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DIVERSIDAD, COOPERACION Y CONFLICTO

ECO2016-75992-P

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2016
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Chimera and Anticoordination States in Learning Dynamics

  • Lugo, Haydée
  • González-Avella, Juan Carlos
  • San Miguel, Maxi
In many real-life situations, individuals are dared to simultaneously achieve social objectives of acceptance or approval and strategic objectives of coordination. Since these two objectives may take place in different environments, a two-layer network is the simple and natural framework for the study of such kind of dynamical situations. In this paper we present a model in which the state of the agents corresponds to one of two possible strategies. They change their states by interaction with their neighbors in the network. Inside each layer the agents interact by a social pressure mechanism, while between the layers the agents interact via a coordination game. From an evolutionary approach, we focus on the asymptotic solutions for all-to-all interactions across and inside the layers and for any initial distribution of strategies. We find new asymptotic configurations which do not exist in a single isolated social network analysis. We report the emergence and existence of chimera states in which two different collective states coexist in the network. Namely, one layer reaches a state of full coordination while the other remains in a dynamical state of coexistence of strategies. In addition, the system may also reach a state of global anticoordination where a full coordination is reached inside each layer but with opposite strategies in each of the two network layers. We trace back the emergence of chimera states and global anticoordination states to the agents inertia against social pressure, referred here to as the level of skepticism, along with the degree of risk taken into account in a general coordination game., HL acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under Project No. ECO2016-75992-P. MS acknowledges financial support from Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI, Spain) and Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional under Project ESoTECoS Grant No. FIS2015-63628-C2-2-R (AEI/FEDER,UE) and the Spanish State Research Agency, through the María de Maeztu Program for Units of Excellence in R&D (MDM-2017-0711)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Coordination in a skeptical two-group population

  • González-Avella, Juan Carlos
  • Lugo, Haydée
  • San Miguel, Maxi
This paper explores a situation in which a population split into two groups attempts to achieve the socially efficient outcome of a coordination game between the groups. But, in addition to the coordination game, a second kind of interaction takes place inside each group trying to fulfill internal social aims such as acceptance or approval. To achieve these strategic and social concerns, a learning process comes about inside each group. The accomplishment of the social concerns depends only upon the popularity of the strategies inside each social group. We refer here to skeptical individuals as those that do not feel so much coerced by social influence in relation to social objectives. Our study reveals that a skeptical population can achieve coordination between the two groups, but it can also evolve to other final states, namely, anticoordination, dynamical coexistence of strategies and payoff inferior equilibrium. We analyse the causes that give rise to these final states in the whole range of initial distributions of strategies. Our analysis discloses a highly nontrivial behaviour observed in many real-life situations: We find that for high levels of skepticism a society can coordinate in the socially efficient coordination outcome, which can not be obtained for lower levels of skepticism. We also describe how such coordination is possible in a risky environment. We provide numerical simulations that describe the complexity of the different scenarios., Haydée Lugo acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under Project No. ECO2016-75992-P. Maxi San Miguel acknowledges financial support from Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI, Spain) and Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional under project ESOTECOS FIS2015-63628-C2-2-R (MINECO/AEI/FEDER,UE)., Peer reviewed