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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 5
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RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Dynamic capacity provision for wireless sensors connectivity: A profit optimization approach

  • Sanchis-Cano, Ángel
  • Condoluci, Massimo
  • Guijarro, Luis|||0000-0001-9774-9728
[EN] We model a wireless sensors' connectivity scenario mathematically and analyze it using capacity provision mechanisms, with the objective of maximizing the profits of a network operator. The scenario has several sensors' clusters with each one having one sink node, which uploads the sensing data gathered in the cluster through the wireless connectivity of a network operator. The scenario is analyzed both as a static game and as a dynamic game, each one with two stages, using game theory. The sinks' behavior is characterized with a utility function related to the mean service time and the price paid to the operator for the service. The objective of the operator is to maximize its profits by optimizing the network capacity. In the static game, the sinks' subscription decision is modeled using a population game. In the dynamic game, the sinks' behavior is modeled using an evolutionary game and the replicator dynamic, while the operator optimal capacity is obtained solving an optimal control problem. The scenario is shown feasible from an economic point of view. In addition, the dynamic capacity provision optimization is shown as a valid mechanism for maximizing the operator profits, as well as a useful tool to analyze evolving scenarios. Finally, the dynamic analysis opens the possibility to study more complex scenarios using the differential game extension., The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through project TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R; AEI/FEDER, UE through project TEC2017-85830-C2-1-P; and co-supported by the European Social Fund BES-2014-068998.
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Duopoly Provision of Services Based on Wireless Sensor-supplied Data: a Differential Game Model

  • Sanchis-Cano, Ángel
  • Guijarro, Luis|||0000-0001-9774-9728
  • Pla, Vicent|||0000-0002-0894-9494
  • Vidal Catalá, José Ramón|||0000-0002-7137-1349
[EN] The provision of services based on wireless sensor data is analyzed dynamically. In the proposed scenario, two competing service providers deploy their own wireless sensor networks in order to collect the data and provide services to final users. The service providers compete in prices dynamically in order to maximize their profits, while the behavior of the users is modeled using a discrete choice model. The model is analyzed using game theory. The changes in the population of users are analyzed through an evolutionary game and the Logit dynamic, while the dynamic competition in prices is studied using a differential game. We conclude that the dynamic pricing competition is economically feasible for the service providers and, in addition, the dynamic solution converges to the static solution of the scenario., This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through project TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R and co-supported by the European Social Fund BES-2014-068998.
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Economic Feasibility of Wireless Sensor Network-Based Service Provision in a Duopoly Setting with a Monopolist Operator

  • Sanchis-Cano, Ángel
  • Romero-Chavarro, Julián Camilo
  • Sacoto-Cabrera, Erwin
  • Guijarro, Luis|||0000-0001-9774-9728
[EN] We analyze the feasibility of providing Wireless Sensor Network-data-based services in an Internet of Things scenario from an economical point of view. The scenario has two competing service providers with their own private sensor networks, a network operator and final users. The scenario is analyzed as two games using game theory. In the first game, sensors decide to subscribe or not to the network operator to upload the collected sensing-data, based on a utility function related to the mean service time and the price charged by the operator. In the second game, users decide to subscribe or not to the sensor-data-based service of the service providers based on a Logit discrete choice model related to the quality of the data collected and the subscription price. The sinks and users subscription stages are analyzed using population games and discrete choice models, while network operator and service providers pricing stages are analyzed using optimization and Nash equilibrium concepts respectively. The model is shown feasible from an economic point of view for all the actors if there are enough interested final users and opens the possibility of developing more efficient models with different types of services., This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through projects TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R and (co-supported by the European Social Fund) BES-2014-068998.
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Dynamic Price Competition between a Macrocell Operator and a Small Cell Operator: A Differential Game Model

  • Romero-Chavarro, Julián Camilo
  • Sanchis-Cano, Ángel
  • Guijarro, Luis|||0000-0001-9774-9728
[EN] An economic model was analyzed where a new supplier implements the technology of the small cells and positions itself as an incumbent service provider. This provider performs a dynamic reuse of resources to compete with the macrocells service provider. Themodel was analyzed using game theory as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the service providers play a Stackelberg differential game where the price is the control variable, the existing provider is the leader, and the new supplier is the follower. In the second stage, users' behavior ismodeled using an evolutionary game that allows predicting the population changeswith variable conditions. This paper contributes to the implementation of new technologies in the market of mobile communications through analysis of competition between the new small cell service providers (SSPs) and the existing service providers along with the users' behavior of mobile communications. The result shows that users get a better service, SSP profits are guaranteed, and SSP entry improves users' welfare and social welfare., This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Project TIN2013-47272-C2-1R and cosupported by the European Social Fund BES-2014-068998.
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Strategic Interaction between Operators in the Context of Spectrum Sharing for 5G Networks

  • Sacoto-Cabrera, Erwin
  • Sanchis-Cano, Ángel
  • Guijarro, Luis|||0000-0001-9774-9728
  • Vidal Catalá, José Ramón|||0000-0002-7137-1349
  • Pla, Vicent|||0000-0002-0894-9494
[EN] 5G networks will make network sharing agreements between mobile operators technically possible. However, depending on the agreed and implemented quality-of-service isolation, the provision of services may lead to unsustainable business cases. In this paper, the economic feasibility of such arrangements is analyzed for the case of two operators. Concretely, while one network operator owns the spectrum, one virtual operator does not, and each one provides service to its subscriber base. Two sharing alternatives, namely, pooling and priority sharing, are studied regarding the profits that each operator gets. We conclude that the network operator is worse off under any circumstances under a pooling agreement, while a lump sum payment may leave the network operator better off under a priority sharing agreement., This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through projects TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R (cosupported by the European Social Fund) and BES-2014-068998 and partially supported by the Salesian Polytechnic University of Ecuador through a Ph.D. scholarship granted to the first author.