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INFORMACION, INTERMEDIACION FINANCIERA, MERCADOS FINANCIEROS Y ENDEUDAMIENTO EMPRESARIAL

ECO2017-88509-P

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2017
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA CCT

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 4
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The risk implications of the business loan activity in credit unions

  • Gómez Biscarri, Javier
  • López-Espinosa, Germán
  • Mesa-Toro, Andrés
US credit unions have been subject to a strict regulation of their commercial lending which included both requirements for enhanced organizational practices and a cap on the proportion of business loans relative to assets (imposed in 1998 by US Congress). Since 2003, however, these limitations have been steadily relaxed, a process which has resulted in an increase in credit union business lending activity. Using data from the universe of US credit unions we provide comprehensive evidence that expansion of the business loan portfolio increases the risk of the asset side of the credit union. This is the case even for credit unions which benefit from partnership with the SBA, for which we observe an initial increase in the risk of non-SBA backed loans (an overconfidence effect) which reverses over time (a learning effect). Our results suggest, furthermore, that the risk of business loans is exacerbated for credit unions which initiate their business loan activity and which do so rapidly. In the second part of our analysis we provide descriptive and quasi-experimental evidence that expansions of credit union activity into business loans are associated with lower subsequent growth rates of deposits. This result is similar to the reaction to risk indicators found in the banking literature and might give an ex-ante incentive for the CU that could work as a market-based stabilization mechanism complementary to that of explicit regulation., Andrés Mesa Toro acknowledges financial support from “Asociación de Amigos – Universidad de Navarra” and from Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through project PID2019-105227RB-100. Germán López-Espinosa acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through project ECO2012-33619 and ECO2016-78254, and from Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through project PID2019-105227RB-100 Javier Gomez-Biscarri acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy through projects ECO2017-88509-P and PID2020-118541GB-I00, and from the Serra Húnter Program.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Drivers of depositor discipline in credit unions

  • Gómez Biscarri, Javier
  • López-Espinosa, Germán
  • Mesa-Toro, Andrés
In this paper, we analyze whether credit unions are subject to market discipline by their (member) depositors and examine the drivers of such discipline. We first provide descriptive evidence of depositor discipline in credit unions: shares and deposits as well as savings interest rates react to variables that reflect the financial health of the credit union and its asset risk. We show that this discipline is long-lasting and that it is mediated by the existence of a deposit guarantee scheme and by the strength of the relationship of members with the credit union. We then use proxies of the capability of members to process financial information to show that discipline is heavily influenced by member financial sophistication. Our results suggest that a type of market-based discipline acts as a complement for regulation in controlling credit union risk taking, thus contributing to overall financial stability., Andrés Mesa Toro acknowledges financial support from “Asociación de Amigos—Universidad de Navarra”. Germán López-Espinosa acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through project ECO2012-33619 and ECO2016-78254. Javier Gómez-Biscarri acknowledges financial support from the Serra Húnter program, the Barcelona GSE and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through project ECO2017-88509-P.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The risk implications of the business loan activity in credit unions

  • Gómez Biscarri, Javier
  • López-Espinosa, Germán
  • Mesa-Toro, Andrés
US credit unions have been subject to a strict regulation of their commercial lending which included both requirements for enhanced organizational practices and a cap on the proportion of business loans relative to assets (imposed in 1998 by US Congress). Since 2003, however, these limitations have been steadily relaxed, a process which has resulted in an increase in credit union business lending activity. Using data from the universe of US credit unions we provide comprehensive evidence that expansion of the business loan portfolio increases the risk of the asset side of the credit union. This is the case even for credit unions which benefit from partnership with the SBA, for which we observe an initial increase in the risk of non-SBA backed loans (an overconfidence effect) which reverses over time (a learning effect). Our results suggest, furthermore, that the risk of business loans is exacerbated for credit unions which initiate their business loan activity and which do so rapidly. In the second part of our analysis we provide descriptive and quasi-experimental evidence that expansions of credit union activity into business loans are associated with lower subsequent growth rates of deposits. This result is similar to the reaction to risk indicators found in the banking literature and might give an ex-ante incentive for the CU that could work as a market-based stabilization mechanism complementary to that of explicit regulation., Andrés Mesa Toro acknowledges financial support from “Asociación de Amigos – Universidad de Navarra” and from Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through project PID2019-105227RB-100. Germán López-Espinosa acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through project ECO2012-33619 and ECO2016-78254, and from Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through project PID2019-105227RB-100 Javier Gomez-Biscarri acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy through projects ECO2017-88509-P and PID2020-118541GB-I00, and from the Serra Húnter Program.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Drivers of depositor discipline in credit unions

  • Gómez Biscarri, Javier
  • López-Espinosa, Germán
  • Mesa-Toro, Andrés
In this paper, we analyze whether credit unions are subject to market discipline by their (member) depositors and examine the drivers of such discipline. We first provide descriptive evidence of depositor discipline in credit unions: shares and deposits as well as savings interest rates react to variables that reflect the financial health of the credit union and its asset risk. We show that this discipline is long-lasting and that it is mediated by the existence of a deposit guarantee scheme and by the strength of the relationship of members with the credit union. We then use proxies of the capability of members to process financial information to show that discipline is heavily influenced by member financial sophistication. Our results suggest that a type of market-based discipline acts as a complement for regulation in controlling credit union risk taking, thus contributing to overall financial stability., Andrés Mesa Toro acknowledges financial support from “Asociación de Amigos—Universidad de Navarra”. Germán López-Espinosa acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through project ECO2012-33619 and ECO2016-78254. Javier Gómez-Biscarri acknowledges financial support from the Serra Húnter program, the Barcelona GSE and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through project ECO2017-88509-P.