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Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Globalization and political structure

  • Gancia, Gino A.
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
  • Ventura, Jaume
Supplemental material files: online appendix; replication files, This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the interaction between globalization and political structure. We show that political structure adapts in a non-monotonic way to declining transport costs. Borders hamper trade. At an earlier stage, the political response to expanding trade opportunities consists of removing borders by increasing country size. At a later stage, instead, it consists of removing the cost of borders by creating international unions. This leads to a reduction in country size. Moreover, diplomacy replaces conquest as a tool to ensure market access. These predictions are consistent with historical evidence on trade, territorial changes, and membership of international unions., We acknowledge financial support from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (StG-240989-GOPG, AdG-693512-GEPPS and StG-714905-CITIZINGLOBAL); the Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033: RYC-2013-13838, SEV-2015-0563, CEX2019-000915-S and PID2019-111691RA-I00); the Generalitat de Catalunya through CERCA, the Institut d’Estudis Autonomics and the SGR Programme (2014-SGR-830 and 2017-SGR-1393); and the Leverhulme Trust through a 2019 Research Fellowship.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A theory of economic unions

  • Gancia, Gino A.
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
  • Ventura, Jaume
After decades of successful growth, economic unions have recently become the focus of heightened political controversy. To understand why, we develop a theoretical model of the effects on trade, income distribution and welfare of economic unions that differ in size and scope. Our model shows that political support for international unions can grow with their breadth and depth provided member countries are sufficiently similar. However, dif- ferences in economic size and factor endowments can trigger disagreement over the value of unions. Our model is consistent with some salient features of the process of European integration and statistical evidence from survey data., We acknowledge financial support from the Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI), through the European Research Council (ERC), under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Programme, Grant Agreements 693512 (“Globalization, Economic Policy and Political Structure”) and 714905 (“Citizens, Institutions and Globalization”), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grants RYC-2013-13838 and SEV-2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya through the CERCA program, and the Leverhulme Trust through a 2019 Research Fellowship.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Securing property rights

  • Behrer, A. Patrick
  • Glaeser, Edward L. (Edward Ludwig), 1967-
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
  • Shleifer, Andrei
Supplemental material files: online appendices; data archive, A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice. We present a model of a polluter whose discharges harm multiple owners, and we compare property rules, liability rules, and regulation on efficiency grounds. We provide conditions under which property rules are preferred to liability rules, thus verifying the Calabresi-Melamed conjecture. Regulation that enforces partial abatement may be preferred to either of the extreme rules. An empirical analysis of water quality in the United States before and after the Clean Water Act shows that the effects of regulation are consistent with several predictions of the model., Ponzetto acknowledges financial support from the European Research Council under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (CITIZINGLOBAL 714905), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2013-13838) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya through the SGR Programme (2017-SGR-1393) and CERCA Programme.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The political economy of transportation investment

  • Glaeser, Edward L. (Edward Ludwig), 1967-
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
Will politics lead to over-building or under-building of transportation projects? In this paper, we develop a model of infrastructure policy in which politicians overdo things that have hidden costs and underperform tasks whose costs voters readily perceive. Consequently, national funding of transportation leads to overspending, since voters more readily perceive the upside of new projects than the future taxes that will be paid for distant highways. Yet when local voters are well-informed, the highly salient nuisances of local construction, including land taking and noise, lead to under-building. This framework explains the decline of urban mega-projects in the US (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003) as the result of increasingly educated and organized urban voters. Our framework also predicts more per capita transportation spending in low-density and less educated areas, which seems to be empirically correct., We acknowledge financial support from the Taubman Center for State and Local Government, the European Research Council under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement n. 714905), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grants RYC-2013-13838 and SEV-2015-0563), and the Government of Catalonia (CERCA program and grant 2014 SGR 830).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The political economy of transportation investment

  • Glaeser, Edward L. (Edward Ludwig), 1967-
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
Will politics lead to over-building or under-building of transportation projects? In this paper, we develop a model of infrastructure policy in which politicians overdo things that have hidden costs and underperform tasks whose costs voters readily perceive. Consequently, national funding of transportation leads to overspending, since voters more readily perceive the upside of new projects than the future taxes that will be paid for distant highways. Yet when local voters are well-informed, the highly salient nuisances of local construction, including land taking and noise, lead to under-building. This framework explains the decline of urban mega-projects in the US (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003) as the result of increasingly educated and organized urban voters. Our framework also predicts more per capita transportation spending in low-density and less educated areas, which seems to be empirically correct., We acknowledge financial support from the Taubman Center for State and Local Government, the European Research Council under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement n. 714905), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grants RYC-2013-13838 and SEV-2015-0563), and the Government of Catalonia (CERCA program and grant 2014 SGR 830).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A theory of economic unions

  • Gancia, Gino A.
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
  • Ventura, Jaume
After decades of successful growth, economic unions have recently become the focus of heightened political controversy. To understand why, we develop a theoretical model of the effects on trade, income distribution and welfare of economic unions that differ in size and scope. Our model shows that political support for international unions can grow with their breadth and depth provided member countries are sufficiently similar. However, dif- ferences in economic size and factor endowments can trigger disagreement over the value of unions. Our model is consistent with some salient features of the process of European integration and statistical evidence from survey data., We acknowledge financial support from the Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI), through the European Research Council (ERC), under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Programme, Grant Agreements 693512 (“Globalization, Economic Policy and Political Structure”) and 714905 (“Citizens, Institutions and Globalization”), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grants RYC-2013-13838 and SEV-2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya through the CERCA program, and the Leverhulme Trust through a 2019 Research Fellowship.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Globalization and political structure

  • Gancia, Gino A.
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
  • Ventura, Jaume
Supplemental material files: online appendix; replication files, This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the interaction between globalization and political structure. We show that political structure adapts in a non-monotonic way to declining transport costs. Borders hamper trade. At an earlier stage, the political response to expanding trade opportunities consists of removing borders by increasing country size. At a later stage, instead, it consists of removing the cost of borders by creating international unions. This leads to a reduction in country size. Moreover, diplomacy replaces conquest as a tool to ensure market access. These predictions are consistent with historical evidence on trade, territorial changes, and membership of international unions., We acknowledge financial support from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (StG-240989-GOPG, AdG-693512-GEPPS and StG-714905-CITIZINGLOBAL); the Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033: RYC-2013-13838, SEV-2015-0563, CEX2019-000915-S and PID2019-111691RA-I00); the Generalitat de Catalunya through CERCA, the Institut d’Estudis Autonomics and the SGR Programme (2014-SGR-830 and 2017-SGR-1393); and the Leverhulme Trust through a 2019 Research Fellowship.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Securing property rights

  • Behrer, A. Patrick
  • Glaeser, Edward L. (Edward Ludwig), 1967-
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
  • Shleifer, Andrei
Supplemental material files: online appendices; data archive, A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice. We present a model of a polluter whose discharges harm multiple owners, and we compare property rules, liability rules, and regulation on efficiency grounds. We provide conditions under which property rules are preferred to liability rules, thus verifying the Calabresi-Melamed conjecture. Regulation that enforces partial abatement may be preferred to either of the extreme rules. An empirical analysis of water quality in the United States before and after the Clean Water Act shows that the effects of regulation are consistent with several predictions of the model., Ponzetto acknowledges financial support from the European Research Council under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (CITIZINGLOBAL 714905), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2013-13838) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya through the SGR Programme (2017-SGR-1393) and CERCA Programme.