DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication
Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)
Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding
Trabajo presentado en el 46th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, celebrado en Barcelona (España), del 30 de agosto al 1 de septiembre, Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise
money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring
incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz
(2017) claims that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually rational mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard
and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all
crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding
tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher prots and welfare,
but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome, We gratefully acknowledge financial support from 2016 FBBVA grant Innovación e Información
en la Economía Digital, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness via the Severo Ochoa
Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grants ECO2017-88129-P (Ellman)
and ECO2015-67171-P (Hurkens) and the Generalitat de Catalunya via the grant 2017-SGR-1136
Project:
MINECO / Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016 SEV-2015-0563
,
AEI / Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020 ECO2017-88129-P
,
MINECO / Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016 ECO2015-67171-P
View at: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/254361