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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Private versus social incentives for pharmaceutical innovation

  • González, Paula|||0000-0003-1630-9726
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We provide a theoretical framework to contribute to the current debate regarding the tendency of pharmaceutical companies to direct their R&D toward marketing products that are follow-on drugs of already existing drugs, rather than toward the development of breakthrough drugs. We construct a model with a population of patients who can be treated with drugs that are horizontally and vertically differentiated. In addition to a pioneering drug, a new drug can be marketed as the result of an innovative process. We analyze physician prescription choices and the optimal pricing decision of an innovative firm. We also characterize the incentives of the innovative firm to conduct R&D activities, disentangling the quest for breakthrough drugs from the firm effort to develop follow-on drugs. Our results offer theoretical support for the conventional wisdom that pharmaceutical firms devote too many resources to conducting R&D activities that lead to incremental innovations.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Endogenous matching in university-industry collaboration, theory and empirical evidence from the UK

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We use a two-sided matching framework to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous academics and firms. We consider both horizontal and vertical characteristics-those related to affinity (e.g., preferences for a type of scientific research) and those related to ability (e.g., capacity to produce high-quality scientific output). We build a unique data set based on the teams of academics and firms that proposed research projects to the UK's Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. Our results are suggestive of positive assortative matching in terms of ability and type, while the matching is negative assortative in terms of their interactions. The most able and the most applied academics are the ones that are more likely to propose collaborative as opposed to noncollaborative projects.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

  • Diamantoudi, Effrosyni
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Xue, Licun
We consider issue-externality games in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues, that is, the amount a coalition receives in one issue depends on how the players are organized on all the issues. Examples of such games are several Örms competing in multiple markets, and countries negotiating both a trade agreement (through, e.g., WTO) and an environmental agreement (e.g., Kyoto Protocol). We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values for partition function games to issue-externality games. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment. The solution concept that we propose can be applied to many interesting games, including intertemporal situations where players meet sequentially.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory

Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability

  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Wettstein, David
We study contests with private information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities. The designer's revenue depends on the quality of the output, and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes, and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive conditions under which the designer obtains a larger payoff when using a discriminatory contest and describe settings, where these conditions are satisfied.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets

  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira
We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. In particular, this result extends to the one-to-many (respectively, many-to-one) models the Non-Manipulability Theorem of the buyers (respectively, sellers), proven by Demange (Strategyproofness in the assignment market game. École Polytechnique, Laboratoire d'Économetrie, Paris, 1982), Leonard (J Polit Econ 91:461-479, 1983), and Demange and Gale (Econometrica 55:873-888, 1985) for the assignment game. Second, we prove a "General Manipulability Theorem" that implies and generalizes two "folk theorems" for the assignment game, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, never proven before. For the one-to-one case, this result provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically

  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira
We analyze the two-stage games induced by competitive equilibrium rules for the buyer-seller market of Shapley and Shubik (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972). In these procedures, first sellers and then buyers report their valuation and the outcome is determined by a competitive equilibrium outcome for the market reported by the agents. We provide results concerning buyers and sellers' equilibrium strategies. In particular, our results point out that, by playing first, sellers are able to instigate an outcome that corresponds to the sellers' optimal competitive equilibrium allocation for the true market.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups

  • Guo, Bing
  • Lou, Yun
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amounts than those financed by independent VC funds. Although a longer duration leads to a higher likelihood of an exit through an acquisition, a larger investment increases the probability of an IPO exit. These predictions find strong empirical support.