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ACTITUDES POPULISTAS EN LA OPINION PUBLICA ESPAÑOLA

BES-2015-072756

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Funding agency acronym MICINN
Program Programa Estatal de Promoción del Talento y su Empleabilidad en I+D+i
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Formación
Call Contratos Predoctorales
Call year 2015
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Management unit Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Choosing the crook, a conjoint experiment on voting for corrupt politicians

  • Breitenstein, Sofia|||0000-0002-5591-3320
The coexistence of harsh disapproval of corruption and the limited electoral consequences of malfeasant behavior remains a conundrum in social sciences. While elections should be used to hold politicians accountable, evidence shows that voters only mildly punish corrupt politicians. This paper assesses the trade-off hypothesis, which suggests that voters forgive corrupt candidates when these candidates provide other valued outcomes. It distinguishes two possible factors against which integrity can be traded-partisanship and economic performance-and tests them in a multidimensional experiment. With the results of an original conjoint analysis, this paper provides compelling evidence for the relative importance of corruption when casting a vote and the mitigating effects of other valued candidate characteristics. Even when obtaining highly credible information, partisanship determines the vote to the same extent as corruption. Additionally, co-partisanship and a strong economic performance moderate the negative effect corruption has on the vote.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Too Crooked to be Good?, trade-offs in the Electoral Punishment of Malfeasance and Corruption

  • Breitenstein, Sofia|||0000-0002-5591-3320
  • Hernández, Enrique|||0000-0002-9219-9293
While elections are an instrument to hold politicians accountable, corrupt politicians are often re-elected. A potential explanation for this paradox is that citizens trade-off integrity for competence. Voters may forgive corruption if corrupt politicians manage to deliver desirable outcomes. While previous studies have examined whether politicians' competence moderates the negative effect of corruption, this paper focuses on voters' priorities and directly assesses what citizens value more: integrity or favourable outcomes. Using a survey experiment, we assess citizens' support for politicians who violate the law in order to improve the welfare of their community and, in some cases, benefit personally from these violations. The results indicate that citizens prefer a politician who follows the law, even if this leads to a suboptimal outcome. However, voters are more likely to overlook violations of the law that benefit the community if these do not result in a personal gain for politicians (i.e., in the absence of corruption). These findings suggest that the mild electoral punishment of corruption may be due to the public's unawareness of private gains from malfeasance, or to the delay in these private benefits becoming apparent by election day.