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COMPETENCIA, ESTABILIDAD E INTEGRACION

ECO2014-52345-P

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Funding agency acronym MINECO
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2014
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Management unit Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD DE MALAGA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 1
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Pooling or fooling? An experiment on signaling

  • Feri, Francesco
  • Meléndez Jiménez, Miguel Ángel
  • Ponti, Giovanni
  • Vega-Redondo, Fernando
  • Yu, Haihan
  • Ponti, Giovanni|||/items/ef055331-2045-4ba3-9308-61994c6a83ab
We compare two zero-sum versions of the so called Chinos Game, a traditional parlour game played in many countries. In one version, which we call Preemption Scenario, the first player who guesses right wins the prize. In the alternative version, called the Copycat Scenario, the last player who guesses right wins the prize. While in the Preemption Scenario there is a unique and fully revealing equilibrium, in the Copycat Scenario all equilibria have first movers pool (i.e. hide) their private information. Our experimental evidence shows, however, that in the latter case early movers do not pool but try to fool, i.e. to “lie” by systematically distorting behavior relative to equilibrium play. In fact, doing so they benefit, although the resulting gains diminish as the game proceeds. This highlights the point that, as players adjust their behavior off equilibrium, they also attempt to exploit the induced strategic uncertainty whenever the game allows for this possibility.