Skip to main content

COMPETENCIA, COOPERACION, NEGOCIACION Y FORMACION DE PRECIOS(II)

ECO2012-38860-C02-02

•
Funding agency name Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Funding agency acronym MINECO
Program Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprogram Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Call Proyectos I+D
Call year 2012
State Plan 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Management unit Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD DE VIGO

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On restricted bargaining sets

  • Hervés Estévez, Javier
  • Moreno García, Emma
In this paper we analyze the behavior of bargaining sets in continuum economies when there are restrictions on the formation of coalitions. We provide several characterizations of Vind’s (J Math Econ 21:89–97, 1992) bargaining set in terms of its restricted versions, where not all the coalitions are formed. Moreover, we show that these equivalences do not hold for Mas-Colell’s (J Math Econ 18:129–139, 1989) bargaining set. These findings highlight the different nature of both notions of bargaining sets. Finally, we illustrate the impossibility of extrapolating our results to a more general setting., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2012-38860-C02-01, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2012-38860-C02-02, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. 10PXIB300141PR
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stability in price competition revisited

  • Faias, Marta
  • Hervés Estévez, Javier
  • Moreno García, Emma
We consider consumers with the same reservation price, who desire to buy at most one unit of a good. Firms compete only in prices, but there are other features firms cannot control that would eventually lead an agent to buy in one firm or another. We introduce such uncertainty in a model of a price competition game with incomplete information. This competition takes place under stability and we provide equilibrium existence results. We analyze different specifications of residual demands which yield further interpretations that deepen the phenomenon of price dispersion, Bertrand’s paradox and market power., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2012-38860-C02-01, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2012-38860-C02-02, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia | Ref. UID/MAT/00297/2013