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EMISIONES DE CARBONO, USO DE RECURSOS Y SOSTENIBILIDAD: ANALISIS CUANTITATIVOS E IMPLICACIONES DE POLITICA

PID2020-119152GB-I00

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Call Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Call year 2020
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 4
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems

  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Solís-Baltodano, María-José
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
The notion of lower bound on awards has been introduced in the literature to analyze the establishment of guarantees that ensure a minimum award to each agent involved in situations of conflicting claims, such as the rationing of a resource or the distribution of the assets of a bankrupt firm. Indeed, this concept has a core role in many approaches related to the problem of fair allocation (Thomson in Math Soc Sci 74:41–59, 2015) and a range of such lower bounds have been proposed: the minimal right (Curiel et al. in Z Oper Res 31:A143–A159, 1987), the fair bound (Moulin in Handb Soc Choice Welf 1:289–357, 2002), securement (Moreno-Ternero and Villar in Math Soc Sci 47(2):245–257, 2004) and the min bound (Dominguez in mimeo, 2006). In this context, the key contribution of the current paper is to show that there is a correspondence between lower bounds and rules; i.e., associated to each particular lower bound, we find a specific way of distributing the resources. In doing so, we provide new characterizations for two well known rules, the constrained equal awards and Ibn Ezra’s rules. A dual analysis, by using upper bounds on awards will provide characterizations of the dual of the previously mentioned rules: the constrained equal losses rule and the dual of Ibn Ezra’s rule.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Cooperative TU-games: Dominance, stable sets, and the core revisited

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
Stable sets are introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as “the solution” of a cooperative game. Later on, Gillies (1953) defines the core of the game. Both notions can be established in terms of dominance. It is well known that the core may be an empty set, whereas stable sets may fail to exist, or may produce different proposals. We provide a new dominance relation so that the stable set obtained when applying this notion (the δ-stable set) always exists, it is unique, and it coincides with the core of the cooperative game, whenever the core is not empty. We apply this concept to some particular classes of TU-games having typically an empty core: voting (majority) games, minimum cost spanning trees games with revenue, controlled capacitated networks, or m-sequencing games.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Non-emptiness of the core of mcst games with revenues

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
The minimum cost spanning tree (mest) problem analyzes how to efficiently connect geographically dispersed agents to a common source. Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) study mest problems involving revenues, in which the agents benefit from being connected to the source. A key feature of their framework is that only certain coalitions, called effective coalitions, make sense to form. Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) show that the core in cost–revenue mest games is typically empty. In this paper, we present a necessary condition that mest games with revenues need to fulfill to ensure the non-emptiness of the core: the existence of at least one agent with veto power, i.e., an agent whose participation is required in every effective coalition. Additionally, we extend the sufficient condition in Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) for elementary cost mest problems.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Irreducible minimum cost spanning tree problems with revenues

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
The current paper analyzes minimum cost spanning tree problems having irreducible costs while incorporating revenues. We prove that, in this context, the core of the associated cost-revenues game (the r-core) is non-empty. In particular, we find an stable allocation in the r-core, based on the CEL bankruptcy rule, that ensures fairness by distributing revenues only among agents that belong to every effective coalition. Therefore, our findings contribute to the literature by identifying structural conditions that guarantee stability in minimum cost spanning tree problems with revenues, overcoming previous results which showed that the r-core could be empty.