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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Incentives in university technology transfers

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
There are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms: licensing agreements and the creation of spin-offs. In this paper, we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations, the main incentive issues that appear in this process, and the contractual solutions proposed to address them.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups

  • Guo, Bing
  • Lou, Yun
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amounts than those financed by independent VC funds. Although a longer duration leads to a higher likelihood of an exit through an acquisition, a larger investment increases the probability of an IPO exit. These predictions find strong empirical support.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Optimal monitoring to implement a clean technology when emissions are random

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We consider a model of polluting firms subject to tax on emissions, monitoring, and penalties in case of underreporting and which face a choice between a more expensive clean and a less expensive dirty technology. Moreover, emissions are subject to random events. We show that the optimal monitoring is a cut-off policy, where all reports below a threshold are inspected with the same probability, while reports above the threshold are not monitored. If the adoption of the technology is firms' private information, too few firms will adopt the clean technology under the optimal monitoring policy. However, when the environmental agency can check the technology adopted by the firms, the optimal policy may induce overswitching or underswitching to the clean technology.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Wettstein, David
In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalities defined in Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). This is a large family of values that includes several recent proposals. We show that they can be constructed through the sharing of appropriately defined dividends. Furthermore, we show the flexibility of this approach by using it to generate non-symmetric values.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Codes of best practices in competitive markets for managers

  • Alonso-Paulí, Eduard
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We study the corporate governance of firms in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for better management control, but makes it hard for managers to react quickly when market conditions change. Codes tend to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in environments where managers obtain low levels of benefits. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt a Code when managers are not too heterogeneous, while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce hiring the best managers; instead, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Research output from university-industry collaborative projects

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We study collaborative and noncollaborative projects that are supported by government grants. First, we propose a theoretical framework to analyze optimal decisions in these projects. Second, we test our hypotheses with a unique data set containing academic publications and research funds for all academics at the major university engineering departments in the United Kingdom. We find that the type of the project (measured by its level of appliedness) increases the type of both the university and firm partners. Also, the quality of the project (number and impact of the publications) increases with the quality of the researcher and firm, and with the affinity in the partners' preferences. The collaboration with firms increases the quality of the project only when the firms' characteristics make them valuable partners.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information

  • Clippel, Geoffroy de
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Wettstein, David
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were un-der complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás
We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms differ in the expected values of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. Worker effort is not contractible and worker ability is revealed during the relationship. The market dictates the trade-off between sorting and incentives. Short- and long-term contracts often coexist: The best firms always use short-term contracts to hire high-ability senior workers, firms with less profitable projects use short-term contracts to save on the cost of hiring junior workers, whereas intermediate firms use long-term agreements to provide better incentives to their workers. We relate our results to the optimal assignment literature that follows Becker (1973).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A theoretical approach to dual practice regulations in the health sector

  • González, Paula|||0000-0003-1630-9726
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
Internationally, there is wide cross-country heterogeneity in government responses to dual practice in the health sector. This paper provides a uniform theoretical framework to analyze and compare some of the most common regulations. We focus on three interventions: banning dual practice, offering rewarding contracts to public physicians, and limiting dual practice (including both limits to private earnings of dual providers and limits to involvement in private activities). An ancillary objective of the paper is to investigate whether regulations that are optimal for developed countries are adequate for developing countries as well. Our results offer theoretical support for the desirability of different regulations in different economic environments.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the joint production of research and training

  • Freitas, Antonio
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
Universities and research institutions have the responsibility to produce science and to provide training to new generations of researchers. In this paper, we propose a model to analyze the determinants of a senior scientist's decisions about allocating time between these tasks. The results of this decision depend upon the characteristics of the research project, the senior scientist's concern for training and the expected innate ability of the junior scientist involved. We analyze the role that a regulator can play in defining both the value of scientific projects and the future population of independent scientists.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Technological endowment in entrepreneurial partnerships

  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
  • Nicolini, Rosella|||0000-0002-3331-8926
This paper discusses a novel argument to interpret the importance of thinking of collaborative partnerships in pre-competitive agreements. To do so, we adopt a dynamic iterative process to model technology diffusion between the partners of an agreement. We find that the success of an agreement of a given length hinges around identifying the suitable efficient combinations of the initial technological endowments of partners. As the time horizon of the agreement expands, the probability of identifying a suitable partner decreases, thus justifying the prevalence of short-horizon R&D agreements
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?

  • Olivella, Pau|||0000-0002-0150-5903
  • Vera-Hernández, Marcos
When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Testing for asymmetric information in private health insurance

  • Olivella, Pau|||0000-0002-0150-5903
  • Vera-Hernández, Marcos
We test for asymmetric information in the UK private health insurance (PHI) market. In contrast to earlier research that considers either a purely private system or one where private insurance is complementary to public insurance, PHI is substitutive of the public system in the UK. Using a theoretical model of competition among insurers incorporating this characteristic, we link the type of selection (adverse or propitious) with the existence of risk-related information asymmetries. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we find evidence that adverse selection is present in the PHI market, which leads us to conclude that such information asymmetries exist.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games, What do dictators believe other dictators do?

  • Iriberri, Nagore
  • Rey-Biel, Pedro|||0000-0002-1606-2631
Using data from modified dictator games and a mixture-of-types estimation technique, we find a clear relationship between a classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (selfish, social welfare maximizers, inequity averse, and competitive) and the beliefs subjects hold about others' distributive choices in a nonstrategic environment. In particular, selfish individuals fall into false-consensus bias more than other types, as they can hardly conceive that other individuals incur costs so as to change the distribution of payoffs. We also find that selfish individuals are the most robust preference type when repeating play, both when they learn about others' previous choices (social information) and when they do not, while other preference types are more unstable. © 2013 Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey-Biel.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Hospitals, Teaming Up

  • Barros, Pedro Pita|||0000-0002-0881-4928
  • Olivella, Pau|||0000-0002-0150-5903
This article describes the economics literature on the operation of hospitals using a framework based on the notion of "teams". It presents two distinctive features. The first one is the separation of ownership and control in hospitals and the other is to look at hospitals through the lens of teams. It addresses technology issues like output measurement, as well as economies of scale and scope and gives a brief overview of different theories on how the ruling body of the hospital chooses between the different technologically feasible options. It shows that the idea of team interactions can be extended beyond the limits of the hospital in two main areas. It addresses the relationship of hospitals with third-party payers as well as notices that patients arrive at hospital referred there by other agents, namely general practitioners. It further discusses and proposes challenges for future research.