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The survival and demise of the state: a dynamic theory of secessions
This paper analizes the repeated interaction between groups in a country as a
repeated Stackelberg game, where conflict and secession can occur on the equilibrium
path owing to commitment problems. If a group out of power is small enough and
its contribution to total surplus not too large, then the group in power can always
maintain peace with an acceptable offer of surplus sharing for every period. When
there is a mismatch between the relative size and the relative surplus contribution of
the minority group, conflict can occur. While in the static model secession can occur
only as a peaceful outcome, in the infinite horizon game with high discount factor
secession may result following costly conflict. We discuss our full characterization
of equilibrium outcomes in the light of the available empirical evidence., Joan Esteban gratefully acknowledges financial support from
the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres
of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and grant number ECO2015−66883−P, from the Generalitat
de Catalunya grant 2017SGR1359, and from National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370.
Massimo Morelli wishes to thank the European Research Council, advanced grant 694583. Dominic
Rohner is grateful for financial support from the ERC Starting Grant 677595., Peer reviewed