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AVANCES TEORICOS Y EXPERIMENTALES SOBRE NORMAS, CREENCIAS, JUEGOS Y CIBERSEGURIDAD

ECO2017-82449-P

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2017
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 7
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Otros (Other)

Self-serving recall is not a sufficient cause of optimism: An experiment

  • Caballero, Adrián
  • López Pérez, Raúl
A recent experimental literature has documented that people are (sometimes) asymmetric updaters: Good news are over-weighted, relative to bad news. We contribute to this literature with a novel experimental test of a potential mechanism of asymmetric updating, that is, that people recall better the positive than the negative evidence. In our design, this account predicts inflated posteriors regarding some future financial prize. Contrary to that, the average subject (slightly) underestimates the mode of the posterior beliefs about that payoff prospect. Although subjects tend to exhibit selfserving recall (SSR) in that they remember better the positive realizations of a signal in a memory task, this has little effect on their estimates and the extent and direction of the bias. A difficulty to recall accurately, we conclude, is not a sufficient cause for a positivity bias., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Otros (Other)

An experimental test of some economic theories of optimism

  • Caballero, Adrián
  • López Pérez, Raúl
Economic theories of optimism provide different rationales for the phenomenon of motivated reasoning, and a recent empirical literature has tested some of them, with mixed results. We contribute to this literature with a novel experimental test of two mechanisms, according to which optimism is respectively predicted when (1) the potential material losses due to the bias are relatively small or (2) the cognitive costs of the bias are small enough. In our design, these two accounts predict inflated expectations regarding some future payoff. Contrary to that, the average subject tends to (slightly) underestimate that financial prospect. Although a minority of the subjects overestimate systematically, the size of their errors is rather reduced, and they hardly differ in their personal characteristics from the rest of the subjects. In fact, optimism in our experiment is correlated with the sample observed, in that it is more likely when a subject observes relatively few good signals. This is again at odds with (1) and (2). These mechanisms, we conclude, do not appear to fully capture under which circumstances people fail into a positivity bias. Yet (1) seems to be empirically less relevant, in that we observe a similarly limited level of bias irrespectively of its monetary cost., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Simplified mental representations as a cause of overprecision

  • López Pérez, Raúl
  • Rodríguez Moral, Antonio
  • Vorsatz, Marc
Este artículo está sujeto a una licencia CC BY 4.0, Although no consensus on the issue exists yet, some evidence indicates that people are typically overprecise in their inferences. In particular, subjective confidence intervals are often too narrow when compared with Bayesian ones. This paper uses a quasi-Bayesian theory and lab experiments to explore overprecision when people learn about the empirical frequency of some random event. Motivated by the literature on limited attention, we hypothesize that, when there is a large number of potential values of individuals mentally operate with simplified representations of the objective state space. Their mental models are however sophisticated in that they co-move with the signals observed, focusing on the values of most consistent with the evidence available. As a result, they elaborate accurate point estimates of but also become too confident about them, as they hardly reflect on those values of that would call more into doubt their conclusions. In this line, subjects in our experiment almost exclusively report overly narrow confidence intervals, but also unbiased point estimates of (except when takes extreme values, i.e., close to 0 or 1). Indirect evidence suggests that subjects often consider about 1/5 of the objective state space., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Heterogeneous primacy and recency effects in frequency estimation

  • Caballero, Adrián
  • López Pérez, Raúl
Este artículo está sujeto a una licencia CC BY 4.0, Introspection and abundant field and lab evidence indicate that people often infer population characteristics from the data available. When people lack records and are not given feedback, however, they might underweight some of such data, perhaps due to inattention or memory failures. In this paper we use lab experiments and a parsimonious analytical framework to explore inference when limited attention and memory lead to (extreme) data underweighting, the relevance of such phenomenon, and whether people exhibit different patterns of underweighting. In our experiment, subjects arguably face a simple problem of inference. Even so, we find statistically significant evidence of underweighting. Yet subjects are heterogeneous: some infer as if they underweighted very little while others seem to underweight a lot of the signals; these patterns correlate with the subject's CRT score, an individual measure of reflectiveness. Further, our classification analysis also suggests that some subjects exhibit primacy effects in their patterns of underweighting, while others are better characterized by recency effects. When subjects get some experience and their payoffs are non-ambiguous, further, we find that underweighting is reduced, but only if the inference problem is simple enough., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Reciprocal, but inequality averse as well? Mixed motives for punishment and reward

  • Leibbrandt, Andreas
  • López Pérez, Raúl
  • Spiegelman, Eli
Este artículo está sujeto a una licencia CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Considerable experimental evidence indicates that reciprocity and inequality aversion are important motivations to understand deviations from self-interested behavior, and in particular costly punishment and reward. We use a within-subject experimental design to evaluate the share of subjects whose second-party reward and punishment choices are best accounted for by pure reciprocity, pure inequality aversion, a mixture of these two motives, or other motivations like altruism or competitiveness. We find that the largest fraction of punishment and rewards is motivated by a mixture of both inequality aversion and reciprocity, while smaller fractions are primarily motivated by pure inequality aversion and pure reciprocity. These findings provide new insights into the literature on other-regarding preferences and may help to organize some results in the experimental literature on second-party punishment and reward., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Why do people give to their governments? Lab-in-the-field evidence on the role of norms, social information, and political support

  • López Pérez, Raúl
  • Ramírez Zamudio, Aldo
  • Cruz-Martínez, Gibrán
Este artículo está sujeto a una licencia CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, [EN] Although factors leading to selfless acts, such as charitable donations, have been a central concern in political sciences, voluntary donations are among the most atypical and less well-known public revenue-raising sources. In this article, we explore which factors influence people's donations to their government. We conduct an artefactual field experiment in Peru where subjects anonymously decide how much of an endowment they freely donate to the government. We run six sessions with a sample that is representative of the taxpayer population of Metropolitan Lima regarding age, gender, and socioeconomic conditions. Our results suggest that donations depend on the subject's support to the government, the average donation by other subjects (social information) and their beliefs about the average donation of others (perceived social norms)., [IT] Sebbene i fattori che portano ad atti altruistici, come le donazioni a scopi di beneficenza, siano stati al centro delle preoccupazioni della scienza politica, le donazioni volontarie sono tuttora tra le fonti di raccolta di entrate pubbliche più atipiche e meno conosciute. In questo articolo esploriamo i fattori che influenzano la decisione dei cittadini e delle cittadine di fare donazioni al loro proprio governo. L'analisi empirica si basa su un esperimento di campo artefatto condotto in Perù, in cui i soggetti potevano decidere liberamente e in forma anonima la quota di un lascito da donare al governo. Abbiamo condotto sei sessioni con un campione della popolazione dei contribuenti di Lima metropolitana, rappresentativo in termini di età, genere e condizioni socieconomiche. I nostri risultati rivelano che quanto una persona decide di donare dipende dal suo suo sostegno al governo, dalla donazione media delle altre persone (informazione sociale) nonché dalla percezione circa la donazione media delle altre persone (norme sociali percepite)., [FR] Bien que les facteurs conduisant à des actes altruistes, tels que les dons caritatifs, aient été une préoccupation centrale en sciences politiques, les dons volontaires figurent parmi les sources de revenus publics les plus atypiques et moins connues. Dans cet article, nous explorons les facteurs qui influent sur les dons des individus à leur gouvernement. Nous menons une expérience de terrain artéfactuelle au Pérou, où les sujets décident anonymement de la quantité de leur dotation qu'ils veulent librement donner au gouvernement. Nous réalisons six sessions avec un échantillon représentatif de la population contribuable de la région métropolitaine de Lima en ce qui concerne l'âge, le sexe et les conditions socio-économiques. Nos résultats suggèrent que les dons dépendent du soutien du sujet au gouvernement, de la donation moyenne des autres sujets (informations sociales) et de leurs croyances quant à la donation moyenne des autres (normes sociales perçues)., [DE] Obwohl die Faktoren, die zu selbstlosen Handlungen führen, in der Politikwissenschaft ein zentrales Thema sind, gehören freiwillige Spenden zu den untypischsten und weniger bekannten Quellen öffentlicher Einnahmen. In diesem Artikel untersuchen wir, welche Faktoren die Spenden der Bürger an ihre Regierung beeinflussen. Wir haben ein artefaktisches Feldexperiment in Peru durchgeführt, bei dem die Individuum anonym entscheiden, wie viel sie freiwillig an die Regierung spenden. Die Stichprobe ist in Bezug auf Alter, Geschlecht und sozioökonomische Bedingungen repräsentativ für die steuerzahlende Bevölkerung der Metropole Lima. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Spenden von der Unterstützung der Testpersonen für die Regierung, von der durchschnittlichen Spende anderer Testpersonen (soziale Informationen) und von ihren Überzeugungen über die durchschnittliche Spende anderer (wahrgenommene soziale Normen) abhängen., This work was supported by the Instituto de Investigacion Cientifica IDIC at the University of Lima Peru and the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (ECO2017-82449-P)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Information combination and preference reversals: Eye-tracking data

  • López Pérez, Raúl
  • Spiegelman, Eli
In the classic preference reversal (PR) phenomenon, individuals often choose the safer of two gambles but assign a higher monetary evaluation to the riskier one. A key distinction between choice and evaluation tasks is that the former typically require comparative processing of the two bets, while the latter can be conducted in isolation for each bet. If this task-mode difference plays a causal role in generating PRs, then the frequency of PRs across individuals should correlate with differences in comparative cognitive processes across tasks. Assuming that sequences of visual fixations reflect cognitive comparisons, we test this hypothesis using eye-tracking during a classic PR experiment. Specifically, we compare the prevalence of across-bet transitions, eye movements between the probabilities or prizes of different bets, with within-bet transitions, movements between attributes of the same bet. As expected, participants exhibit more across-bet transitions in Choice than in Evaluation. However, variation in transition patterns does not predict behavior or PR incidence, challenging context-dependent explanations of classical PRs., We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics, Industry and Competitiveness through the research projects ECO2017-82449-P and PID2021-125155NB-100 (Raúl López-Pérez), and via a Vidi and Aspasia grant (015.008.026) from the Netherlands Foundation for Scientific Research (NWO) (Eli Spiegelman via Sigrid Suetens), Peer reviewed