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MICROESTRUCTURA DE LOS MERCADOS FINANCIEROS DIRIGIDOS POR ORDENES: FORMACION DE PRECIOS Y PROVISION DE LIQUIDEZ

ECO2010-18567

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Funding agency acronym MICINN
Program Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprogram Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Call Proyectos I+D
Call year 2010
State Plan 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Management unit Subdirección General de Proyectos de Investigación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS ISLAS BALEARES

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 3
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositori Institucional UIB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Executive director's pay, networks and operating performance: The influence of ownership structure

  • Crespí Cladera, Rafel
  • Pascual Fuster, Bartolomé
[eng] This paper examines how ownership structure affects the director networking–compensation relationship. Furthermore, we measure the subsequent impact of this relationship on future operating performance of firms. As in previous research, our study also finds empirical evidence suggesting that higher network activity of executive directors conveys to larger compensation figures. This excess pay has an impact on future operating performance. Our data set of Spanish listed companies, with high average ownership concentration, show that the network related higher compensation for firms with dispersed ownership leads to subsequent negative operating performance. The implications for executive directors are that networking leads to higher compensation. For dispersed ownership firms, the consequence is that promoting executive networking could be harmful unless other corporate governance mechanisms prevent this outcome. For concentrated ownership firms, this structure allows to capture increases in operating performance. Finally, policy recommendations on corporate governance regulation are that self-regulation is better than imposing the same limit on the number of directorships to all firms if an effective control mechanism operates. Our results suggest that the presence of controlling owners is a strong corporate governance mechanism.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Pricing executive stock optons under employment shocks

  • Carmona-Martínez, Julio
  • León Valle, Ángel M.
  • Vaello-Sebastià, Antoni
  • Carmona-Martínez, Julio|||/items/92ce8776-d5b6-42c5-a6dc-a17091838ab3
  • León Valle, Ángel M.|||/items/764769ef-60cf-4dda-a7bd-d42395be3add
We obtain explicit expressions for the subjective, objective and market value of perpetual executive stock options (ESOs) under exogenous employment shocks driven by an independent Poisson process. Previously, we obtain the executive's optimal exercise policy from the subjective valuation that is necessary for the objective one, or fair value. The perpetual ESO is compared with the true finite maturity ESO finding that the approximation is reasonably good. To illustrate the usefulness of the objective valuation for accounting purposes, we analyze the statistical distribution of the fair value when there is uncertainty about the employment shock intensity. Finally, the role of ESOs in the design of executives’ incentives is also discussed.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Does stock return predictability affect ESO fair value?

  • Carmona-Martínez, Julio
  • León Valle, Ángel M.
  • Vaello-Sebastià, Antoni
  • Carmona-Martínez, Julio|||/items/92ce8776-d5b6-42c5-a6dc-a17091838ab3
  • León Valle, Ángel M.|||/items/764769ef-60cf-4dda-a7bd-d42395be3add
Executive Stock Options (ESOs) are modified American options that cannot be valued using standard methods. With a few exceptions, the literature has discussed the ESO fair value by assuming unpredictable stock returns which are not supported by the available empirical evidence. In this paper we obtain the fair value of American ESOs when stock returns are predictable and, specifically, driven by the trending Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process of Lo and Wang (1995). We solve the executive’s portfolio allocation problem for a simple buy-and-hold strategy when his wealth can be distributed between a risk-free asset and a market portfolio. This problem is jointly solved with the executive’s optimal exercise policy. We find that executives tend to wait longer the higher the predictability, independently of the composition of executive’s asset menu. We have also analyzed the implications under the FAS123R proposals for the ESO fair value and found that, even for low autocorrelations, there is a meaningful mispricing when unpredictable returns are erroneously assumed.