DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication
Artículo científico (JournalArticle)
Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy
This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with overlapping ownership. We show that overlapping ownership leads to internalization of rivals’ profits by firms and find that, for demand not too convex, increases in overlapping ownership increase (decrease) R&D and output for high (low) enough spillovers while they increase R&D but decrease output for intermediate levels of spillovers. There is scope for overlapping ownership to improve welfare and consumer surplus, provided that spillovers are sufficiently large. The results obtained are robust when R&D has commitment value and in a Bertrand oligopoly model with product differentiation., Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under ECO2015-
63711-P, for López from AGAUR (under SGR 1326) and for Vives from the European Research Council
(Advanced Grant No 789013) and AGAUR (under SGR 1244), is gratefully acknowledged., Peer reviewed
Project:
MINECO / H2020 ECO2015-63711-P
,
EC 789013
View at: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/344803