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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Financing public education when agents have retirement concerns

  • Montolio, Daniel|||0000-0002-6751-6701
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Salvadori, Luca|||0000-0001-7610-439X
We study, theoretically and empirically, the link between voters' support for public education and pensions. We show that the (inter-generational) redistributive component of the retirement system creates a link between current spending on education and future pensions. Specifically, investments in education increase the young's productivity and, hence, future tax proceeds that will finance the current workers' pension. Consequently, the support for publicly financed education grows together with the generosity and degree of redistribution of the retirement system. The empirical analysis uses repeated cross-country surveys to confirm the model predictions.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

An axiomatic approach to the law of small numbers

  • Noor, Jawwad
  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
With beliefs over the outcomes of coin-tosses as our primitive, we formalize the Law of Small Numbers (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) by an axiom that expresses a belief that the sample mean of any sequence will tend towards the coin's perceived bias along the entire path. The agent is represented by a belief that the bias of the coin is path-dependent and self-correcting. The model is consistent with the evidence used to support the Law of Small Numbers, such as the Gambler's Fallacy. In the setting of Bayesian inference, we show how learning is affected by the interplay between two potentially opposing forces: a belief in the absence of streaks and a belief that the sample mean will tend to the true bias. We show that, unlike other learning results in the literature (Rabin (2002), Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni (2010)), the latter force ensures that the agent at least admits the true parameter as possible in the limit, if not learn with certainty that it is true. In an evolutionary setting, we show that agents who believe in the Law of Small Numbers are never pushed out of the evolutionary race by "standard" agents who correctly understand randomness.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Mixture-dependent preference for commitment

  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
The literature on temptation and self-control is motivated by evidence of a preference for commitment. This literature has typically put forth models for preferences over menus of lotteries that satisfy the Independence axiom. Independence requires that the ranking of two menus is not affected if each is mixed (probabilistically) with a common third menu. In particular, the preference for commitment is invariant under Independence. We argue that intuitive behavior may require that the preference for commitment be affected by such mixing, and hence be mixture-dependent. To capture such behavior, we generalize Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) by replacing their Independence axiom with a suitably adapted version of the Mixture-Betweenness axiom of Chew (1989)- Dekel (1986). Axiomatizing the model involves a novel extension of the Mixture Space Theorem to preferences that satisfy Mixture-Betweenness.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

'Information doesn't want to be free', informational shocks with anonymous online platforms

  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
Anonymous information platforms (e.g. Airbnb) provide information about experience goods while keeping agents' identity hidden until the transaction is completed. In doing so, they generate heterogeneity in the information levels across consumers. In this paper, I show that such platforms induce a weak increase of fine prices and that only low-valuation goods are cheaper online than offline. Platforms always lead to an increase in profits. In terms of consumer welfare, the platform equilibrium is Pareto superior for low-and high-valuation goods, while for intermediate ranges some buyers benefit while others lose from the presence of the platform.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Does the winner take it all?, redistributive policies and political extremism

  • Daniele, Gianmarco
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Sas, Willem
The impact of federal policies often depends on fixed regional differences (economic, historical, geographical). Certain regions can therefore be seen as permanently benefiting from the federation and others as losing. We show that this distorts voting behaviour in two ways. First, voters strategically elect federal representatives that are extremely protective of regional interests. Second, they suboptimally invest in locally funded goods. This distortion is U-shaped in expected federal benefits. Lastly, we do not observe the usual race to be included in the federal coalition, which would reduce the distortion. We test these predictions on national and European Parliamentary elections since 1990, and find that extreme voting is indeed U-shaped: winning and losing states distort more than those in the middle. We conclude that federal political structures foment political polarisation, especially when federal decisions require large consensus. Loosening the ties between representatives and their constituency may mitigate this problem.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Drought-reliefs and partisanship

  • Boffa, Federico
  • Cavalcanti, Francisco
  • Fons-Rosen, Christian
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
We analyse partisan biases in the allocation of central discretionary transfers in a federal country. We study drought aid-relief in Brazil, where presidential and municipal elections alternate every two years, to identify a novel pattern of distributive politics, determined by the sequence of central and local elections. In particular, we show that alignment advantage materialises only in the period before municipal elections, while it disappears in the period before presidential elections. Furthermore, we show that even before mayoral elections partisanship only counts for districts with intermediate levels of aridity, where being aligned causes an increase by a factor of almost two (equivalent to +18.1 p.p.) in the chances of receiving aid-relief. We rationalise this pattern in a model with office-motivated politicians and rational voters.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Information vs competition, how platform design affects profits and surplus

  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Schuett, Florian
We study the design of online platforms that aggregate information and facilitate transactions. Two different designs can be observed in the market: revealing platforms that disclose the identity of transaction partners (e.g. Booking) and anonymous platforms that do not (e.g. Hotwire). To analyse the implications of this design choice for profits and surplus, we develop a model in which consumers differ in their location as well as their preferred product variety. Sellers offer their products for sale both directly ('offline') and indirectly via the platform ('online') but are unable to credibly disclose the product variety they offer when selling offline. The model gives rise to a novel trade-off associated with the anonymous platform design: offline, consumers observe location but not variety; online, they observe variety but not location. While the revealing design leads to more informed consumers and better matches, the anonymous design allows sellers to price discriminate and introduces competition between sellers whose markets would otherwise be segmented. We show that the comparison between the designs depends crucially on the relative importance of information about location vis-à-vis information about variety. For an intermediate range, the anonymous design outperforms the revealing design in terms of both profits and welfare.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Updating under imprecise information

  • Lin, Yi-Hsuan
  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
This paper models an agent that ranks actions with uncertain payoffs after observing a signal that could have been generated by multiple objective information structures. Under the assumption that the agent's preferences conform to the multiple priors model (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), we show that a simple behavioral axiom characterizes a generalization of Bayesian Updating. Our axiom requires that whenever all possible sources of information agree that it is more 'likely' for an action with uncertain payoffs to be better than one with certain payoffs, the agent prefers the former. We also provide axiomatizations for several special cases. Finally, we consider the situation where the informational content of a signal is purely subjective. We characterize the existence of a subjective set of information structures under full Bayesian updating for two extreme cases: (i) No ex-ante state ambiguity, and (ii) No signal ambiguity.