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INNOVACION E INTERVENCION POLITICA EN CUESTIONES SOCIALES Y ECONOMICAS

PGC2018-097898-B-I00

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento y Fortalecimiento Científico y Tecnológico del Sistema de I+D+i
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2018
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 3
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mobile termination rates and retail regimes in Europe and the US: A unified theory of CPP and RPP

  • Hurkens, Sjaak
  • López, Ángel L.
We analyse an oligopoly model where mobile operators may charge subscribers for placing and receiving calls. We compare the CPP equilibrium (where receiving calls is free) with the RPP equilibrium (where placing and receiving calls are priced equally). Reducing termination rates leads to lower prices and higher penetration under CPP, but has reversed effects under RPP. No termination rate yields efficiency under either retail regime. Comparing EU practice (CPP with termination regulated at cost) and US practice (RPP with Bill and Keep), we find that total surplus is higher in the US when the value of receiving calls is very high, but both producer and consumer surplus are higher in the EU for intermediate values of the call externality. If call externality is higher (resp., lower), consumers (resp., producers) are better off in the US., This research was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities through grants PGC2018-097898-B-100 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE) and RTI2018-097434-B-I00, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S), the Generalitat de Catalunya through grants 2017 SGR 1136 and 2017 SGR 1301 and the Net Institute, http://www.Netinst.org.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Perception of corruption and public support for redistribution in Latin America

  • Hauk, Esther
  • Oviedo, Mónica
  • Ramos, Xavier
This paper studies the relationship between people’s beliefs about the quality of their institutions, as measured by corruption perceptions, and preferences for redistribution in Latin America. Our empirical study is guided by a theoretical model which introduces taxes into Foellmi and Oechslin’s (2007) general equilibrium model of non-collusive corruption. In this model perceived corruption influences people’s preferences for redistribution through two channels. On the one hand it undermines trust in government, which reduces people’s support for redistribution. On the other hand, more corruption decreases own wealth relative to average wealth of below-average-wealth individuals leading to a higher demand for redistribution. Thus, the effect of perceived corruption on redistribution cannot be signed a priori. Our novel empirical findings for Latin America suggest that perceiving corruption in the public sector increases people’s support for redistribution. Although the wealth channel dominates in the data, we also find evidence for the trust channel — from corruption to demand for redistribution via reduced trust., Xavier Ramos acknowledges financial support of projects PID2019-104619RB-C43 (Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Spain) and 2017SGR-1571 (Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain). Esther Hauk acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), and through CICYT project number ECO2015-67171-P (MINECO/FEDER), and from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities through project PGC2018-097898-B-100 MCIU/AEI/FEDER and from the government of Catalonia under project 2017SGR1571., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Political correctness and elite prestige

  • Hauk, Esther
  • Ortega, Javier
Consider a society where the prestige of orthodox views is linked to the prestige of the elite. Heterodox individuals are less likely to express their views if other peers refrain from doing so and if the elite is prestigious. In turn, corruption by the elite is less easily detected if orthodox views dominate. We characterize equilibrium self-denial and corruption and show that an exogenous increase in the range of orthodox views may result in a decrease in the total number of individuals truthfully expressing their views. Some features of the model are shown to be compatible with US data., The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S); from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities through project PGC2018-097898-B-100 MCIU/AEI/FEDER, EU; from the Government of Catalonia under project 2017 SGR 1571 AGAUR Generalitat de Catalunya and from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through research project PID2021-126209OB-I00 funded by MCIN-AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by ERDF A way of making Europe., Peer reviewed