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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Transportation and housing markets in cities

  • García López, Miquel-Àngel|||0000-0002-0515-2922
  • Sanchis-Guarner, Rosa
  • Viladecans Marsal, Elisabet|||0000-0003-3722-2371
This paper surveys recent literature estimating the causal effects of urban transport investments and urban mobility policies on housing markets. We synthesise evidence along three dimensions: the capitalisation of accessibility gains, the internalisation of transport-related externalities, and the rise of green mobility initiatives. Results indicate that while improved accessibility is generally capitalised into higher property values, negative externalities-such as noise, pollution, and congestion-can attenuate or reverse these effects. Policies such as congestion pricing, zoning reforms, and low-emission zones also influence these outcomes, highlighting how institutions, network design, and local environmental conditions shape the housing market's response to transport investments. Recent green interventions in city centres have shown an even stronger impact on housing prices, although they can also create spillover effects in nearby neighbourhoods.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. The two rules are in addition envy-free, but they differ on wether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (i) the constrained equal losses rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies justified envy-freeness on losses and (ii) the constrained equal awards rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies envy-freeness on awards.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Sectoral composition and macroeconomic dynamics

  • Alonso Carrera, Jaime|||0000-0001-8525-7769
  • Caballé, Jordi|||0000-0003-0253-5634
  • Raurich, Xavier|||0000-0002-5210-1909
We analyze the transitional dynamics of a model with heterogeneous consumption goods. In this model, convergence is driven by two different forces: the typical diminishing returns to capital and the sectoral change inducing the variation in relative prices. We show that this second force a¤ects the growth rate if the two consumption goods are not Edgeworth independent and if these two goods are produced with technologies exhibiting different capital intensities. Because the aforementioned dynamic sectoral change arises only under heterogeneous consumption goods, the transitional dynamics of this model exhibits striking differences with the growth model with a single consumption good. We also show that these differences in the transitional dynamics can give raise to large discrepancies in the welfare cost of shocks between the economy with a unique consumption good and the economy with multiple consumption goods.