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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Construction corrupts, empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries

  • Kyriacou, Andreas
  • Muinelo Gallo, Walter Leonel
  • Roca i Sagalés, Oriol|||0000-0002-5401-442X
The construction sector, whether privately or publicly financed, is characterized by potentially large rents and government intervention making it vulnerable to corruption. Consistent with this, both case-study and survey evidence has been provided highlighting the problem of malfeasance in this sector. In this article, we test the proposition that a bigger construction sector is likely to be inimical to clean government based on a panel of 42 countries over the period 1995-2011. We control for a range of potentially confounding variables and the expectation that corrupt public officials may favor the development of this sector because it increases the volume of rents available to them. Our empirical evidence shows that a larger construction sector will tend to increase perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Individualism-collectivism, governance and economic development

  • Kyriacou, Andreas
While an individualist society prizes personal control, autonomy and individual accomplishments, a collectivist society puts a premium on loyalty and cohesion and imposes mutual obligations in the context of in-groups. It has been argued that individualism will promote economic development directly by sharpening individual incentives to invest, innovate and accumulate wealth. In this article, I argue that the individualist-collectivist dimension can also affect development through its impact on governance. The in-group favoritism inherent to collectivist societies is likely to engender corruption, nepotism and clientelism in the public sphere. In individualist societies, the relative weakness of in-group pressures and an emphasis on personal achievement and worth will contribute towards a more meritocratic and efficient public sector. My empirical evidence confirms the strong positive relationship between individualism and government quality. Moreover, I provide robust empirical evidence showing that the expected direct positive impact of individualism on economic development disappears when additionally controlling for governance, a finding which suggests that insofar as individualism affects development it does so because it promotes good governance.