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TRANSFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL DE TECNOLOGIAS Y ESTRATEGIAS DE LAS EMPRESAS

ECO2011-25624

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Funding agency acronym MICINN
Program Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprogram Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Call Proyectos I+D
Call year 2011
State Plan 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Management unit Subdirección General de Proyectos de Investigación
Beneficiary centre CENTRE DE RECERCA EN ECONOMIA INTERNACIONAL

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Heterogeneity, selection and labor market disparities

  • Bonfiglioli, Alessandra
  • Gancia, Gino A.
We propose a model in which differences in socioeconomic and labor market outcomes between ex-ante identical countries can be generated as multiple equilibria sustained by different beliefs on the value of effort for finding jobs. To do so, we study the incentive to improve ability in a model where heterogeneous firms and workers interact in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and costly screening. When effort in improving ability raises both the mean and the variance of the resulting ability distribution, a complementarity between workers' choices and firms' hiring strategies can give rise to multiple equilibria. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in ability is larger and induces firms to screen more intensively workers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is important for finding good jobs. In the low-effort equilibrium, ability is less dispersed and firms screen less intensively, which confirms the belief that effort is not so important. The model has novel implications for wage inequality, the distribution of firm characteristics, productivity, sorting patterns between firms and workers, and unemployment rates that can help explain observed differences across countries., We acknowledge financial support from the ERC Grant GOPG 240989, the Fundación Ramon Areces, the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (grant ECO2008-04785, ECO2011-25624, ECO2014-59805-P) and the Barcelona GSE.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Agricultural productivity and atructural transformation: evidence from Brazil

  • Bustos, Paula
  • Caprettini, Bruno
  • Ponticelli, Jacopo
We study the effects of the adoption of new agricultural technologies on structural transformation. To guide empirical work, we present a simple model where the effect of agricultural productivity on industrial development depends on the factor-bias of technical change. We test the predictions of the model by studying the introduction of genetically engineered soybean seeds in Brazil, which had heterogeneous effects on agricultural productivity across areas with different soil and weather characteristics. We find that technical change in soy production was strongly labor-saving and led to industrial growth, as predicted by the model., We acknowledge financial support from the Private Enterprise Development in Low-Income Countries Project by the CEPR and UK Department for International Development and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO-2011-25624); Paula Bustos acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2012-11979).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Political centralization and government accountability

  • Boffa, Federico
  • Piolatto, Amedeo
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions., Boffa acknowledges financial support from the Free University of Bolzano (WW82); Piolatto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO-2012-37131) and the Government of Catalonia (2014-SGR-420); Ponzetto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (JCI-2010-08414 and ECO-2011-25624), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2013-13838), the Government of Catalonia (2009-SGR-1157 and 2014-SGR-830), the Barcelona GSE and the BBVA Foundation through its first grant for Researchers, Innovators and Cultural Creators.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Agricultural productivity and atructural transformation: evidence from Brazil

  • Bustos, Paula
  • Caprettini, Bruno
  • Ponticelli, Jacopo
We study the effects of the adoption of new agricultural technologies on structural transformation. To guide empirical work, we present a simple model where the effect of agricultural productivity on industrial development depends on the factor-bias of technical change. We test the predictions of the model by studying the introduction of genetically engineered soybean seeds in Brazil, which had heterogeneous effects on agricultural productivity across areas with different soil and weather characteristics. We find that technical change in soy production was strongly labor-saving and led to industrial growth, as predicted by the model., We acknowledge financial support from the Private Enterprise Development in Low-Income Countries Project by the CEPR and UK Department for International Development and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO-2011-25624); Paula Bustos acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2012-11979).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Heterogeneity, selection and labor market disparities

  • Bonfiglioli, Alessandra
  • Gancia, Gino A.
We propose a model in which differences in socioeconomic and labor market outcomes between ex-ante identical countries can be generated as multiple equilibria sustained by different beliefs on the value of effort for finding jobs. To do so, we study the incentive to improve ability in a model where heterogeneous firms and workers interact in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and costly screening. When effort in improving ability raises both the mean and the variance of the resulting ability distribution, a complementarity between workers' choices and firms' hiring strategies can give rise to multiple equilibria. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in ability is larger and induces firms to screen more intensively workers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is important for finding good jobs. In the low-effort equilibrium, ability is less dispersed and firms screen less intensively, which confirms the belief that effort is not so important. The model has novel implications for wage inequality, the distribution of firm characteristics, productivity, sorting patterns between firms and workers, and unemployment rates that can help explain observed differences across countries., We acknowledge financial support from the ERC Grant GOPG 240989, the Fundación Ramon Areces, the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (grant ECO2008-04785, ECO2011-25624, ECO2014-59805-P) and the Barcelona GSE.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Political centralization and government accountability

  • Boffa, Federico
  • Piolatto, Amedeo
  • Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions., Boffa acknowledges financial support from the Free University of Bolzano (WW82); Piolatto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO-2012-37131) and the Government of Catalonia (2014-SGR-420); Ponzetto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (JCI-2010-08414 and ECO-2011-25624), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2013-13838), the Government of Catalonia (2009-SGR-1157 and 2014-SGR-830), the Barcelona GSE and the BBVA Foundation through its first grant for Researchers, Innovators and Cultural Creators.