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RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Parallel Maude-NPA for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis

  • Do, Canh Minh
  • Riesco, Adrian
  • Ogata, Kazuhiro
  • Escobar Román, Santiago|||0000-0002-3550-4781
[EN] Maude-NPA is a formal verification tool for analyzing cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao strand space model modulo an equational theory defining the cryptographic primitives. It starts from an attack state to find counterexamples or conclude that the attack concerned cannot be conducted by performing a backward narrowing reachability analysis. Although Maude-NPA is a powerful analyzer, its running performance can be improved by taking advantage of parallel and/or distributed computing when dealing with complex protocols whose state space is huge. This paper describes a parallel version of Maude-NPA in which the backward narrowing and the transition subsumption at each layer in Maude-NPA are conducted in parallel. A tool supporting the parallel version has been implemented in Maude with a master-worker model using meta-interpreters. We report on some experiments of various kinds of protocols that demonstrate that the tool can increase the running performance of Maude-NPA by 52% on average for complex case studies in which the number of states located at each layer is considerably large., This workwas supported in part by the JST SICORP under Grant JPMJSC20C2, Japan,in part by JSPS KAKENHI under Grant JP23K28060, Grant JP23K19959,Grant JP24K20757, Grant JP24KK0185, in part by the ProCode10 under Grant PID2023-149943OB-I00, in part by MICIN under Grant PID2021-122830OB-C42, in part by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, in part by ERDF A way ofmaking Europe under Grant CIPROM/2022/6, in part by Generalitat Valenciana,and in part by INCIBE's Chair funded by the EU-NextGenerationEU throughthe Spanish government's Plan de Recuperacion, Transformacion y Resiliencia.
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Formal Analysis of Post-Quantum Hybrid Key Exchange SSH Transport Layer Protocol

  • Tran, Duong Dinh
  • Ogata, Kazuhiro
  • Akleylek, Sedat
  • Otmani, Ayoub
  • Escobar Román, Santiago|||0000-0002-3550-4781
[EN] Facing the quantum attack threat, a quantum-resistant version of the SSH Transport Layer protocol has been proposed and been standardized by an IETF working group. This standardization process has been motivated by the fact that if practical quantum computers become available, classical key exchange algorithms used today will no longer be safe because their security can be efficiently broken by Shor's algorithm running on a quantum computer. In this paper, we construct a symbolic model of the proposed protocol, specify it in the specification language CafeOBJ, and conduct a formal analysis of the claimed security properties with the employment of a formal method tool called Invariant Proof Score Generator (IPSG). Three security properties are formally verified with respect to an unbounded number of protocol participants and protocol executions by employing IPSG to produce their formal proofs, the so- called proof scores in CafeOBJ. With another property, namely authentication, we find a counterexample against it, and then we propose to slightly revise the protocol. With the improved version, we formally verify that the authentication property is enjoyed, while the three properties remain secure. To model the presence of malicious participants, we extend the Dolev-Yao intruder, which is the standard intruder model used in security protocol analysis/verification, because the availability assumption of large-scale quantum computers gives the attacker some new capabilities. Under our threat model, the intruder is given capabilities of fully controlling the network as the Dolev-Yao intruder, and additionally breaking ECDH's security as well as compromising secrets., The work of Duong Dinh Tran and Kazuhiro Ogata was supported by the JST SICORP, Japan, under Grant JPMJSC20C2. The work of Santiago Escobar was supported in part by the MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and ERDF A way of making Europe under Grant PID2021-122830OB-C42, in part by the Generalitat Valenciana under Grant CIPROM/2022/6, in part by the MICIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 under Grant PCI2020-120708-2, and in part by the European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR. The work of Sedat Akleylek was supported in part by TUBITAK under Grant 121R006. The work of Ayoub Otmani was supported in part by the FAVPQC Project funded by CNRS, and in part by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) within France 2030 Program under Grant ANR-22-PETQ-0008 PQ-TLS.
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Symbolic Analysis and Verification of Hybrid Post-Quantum TLS 1.2

  • Tran, Duong Dinh
  • Ogata, Kazuhiro
  • Akleylek, Sedat
  • Escobar Román, Santiago|||0000-0002-3550-4781
[EN] Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a fundamental protocol for securing communications over untrusted networks. With the rising threat of quantum computing, Amazon Web Services (AWS) proposed Hybrid Post-Quantum (PQ) TLS, an extended version of TLS 1.2 designed to resist quantum attacks. In this paper, we present a formal symbolic analysis of the AWS protocol proposal using the CafeOBJ algebraic specification language and the Invariant Proof Score Generator (IPSG) tool. Our analysis formally evaluates the protocol's resilience under two attacker models: one where classical primitives fail (by quantum adversaries), and one where PQ primitives are compromised (as they are relatively new). We verify key security properties, including the confidentiality of session keys, confidentiality of ephemeral secret keys, and forward secrecy, against both classical and quantum adversaries, confirming the security claims of the proposal. All proofs are executable within the CafeOBJ system and hold for an unbounded number of protocol participants and sessions. Although authentication is beyond the scope of the AWS protocol, we propose an improved version that incorporates hybrid digital signatures to restore quantum-safe authentication., The work of Duong Dinh Tran and Kazuhiro Ogata was supported by JST SICORP, Japan, under Grant JPMJSC20C2, and by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 24KK0185 and 23K28060. The work of Santiago Escobar was supported by the grant PID2024-162030OB-100 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, and by the grant CIPROM/2022/6 funded by Generalitat Valenciana. The work of Sedat Akleylek was supported in part by the Estonian Research Council under Grant PRG2531, No 2-2/24/541-1, and in part by TUBITAK under Grant 121R006.
RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Modelling and verification of post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms using Maude

  • García-Valero, Víctor|||0000-0003-0681-1130
  • Escobar Román, Santiago|||0000-0002-3550-4781
  • Ogata, Kazuhiro
  • Akleylek, Sedat
  • Otmani, Ayoub
[EN] Communication and information technologies shape the world's systems of today, and those systems shape our society. The security of those systems relies on mathematical problems that are hard to solve for classical computers, that is, the available current computers. Recent advances in quantum computing threaten the security of our systems and the communications we use. In order to face this threat, multiple solutions and protocols have been proposed in the Post-Quantum Cryptography project carried on by the National Institute of Standards and Technologies. The presented work focuses on defining a formal framework in Maude for the security analysis of different postquantum key encapsulation mechanisms under assumptions given under the DolevYao model. Through the use of our framework, we construct a symbolic model to represent the behaviour of each of the participants of the protocol in a network. We then conduct reachability analysis and find a man-in-the-middle attack in each of them and a design vulnerability in Bit Flipping Key Encapsulation. For both cases, we provide some insights on possible solutions. Then, we use the Maude Linear Temporal Logic model checker to extend the analysis of the symbolic system regarding security, liveness and fairness properties. Liveness and fairness properties hold while the security property does not due to the man-in-the-middle attack and the design vulnerability in Bit Flipping Key Encapsulation., Victor Garcia and Santiago Escobar were supported by the grant PID2021-122830OB-C42 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and ERDF A way of making Europe and by the grant PCI2020-120708-2 funded by MICIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by the European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR. Kazuhiro Ogata was supported by JST SICORP Grant Number JPMJSC20C2, Japan. Sedat Akleylek was supported by TUBITAK under Grant No. 121R006. Ayoub Otmani was supported by FAVPQC project funded by CNRS and by the grant ANR-22-PETQ-0008 PQ-TLS funded by Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) within France 2030 program. There was no additional external funding received for this study. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.