institutions and Markets

RYC-2016-19371

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de Promoción del Talento y su Empleabilidad en I+D+i
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Incorporación
Call Ramón y Cajal
Call year 2016
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 8
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Financing public education when agents have retirement concerns

  • Montolio, Daniel|||0000-0002-6751-6701
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Salvadori, Luca|||0000-0001-7610-439X
We study, theoretically and empirically, the link between voters' support for public education and pensions. We show that the (inter-generational) redistributive component of the retirement system creates a link between current spending on education and future pensions. Specifically, investments in education increase the young's productivity and, hence, future tax proceeds that will finance the current workers' pension. Consequently, the support for publicly financed education grows together with the generosity and degree of redistribution of the retirement system. The empirical analysis uses repeated cross-country surveys to confirm the model predictions.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Financing public education when agents have retirement concerns

  • Montolio, Daniel|||0000-0002-6751-6701
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Salvadori, Luca|||0000-0001-7610-439X
We study, theoretically and empirically, the link between voters' support for public education and pensions. We show that the (inter-generational) redistributive component of the retirement system creates a link between current spending on education and future pensions. Specifically, investments in education increase the young's productivity and, hence, future tax proceeds that will finance the current workers' pension. Consequently, the support for publicly financed education grows together with the generosity and degree of redistribution of the retirement system. The empirical analysis uses repeated cross-country surveys to confirm the model predictions.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Experience of the COVID-19 pandemic and support for safety-net expansion

  • Salvadori, Luca|||0000-0001-7610-439X
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Rees-Jones, Alex
  • D'Attoma, John
Did individuals' experiences with the harms of the COVID-19 pandemic influence their attitudes towards safety-net programs? To assess this question, we combine rich information about county-level impacts and individual-level perceptions of the early pandemic, repeated measurements of attitudes towards safety-net expansion, and pre-pandemic measurements of related political attitudes. Individuals facing higher county-level impact or greater perceived risks are more likely to support long-term expansions to unemployment insurance and government-provided healthcare when surveyed in June 2020. These differences persist across time, with experiences in the early months of the pandemic remaining strongly predictive of attitudes towards safety-net expansion in early 2021.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Drought-Reliefs and Partisanship

  • Boffa, Federico
  • Cavalcanti, Francisco
  • Fons-Rosen, Christian
  • Piolatto, Amedeo.|||0000-0002-3571-8069
We combine a model of symmetric information with selfish and office-motivated politicians and an Regression Discontinuity Design analysis based on close municipal elections to study partisan bias in the allocation of drought aid relief in Brazil. We identify a novel pattern of distributive politics whereby partisan bias materializes only before municipal elections, while it disappears before presidential elections. Furthermore, before mayoral elections, it fades for extreme (high or low) aridity levels while persisting for moderate levels. Our empirical results show that in this case alignment increases the probability of receiving aid relief by a factor of two (equivalent to 18.1 percentage points).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

'Information doesn't want to be free', informational shocks with anonymous online platforms

  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
Anonymous information platforms (e.g. Airbnb) provide information about experience goods while keeping agents' identity hidden until the transaction is completed. In doing so, they generate heterogeneity in the information levels across consumers. In this paper, I show that such platforms induce a weak increase of fine prices and that only low-valuation goods are cheaper online than offline. Platforms always lead to an increase in profits. In terms of consumer welfare, the platform equilibrium is Pareto superior for low-and high-valuation goods, while for intermediate ranges some buyers benefit while others lose from the presence of the platform.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Does the winner take it all?, redistributive policies and political extremism

  • Daniele, Gianmarco
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Sas, Willem
The impact of federal policies often depends on fixed regional differences (economic, historical, geographical). Certain regions can therefore be seen as permanently benefiting from the federation and others as losing. We show that this distorts voting behaviour in two ways. First, voters strategically elect federal representatives that are extremely protective of regional interests. Second, they suboptimally invest in locally funded goods. This distortion is U-shaped in expected federal benefits. Lastly, we do not observe the usual race to be included in the federal coalition, which would reduce the distortion. We test these predictions on national and European Parliamentary elections since 1990, and find that extreme voting is indeed U-shaped: winning and losing states distort more than those in the middle. We conclude that federal political structures foment political polarisation, especially when federal decisions require large consensus. Loosening the ties between representatives and their constituency may mitigate this problem.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Drought-reliefs and partisanship

  • Boffa, Federico
  • Cavalcanti, Francisco
  • Fons-Rosen, Christian
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
We analyse partisan biases in the allocation of central discretionary transfers in a federal country. We study drought aid-relief in Brazil, where presidential and municipal elections alternate every two years, to identify a novel pattern of distributive politics, determined by the sequence of central and local elections. In particular, we show that alignment advantage materialises only in the period before municipal elections, while it disappears in the period before presidential elections. Furthermore, we show that even before mayoral elections partisanship only counts for districts with intermediate levels of aridity, where being aligned causes an increase by a factor of almost two (equivalent to +18.1 p.p.) in the chances of receiving aid-relief. We rationalise this pattern in a model with office-motivated politicians and rational voters.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Information vs competition, how platform design affects profits and surplus

  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Schuett, Florian
We study the design of online platforms that aggregate information and facilitate transactions. Two different designs can be observed in the market: revealing platforms that disclose the identity of transaction partners (e.g. Booking) and anonymous platforms that do not (e.g. Hotwire). To analyse the implications of this design choice for profits and surplus, we develop a model in which consumers differ in their location as well as their preferred product variety. Sellers offer their products for sale both directly ('offline') and indirectly via the platform ('online') but are unable to credibly disclose the product variety they offer when selling offline. The model gives rise to a novel trade-off associated with the anonymous platform design: offline, consumers observe location but not variety; online, they observe variety but not location. While the revealing design leads to more informed consumers and better matches, the anonymous design allows sellers to price discriminate and introduces competition between sellers whose markets would otherwise be segmented. We show that the comparison between the designs depends crucially on the relative importance of information about location vis-à-vis information about variety. For an intermediate range, the anonymous design outperforms the revealing design in terms of both profits and welfare.