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EXPERIMENTACION, MERCADOS Y COMPORTAMIENTO

ECO2008-01768

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Funding agency acronym MICINN
Program Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprogram Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Call Proyectos I+D
Call year 2008
State Plan 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Management unit Subdirección General de Proyectos de Investigación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA CCT

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution

  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Nagel, Rosemarie
  • Rodríguez-Mora, José Vicente
We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, sustained by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. The equilibrium in which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort is not observed in the experiment. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau., We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Spain’s Ministry of Science and Innovation under grants CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2006-0016 (all authors), ECO2009-10531 (Cabrales), ECO2008-01768 (Nagel) and the Comunidad de Madrid under grant Excelecon (Cabrales), the Generalitat de Catalunya and the CREA program (Nagel), and project SEJ2007-64340 of Spain’s Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Rodríguez Mora).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Neural mechanisms mediating degrees of strategic uncertainty

  • Nagel, Rosemarie
  • Brovelli, Andrea
  • Heinemann, Frank
  • Coricelli, Giorgio
In social interactions, strategic uncertainty arises when the outcome of one’s choice depends on the choices of others. An important question is whether strategic uncertainty can be resolved by assessing subjective probabilities to the counterparts’ behavior, as if playing against nature, and thus transforming the strategic interaction into a risky (individual) situation. By means of functional magnetic resonance imaging with human participants we tested the hypothesis that choices under strategic uncertainty are supported by the neural circuits mediating choices under individual risk and deliberation in social settings (i.e. strategic thinking). Participants were confronted with risky lotteries and two types of coordination games requiring different degrees of strategic thinking of the kind ‘I think that you think that I think etc.’ We found that the brain network mediating risk during lotteries (anterior insula, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex) is also engaged in the processing of strategic uncertainty in games. In social settings, activity in this network is modulated by the level of strategic thinking that is reflected in the activity of the dorsomedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These results suggest that strategic uncertainty is resolved by the interplay between the neural circuits mediating risk and higher order beliefs (i.e. beliefs about others’ beliefs)., This work was supported by the European Research Council (ERC Consolidator Grant 617629 to G.C.); Human Frontier Science Program Organization (for life science and physics) to G.C., A.B. and R.N.; Dirección General de Investigación Cientifíca y Técnica (ECO2011-25295) (ECO2008-01768), Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and the Generalitat de Catalunya to R.N. A.B. was also supported by the Projet Exploratoire Premier Soutien (PEPS) Bio-Maths-Info (BMI) of the CNRS–INRIA–INSERM.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Disclosure of belief-dependent preferences in a trust game

  • Attanasi, Giuseppe
  • Battigalli, Pierpaolo
  • Manzoni, Elena
  • Nagel, Rosemarie
Data de publicació electrònica: 07-04-2025, Experimental evidence suggests that agents in social dilemmas have belief-dependent, other-regarding preferences. But in experimental games such preferences cannot be common knowledge, because subjects play with anonymous co-players. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the context of a Trust Game, assuming that the trustee's choice may be affected by a combination of guilt aversion and intention-based reciprocity. We recover trustees' belief-dependent preferences from their answers to a structured questionnaire. In the main treatment, the answers are disclosed and made common knowledge within each matched pair, while in the control treatment there is no disclosure. Our main auxiliary assumption is that such disclosure approximately implements a psychological game with complete information. To organize the data, we classify subjects according to their elicited preferences, and test predictions for the two treatments using both rationalizability and equilibrium. We find that, while preferences are heterogeneous, guilt aversion is the prevalent psychological motivation, and that behavior and elicited beliefs move in the direction predicted by the theory., Attanasi gratefully acknowledges financial support by the ERC (Grant DU283953), "Attractivité" IDEX2013 (University of Strasbourg), the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) under Grant ANR-18-E26-0018 (Project GRICRIS), the Italian Ministry of Universities and Research under Grant PRIN 2022 n. 20229LRAHK (funded by the European Union - Next Generation EU, Mission 4 Component 1, CUP B53D23012680006), the Sapienza University under Ateneo Grants 2023 for project n. RG123188B4CEE028, and the D34Health through the PNC-Spoke3 program research project "Wearable technologies, sensors, and biomarkers for care through digital twin approaches", under Grant B53C22006120001. P. Battigalli gratefully acknowledges the financial support by the ERC (Grant 324219). R. Nagel gratefully acknowledges financial support by FEDER/Ministerio de Ciencia de Innovación (Agencia Estatal de Investigación) through Grant ECO2008-01768, ECO2011-25295, PID2021-125538NB-I00 and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution

  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Nagel, Rosemarie
  • Rodríguez-Mora, José Vicente
We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, sustained by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. The equilibrium in which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort is not observed in the experiment. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau., We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Spain’s Ministry of Science and Innovation under grants CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2006-0016 (all authors), ECO2009-10531 (Cabrales), ECO2008-01768 (Nagel) and the Comunidad de Madrid under grant Excelecon (Cabrales), the Generalitat de Catalunya and the CREA program (Nagel), and project SEJ2007-64340 of Spain’s Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Rodríguez Mora).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Disclosure of belief-dependent preferences in a trust game

  • Attanasi, Giuseppe
  • Battigalli, Pierpaolo
  • Manzoni, Elena
  • Nagel, Rosemarie
Data de publicació electrònica: 07-04-2025, Experimental evidence suggests that agents in social dilemmas have belief-dependent, other-regarding preferences. But in experimental games such preferences cannot be common knowledge, because subjects play with anonymous co-players. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the context of a Trust Game, assuming that the trustee's choice may be affected by a combination of guilt aversion and intention-based reciprocity. We recover trustees' belief-dependent preferences from their answers to a structured questionnaire. In the main treatment, the answers are disclosed and made common knowledge within each matched pair, while in the control treatment there is no disclosure. Our main auxiliary assumption is that such disclosure approximately implements a psychological game with complete information. To organize the data, we classify subjects according to their elicited preferences, and test predictions for the two treatments using both rationalizability and equilibrium. We find that, while preferences are heterogeneous, guilt aversion is the prevalent psychological motivation, and that behavior and elicited beliefs move in the direction predicted by the theory., Attanasi gratefully acknowledges financial support by the ERC (Grant DU283953), "Attractivité" IDEX2013 (University of Strasbourg), the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) under Grant ANR-18-E26-0018 (Project GRICRIS), the Italian Ministry of Universities and Research under Grant PRIN 2022 n. 20229LRAHK (funded by the European Union - Next Generation EU, Mission 4 Component 1, CUP B53D23012680006), the Sapienza University under Ateneo Grants 2023 for project n. RG123188B4CEE028, and the D34Health through the PNC-Spoke3 program research project "Wearable technologies, sensors, and biomarkers for care through digital twin approaches", under Grant B53C22006120001. P. Battigalli gratefully acknowledges the financial support by the ERC (Grant 324219). R. Nagel gratefully acknowledges financial support by FEDER/Ministerio de Ciencia de Innovación (Agencia Estatal de Investigación) through Grant ECO2008-01768, ECO2011-25295, PID2021-125538NB-I00 and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Neural mechanisms mediating degrees of strategic uncertainty

  • Nagel, Rosemarie
  • Brovelli, Andrea
  • Heinemann, Frank
  • Coricelli, Giorgio
In social interactions, strategic uncertainty arises when the outcome of one’s choice depends on the choices of others. An important question is whether strategic uncertainty can be resolved by assessing subjective probabilities to the counterparts’ behavior, as if playing against nature, and thus transforming the strategic interaction into a risky (individual) situation. By means of functional magnetic resonance imaging with human participants we tested the hypothesis that choices under strategic uncertainty are supported by the neural circuits mediating choices under individual risk and deliberation in social settings (i.e. strategic thinking). Participants were confronted with risky lotteries and two types of coordination games requiring different degrees of strategic thinking of the kind ‘I think that you think that I think etc.’ We found that the brain network mediating risk during lotteries (anterior insula, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex) is also engaged in the processing of strategic uncertainty in games. In social settings, activity in this network is modulated by the level of strategic thinking that is reflected in the activity of the dorsomedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These results suggest that strategic uncertainty is resolved by the interplay between the neural circuits mediating risk and higher order beliefs (i.e. beliefs about others’ beliefs)., This work was supported by the European Research Council (ERC Consolidator Grant 617629 to G.C.); Human Frontier Science Program Organization (for life science and physics) to G.C., A.B. and R.N.; Dirección General de Investigación Cientifíca y Técnica (ECO2011-25295) (ECO2008-01768), Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and the Generalitat de Catalunya to R.N. A.B. was also supported by the Projet Exploratoire Premier Soutien (PEPS) Bio-Maths-Info (BMI) of the CNRS–INRIA–INSERM.