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JUEGOS DE VOTACION Y COOPERACION CON APLICACIONES A LAS REDES SOCIALES Y A LAS CIENCIAS POLITICAS

PID2019-104987GB-I00

•
Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Call Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Call year 2019
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT POLITECNICA DE CATALUNYA

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Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Typeface recognition and legibility metrics

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier|||0000-0002-5203-4347
  • Tàpias Anton, Montserrat|||0000-0003-2421-0718
  • Balius Planelles, Andreu
  • Salvadó Arqués, Francisco María
In the digital age, people prefer digital content, but screen-related health concerns like eye strain and blue light emerge. Legibility gains importance in digital text, especially in fields like optometry and for those with low vision. Therefore, having good letter recognition ensures better readability of words and written language in general. This work focuses on defining three typeface legibility indices from the judgements of a group of 31 observers. Those indices are based on statistics, confusion matrices, and power indices from game theory. As far as we know, this is the first time that typeface legibility indices have been defined using game theory. These indices help us to globally assess how legible is a typeface. We apply them to three commonly used typefaces (Roboto, Helvetica and Georgia), and to a new one developed for the authors (Optotipica 5 v2022). This comparison helps us understand which typefaces are more legible according to the defined indices on digital screens. The major conclusions are: (1) The three indices are highly consistent pairwise; (2) Helvetica is the most legible typeface for uppercase letters, whilst Optotipica is the most legible for lowercase; (3) the two cases of Helvetica exhibit uniform high legibility metrics, ensuring optimal recognition regardless of letter case., X. Molinero was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and the European Union (FEDER funds) [PID2019-104987GB-I00, JUVOCO], the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación [PID-2020-112581GB-C21, MOTION] and the Catalan government [2021 SGR 01419 ALBCOM], Peer Reviewed, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::1 - Fi de la Pobresa, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::3 - Salut i Benestar, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::10 - Reducció de les Desigualtats, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::11 - Ciutats i Comunitats Sostenibles
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Multidimension: a dimensionality extension of simple games

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier|||0000-0002-5203-4347
  • Riquelme Csori, Fabian Rolando|||0000-0003-4491-0148
  • Roura Ferret, Salvador|||0000-0003-4394-5939
  • Serna Iglesias, María José|||0000-0001-9729-8648
In voting theory and social choice theory, decision systems can be represented as simple games, i.e., cooperative games defined through their players or voters and their set of winning coalitions. The weighted voting games form a well-known strict subclass of simple games, where each player has a voting weight so that a coalition wins if the sum of weights of their members exceeds a given quota. Since the number of winning coalitions can be exponential in the number of players, simple games can be represented much more compactly as intersections or unions of weighted voting games. A simple game’s dimension (codimension) is the minimum number of weighted voting games such that their intersection (union) is the given game. It is known there are voting systems with a high (co)dimension. This work introduces the multidimension as the minimum size of an expression with intersections and unions on weighted voting games necessary to obtain the considered simple game. We generalize this notion to subclasses of weighted voting games and analyze the generative properties of these subclasses. We also characterize the simple games with finite generalized multidimension over the set of weighted voting games without dummy players. We provide a comprehensive classification for simple games up to a certain number of players. These results complement similar classification results for generalized (co)dimensions. Our results show how generalized multidimension allows representing more simple games and more compactly, even for a small number of players and for subclasses., "Xavier Molinero was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and the European Union (FEDER funds) [PID2019-104987GB-I00, JUVOCO]. Fabián Riquelme was supported by the Fondecyt de Iniciación 11200113 from ANID, Chile. Maria Serna was partially supported by the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación [PID-2020-112581GB-C21, MOTION]. Xavier Molinero, Salvador Roura, and Maria Serna were also partially supported by the Catalan government [2021 SGR 01419 ALBCOM]", Peer Reviewed
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Extremal coalitions for influence games through swarm intelligence-based methods

  • Riquelme Csori, Fabian Rolando|||0000-0003-4491-0148
  • Olivares Ordenes, Rodrigo
  • Muñoz Peña, Francisco
  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier|||0000-0002-5203-4347
  • Serna Iglesias, María José|||0000-0001-9729-8648
An influence game is a simple game represented over an influence graph (i.e., a labeled, weighted graph) on which the influence spread phenomenon is exerted. Influence games allow applying different properties and parameters coming from cooperative game theory to the contexts of social network analysis, decision-systems, voting systems, and collective behavior. The exact calculation of several of these properties and parameters is computationally hard, even for a small number of players. Two examples of these parameters are the length and the width of a game. The length of a game is the size of its smaller winning coalition, while the width of a game is the size of its larger losing coalition. Both parameters are relevant to know the levels of difficulty in reaching agreements in collective decision-making systems. Despite the above, new bio-inspired metaheuristic algorithms have recently been developed to solve the NP-hard influence maximization problem in an efficient and approximate way, being able to find small winning coalitions that maximize the influence spread within an influence graph. In this article, we apply some variations of this solution to find extreme winning and losing coalitions, and thus efficient approximate solutions for the length and the width of influence games. As a case study, we consider two real social networks, one formed by the 58 members of the European Union Council under nice voting rules, and the other formed by the 705 members of the European Parliament, connected by political affinity. Results are promising and show that it is feasible to generate approximate solutions for the length and width parameters of influence games, in reduced solving time, "Funding Statement: F. Riquelme has been partially supported by Fondecyt de Iniciación 11200113, Chile, and by the SEGIB scholarship of Fundación Carolina, Spain; X. Molinero under grants PID2019-104987GB-I00 (JUVOCO); M. Serna under grants PID2020-112581GB-C21 (MOTION) and 2017-SGR-786 (ALBCOM)", Peer Reviewed
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On anonymous and weighted voting systems

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
  • Pons Vallès, Montserrat|||0000-0003-1592-0347
Many bodies around the world make their decisions through voting systems in which voters have several options and the collective result also has several options. Many of these voting systems are anonymous, i.e., all voters have an identical role in voting. Anonymous simple voting games, a binary vote for voters and a binary collective decision, can be represented by an easy weighted game, i.e., by means of a quota and an identical weight for the voters. Widely used voting systems of this type are the majority and the unanimity decision rules. In this article, we analyze the case in which voters have two or more voting options and the collective result of the vote has also two or more options. We prove that anonymity implies being representable through a weighted game if and only if the voting options for voters are binary. As a consequence of this result, several significant enumerations are obtained., This research was partially supported by funds from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2019-I04987GB-I00. We are grateful to the associate editor and two anonymous referees whose interesting comments allowed us to improve the paper., Peer Reviewed
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On the enumeration of bipartite simple games

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
  • Samaniego Vidal, Daniel
© 2021. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/, This paper provides a classification of all monotonic bipartite simple games. The problem we deal with is very versatile since simple games are inequivalent monotonic Boolean functions, functions that are used in many fields such as game theory, neural networks, artificial intelligence, reliability or multiple-criteria decision-making. The obtained classification can be implemented in an algorithm able to enumerate bipartite simple games. These numbers provide some light on enumerations of several subclasses of bipartite simple games, for which we find formulas. Complete simple games, a subclass of all simple games for which the desirability relation is a complete preordering, were already classified by means of two parameters: a vector and a matrix fulfilling some conditions. Complete simple games are inequivalent monotonic regular Boolean functions. In this paper, we deduce a procedure for bipartite non-complete games, which allows enumerating the number of bipartite simple games. Several formulas are obtained, in particular polynomial expressions for the number of bicameral meet games and the number of bicameral join games, two types of voting systems widely used in practice., This research has been partially supported by funds from the Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities grant PID2019-104987GB-I00., Peer Reviewed
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Enumeration of simple games with two equivalence classes of players

  • Kurz, Sascha
  • Samaniego Vidal, Daniel
© 2023. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/, Many real-world voting systems consist of voters that occur in just two different types. Indeed, each voting system with a “House” and a “Senate” is of that type. Here we present structural characterizations and an explicit enumeration formula for these so-called bipartite simple games. This formula extends some partial enumerations of simple games related to completeness or the number of minimal winning coalitions., This paper is part of the project PID2019-104987GB-I00 financed by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/ 501100011033.
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Some characterizations of resolute majority rules

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
  • Samaniego Vidal, Daniel
The version of record of this article, first published in Annals of Operations Research, is available online at Publisher’s website: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05621-x, In this paper we consider decision functions in which voters have three options and one of them is abstention or indifference and the output is a binary decision between two alternatives so that a tie is not possible. These resolute decision functions appear frequently in grading, in some sport competitions, in voting situations in which the status quo is put to the vote, etc. It is a more restricted case of the voting context considered in the seminal article by Kenneth May on decision functions, published in Econometrica in 1952, because the output set does not admit a tie. Among these resolute decision functions we focus on the study of majority functions, in which the number of favorable votes to an alternative must be strictly greater than the number of votes against it. This work provides an axiomatic characterization for the set of majority functions and for the relative majority function with status quo bias. Both characterizations are based on weaker versions of neutrality. Other complementary characterizations are also provided., Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. This research is part of the I+D+i project PID2019-104987GB-I00 supported by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/., Peer Reviewed
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Stability for coalition structures in terms of the proportional partitional shapley value

  • Carreras Escobar, Francisco|||0000-0002-7248-9912
  • Magaña Nieto, Antonio|||0000-0003-0879-0759
Many coalitional values have been introduced in the literature on cooperative games over the last decades, and especially since 2000. The multiplicity of options suggests the convenience of testing the existence of stable coalition structures, in the sense of Hart and Kurz (1983, Econometrica), when payments are made using some of these values. We recall their concept of ¿–stability and give results for the proportional partitional Shapley value, introduced by Alonso–Meijide et al (2015, Discrete Appl. Math.), which shares the utility of any coalition proportionally to the Shapley value of the involved players in the original game., The authors wish to thank the editors Manfred J. Holler and Jean–François Laslier for their support in the publication of the article, as well as the comments from two anonymous reviewers, which have been useful in improving the content. Antonio Magaña’s research was partially supported by projects PID2019–105118GB–I00 and PID2019–104987GB–I00 funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities and FEDER, “A way to make Europe” and by the Catalan government [2021 SGR01419 ALBCOM]., Peer Reviewed
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An extension and an alternative characterization of May’s theorem

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
  • Pons Vallès, Montserrat|||0000-0003-1592-0347
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Annals of Operations Research. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04044-w., The context of this work is a voting scenario in which each voter expresses his/her level of affinity about a proposal, by choosing a value in the set J={-j,…,-1,0,1,…,j}, and these individual votes produce a collective result, in the same set J, through a decision function. The simple majority, defined for j=1, is a widely used example of such a decision function. In this paper, a set of independent axioms is proved to uniquely characterize the j-majority decision function. The j-majority decision is defined for any positive integer j, and it coincides with the simple majority decision when j=1. In this way, this axiomatic characterization meets two goals: it gives a new characterization of the simple majority decision when j=1 and it extends May’s theorem to this broader context., This research has been partially supported by funds from the Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2019-104987GB-I00., Peer Reviewed
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A characterization of weighted simple games based on pseudoweightings

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Optimization letters. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11590-020-01647-3, The paper provides a new characterization of weighted games within the class of simple games. It is based on a stronger form of the point-set-additive pseudoweighting property of simple games. The characterization obtained is of interest in various research fields such as game theory, coherent structures, logic gates, operations research and Boolean algebra. A (monotonic) simple game corresponds to an inequivalent (monotonic) function in Boolean algebra and a weighted game corresponds to a threshold function. The characterization obtained provides a better understanding of these mathematical structures while opening new prospects for solving numerous open problems in these areas., This research was partially supported by funds from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and from the European Union (FEDER funds) under grant MTM2015–66818-P(MINECO/FEDER)., Peer Reviewed
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A new potential concept for bisemivalues

  • Domènech Blázquez, Margarita|||0000-0001-9237-7232
  • Giménez Pradales, José Miguel|||0000-0003-4754-194X
  • Jiménez Losada, Andrés
  • Puente del Campo, María Albina|||0000-0003-2732-9087
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Optimization on 26 Dec 2024, available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/02331934.2024.2444626.”, In this paper, we study the concept of potential function for bicooperative games. Following the definition of potential given for cooperative games with a fixed set of players we obtain a formulation of this potential for the family of semivalues. This formulation allows for its extension to define a potential concept for the solutions provided by the family of bisemivalues in bicooperative games. This extension to the bicooperative case is achieved by introducing a potential pair for each member of the bisemivalue family., This research project was partially supported by funds from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033), grants PID2019-104987GB-I00 and PID2022-138956NB-100., Peer Reviewed
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On the generalized dimension and codimension of simple games

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier|||0000-0002-5203-4347
  • Riquelme Csori, Fabian Rolando|||0000-0003-4491-0148
  • Roura Ferret, Salvador|||0000-0003-4394-5939
  • Serna Iglesias, María José|||0000-0001-9729-8648
Weighted voting games are simple games that can be represented by a collection of integer weights for each player so that a coalition wins if the sum of the player weights matches or exceeds a given quota. It is known that a simple game can be expressed as the intersection or the union of weighted voting games. The dimension (codimension) of a simple game is the minimum number of weighted voting games such that their intersection (union) is the given game. In this work, we analyze some subclasses of weighted voting games and their closure under intersection or union. We introduce generalized notions of dimension and codimension regarding some subclasses of weighted voting games. In particular, we show that not all simple games can be expressed as intersection (union) of pure weighted voting games (those in which dummy players are not allowed) and we provide a characterization of such simple games. Finally, we experimentally study the generalized dimension (codimension) for some subclasses defined by establishing restrictions on the representations of weighted voting games, Peer Reviewed
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An appropriate way to extend the Banzhaf index for multiple levels of approval

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
  • Pons Vallès, Montserrat|||0000-0003-1592-0347
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Group decision and negotiation. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09718-7., The Banzhaf power index for games admits several extensions if the players have more than two ordered voting options. In this paper we prove that the most intu-itive and recognized extension of the index fails to preserve the desirability rela-tion for games with more than three ordered input levels of approval, a failure that undermines the index to be a good measure of power. This leads us to think of an alternative to the Banzhaf index for several input levels of approval. We propose a candidate for which it is proved that: (1) coincides with the Banzhaf index for sim-ple games, (2) it is proportional to its known extension for three levels of approval, and (3) preserves the desirability relation regardless of the number of input levels of approval. This new index is based on measuring the total capacity the player has to alter the outcome. In addition, it can be expressed through a very appropriate mathematical formulation that greatly facilitates its computation. Defining exten-sions of well-established notions in a wider context requires a careful analysis. Dif-ferent extensions can provide complementary nuances and, when this occurs, none of them can be considered to be ‘the’ extension. As shown in this paper, this situa-tion applies when trying to extend the Banzhaf power index from simple games to the broader context of games with several ordered input levels of approval., This research was partially supported by funds from: the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and from the European Union (FEDER funds) under grant MTM2015-66818-P (MINECO/FEDER), and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2019-I04987GB-I00., Peer Reviewed
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On the Felsenthal power index

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
  • Samaniego Vidal, Daniel
The paper that introduces the Felsenthal index is titled: ‘A well-behaved index of a priori P-Power for simple n-person games.’ In 2016, Felsenthal introduced his index for simple games. His definition does not base on the axiomatic approach. Then, Felsenthal regarded some properties and proved that his index satisfies a list of six reasonable and compelling postulates. Three of the properties that he regarded refer to the weighted games, but this fact does not reduce the definition of his index to weighted games. He proves that none of seven well-known efficient power indices proposed to date satisfies the list of postulates, indicating for each of them which of the six postulates violate. In this paper we extend some of his postulates, originally defined for weighted games, to simple games. The main objective of the article is to answer three open questions motivated in his article. In particular, we prove that his index may not be the unique one fulfilling the six proposed postulates, provide an axiomatic characterization for his index and, propose an impossibility result, which is obtained by adding a new postulate to a sublist of the postulates he considered. We also remark the existence of some alternative compelling postulates which are not satisfied for the index., This research is part of the I+D+i project PID2019-104987GB-I00 supported by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/. We thank José María Alonso-Meijide for his comments and suggestions, which helped us to improve the manuscript. We greatly appreciate the comments of two referees that have contributed to improve this work., Peer Reviewed
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Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Markov chains applied to Parrondo’s paradox: the coin tossing problem

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier|||0000-0002-5203-4347
  • Mégnien, Camille
Parrondo’s paradox was introduced by Juan Parrondo in 1996. In game theory, this paradox is described as: A combination of losing strategies becomes a winning strategy. At first glance, this paradox is quite surprising, but we can easily explain it by using simulations and mathematical arguments. Indeed, we first consider some examples with the Parrondo’s paradox and, using the software R, we simulate one of them, the coin tossing. Actually, we see that specific combinations of losing games become a winning game. Moreover, even a random combination of these two losing games leads to a winning game. Later, we introduce the major definitions and theorems over Markov chains to study our Parrondo’s paradox applied to the coin tossing problem. In particular, we represent our Parrondo’s game as a Markov chain and we find its stationary distribution. In that way, we exhibit that our combination of two losing games is truly a winning combination. We also deliberate possible applications of the paradox in some fields such as ecology, biology, finance or reliability theory., Peer Reviewed
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Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

The decline of the Buchholz tiebreaker system: a preferable alternative

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
We propose a simple method of undoing tiebreaks in sport competitions with a large number of competitors and relatively small number of rounds of competition. Such methods are common in many games including Chess, Go, Bridge or Scrabble, among others. Tie-breaking methods decide in strict order the prizes to be received. One of the most commonly used methods is the well-known Buchholz method, based on the arithmetic mean of the scores obtained by the opponents. The alternative method that we propose in this paper, which is quite close to the median of the scores obtained by the opponents, is also a weighted average of the opponents’ scores, whose weights are based on the binomial distribution. The main objective of the article is to compare the proposed method with that of Buchholz, highlighting the many advantages over it. Unfortunately, even today Buchholz’s method and its variants are routinely used as the first and second tiebreaker criteria. It is the used as a first and second criteria in the rapid and blitz chess world championships that took place in December 2021. We believe that Buchholz’s method should be replaced by the one proposed here as soon as possible., This research is part of the I+D+i project PID2019-104987GB-I00 supported by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/, Peer Reviewed
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An aggregation rule based on the binomial distribution

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
Many decision-making situations require the evaluation of several voters or agents. In a situation where voters evaluate candidates, the question arises of how best to aggregate evaluations so as to compare the candidates. The aim of this work is to propose a method of aggregating the evaluations of the voters, which has outstanding properties and serve as a potential evaluative tool in many contexts. Ordered weighted averages is a family of rules appropriate for studying this problem. In this paper, I propose as a solution an ordered weighted average that satisfies compelling properties and whose weights are derived from the binomial distribution., This research is part of the I+D+i project PID2019-104987GB-I00 supported by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/., Peer Reviewed
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On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier|||0000-0002-5203-4347
  • Serna Iglesias, María José|||0000-0001-9729-8648
  • Taberner Ortiz, Marc
In this paper, we analyze the frequency distributions of weights and quotas in weighted majority voting games (WMVG) up to eight players. We also show different procedures that allow us to obtain some minimum or minimum sum representations of WMVG, for any desired number of players, starting from a minimum or minimum sum representation. We also provide closed formulas for the number of WMVG with n players having a minimum representation with quota up to three, and some subclasses of this family of games. Finally, we complement these results with some upper bounds related to weights and quotas., Peer Reviewed
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On the enumeration of some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Optimization on 13 Dec 2022, available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/02331934.2022.2154126., This paper considers inequivalent monotone Boolean functions of an arbitrary number of variables, two monotone Boolean functions are equivalent if one can be obtained from the other by permuting the variables. It focuses on some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions with three and four types of equivalent variables, where the variables are either dominant or dominated. The paper provides closed formulas for their enumeration as a function of the number of variables. The problem we deal with is very versatile since inequivalent monotone Boolean functions are monotonic simple games, structures that are used in many fields such as game theory, neural networks, artificial intelligence, reliability or multiple-criteria decision-making., This publication is part of the I+D+i project/PID2019-104987GB-I00, financed by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/; Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation., Peer Reviewed
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Legibilidad y letras, Readability and letters

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier|||0000-0002-5203-4347
  • Laamiri, Arm
© 2022 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works., In the present, there are different indices that measure the difficulty level of reading a text, i.e. the readability of a text. Different studies have been made on the frequency of occurrence of letters in several languages, but as we know there are not thorough studies on the occurrence of letters according to the readability of a text. The main objective of the present work is to study the frequency of occurrence of letters in a text according to its legibility. This occurrence will be approached from two points of view. First, through the so-called power indices of game theory. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that a game is associated with a text and the influence or power of each letter will be analysed by means of the so-called power indices of the game theory. Thus, we present a new application of game theory. Second, by means of basic statistics to study relative frequency of letters in a text., Peer Reviewed
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On the enumeration of Boolean functions with distinguished variables

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Soft computing. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00500-020-05422-5, Boolean functions have a fundamental role in neural networks and machine learning. Enumerating these functions and significant subclasses is a highly complex problem. Therefore, it is of interest to study subclasses that escape this limitation and can be enumerated by means of sequences depending on the number of variables. In this article, we obtain seven new formulas corresponding to enumerations of some subclasses of Boolean functions. The versatility of these functions does the problem interesting to several different fields as game theory, hypergraphs, reliability, cryptography or logic gates., Peer Reviewed
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Decay of waves in strain gradient porous elasticity with Moore-Gibson-Thompson dissipation

  • Fernández García, José Ramon
  • Magaña Nieto, Antonio|||0000-0003-0879-0759
  • Quintanilla de Latorre, Ramón|||0000-0001-7059-7058
We study a one-dimensional problem arising in strain gradient porous-elasticity. Three different Moore–Gibson–Thompson dissipation mechanisms are considered: viscosity and hyperviscosity on the displacements, and weak viscoporosity. The existence and uniqueness of solutions are proved. The energy decay is also shown, being polynomial for the two first situations, unless a particular choice of the constitutive parameters is made in the hyperviscosity case. Finally, for the weak viscoporosity, only the slow decay can be expected, Peer Reviewed
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Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues

  • Domènech Blázquez, Margarita|||0000-0001-9237-7232
  • Giménez Pradales, José Miguel|||0000-0003-4754-194X
  • Puente del Campo, María Albina|||0000-0003-2732-9087
We focus on bicooperative games, a variation of the classic cooperative games and, in particular, on the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues defined on these games. We consider three special classes of players: weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players. By introducing new properties related to this kind of players, we provide new axiomatic characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues giving, in both cases, a set of independent properties that univocally determine them. We also provide a computational procedure to calculate the allocations given by the Shapley bisemivalue in terms of the generalized multilinear extension of the game., This research project was partially supported by funds from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2019-104987GB-I00., Peer Reviewed
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Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Analytical study on typeface visual identification

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier|||0000-0002-5203-4347
  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
  • Tàpias Anton, Montserrat|||0000-0003-2421-0718
In this study, our objective is to explore methodologies for the identification of diverse typefaces. Utilizing the gathered data, we conducted a thorough analysis of the outcomes, distinguishing between successes and failures for both uppercase and lowercase letters within each typeface. The analytical framework is anchored in three distinct recognition measures. The initial measure draws upon the relative frequency of accurate responses, providing insights into the overall performance of each typeface. The second measure is constructed around the F-score derived from confusion matrices, offering a comprehensive evaluation of recognition precision and recall. Lastly, the third measure is formulated on the well-established Shapley-Shubik index, extensively scrutinized and endorsed within the realm of classical game theory. This multifaceted approach allows us to comprehensively assess the distinct aspects of typ.eface recognition, contributing to a nuanced under- standing of their effectiveness and characteristics, J. Freixas and X. Molinero has been partially supported by funds from the Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2019-104987GB-I00 (JUVOCO) and the Catalan government [2021 SGR 01419 ALBCOM]., Peer Reviewed, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::5 - Igualtat de Gènere, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::10 - Reducció de les Desigualtats
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Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Social disruption games in signed networks

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier|||0000-0002-5203-4347
  • Riquelme Csori, Fabian Rolando|||0000-0003-4491-0148
  • Serna Iglesias, María José|||0000-0001-9729-8648
Signed networks describe many real-world relations among users. Positive connections between two users or vertices generally mean good feelings between them, but negative connections mean bad feelings. A disruptor cycle in a graph is a cycle containing only one negative edge. A signed graph is known to be clusterable if and only if it does not contain a disruptor cycle. In this paper, we study the clusterability of a signed graph from the point of view of game theory introducing social disruption games on signed graphs. In these games, a coalition wins if the subgraph induced by the coalition is non-clusterable, i.e., it contains a disruptor cycle. Moreover, we study parameters and properties of players and compare them to other subclasses of simple games. In addition, we give some complexity results. In particular, we show that, unlike other subclasses of simple games, given a social disruption game, computing its length, deciding whether it is proper, or deciding whether it has a dummy player can be done in polynomial time. However, other problems, such as deciding whether the game is strong, or computing known power indices, remain computationally hard., "X. Molinero was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and the European Union (FEDER funds) [PID2019-104987GB-I00, JUVOCO] and the Catalan government [2021 SGR 01419 ALBCOM]. F. Riquelme was supported by the Fondecyt de Iniciación 11200113 from ANID, Chile. M. Serna was partially supported by the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación [PID-2020-112581GB-C21, MOTION] and the Catalan government [2021 SGR 01419 ALBCOM].", Peer Reviewed, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::17 - Aliança per a Aconseguir els Objetius, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::11 - Ciutats i Comunitats Sostenibles
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stability for coalition structures in terms of the proportional partitional shapley value

  • Carreras Escobar, Francisco
  • Magaña Nieto, Antonio
Many coalitional values have been introduced in the literature on cooperative games over the last decades, and especially since 2000. The multiplicity of options suggests the convenience of testing the existence of stable coalition structures, in the sense of Hart and Kurz (1983, Econometrica), when payments are made using some of these values. We recall their concept of ¿–stability and give results for the proportional partitional Shapley value, introduced by Alonso–Meijide et al (2015, Discrete Appl. Math.), which shares the utility of any coalition proportionally to the Shapley value of the involved players in the original game., The authors wish to thank the editors Manfred J. Holler and Jean–François Laslier for their support in the publication of the article, as well as the comments from two anonymous reviewers, which have been useful in improving the content. Antonio Magaña’s research was partially supported by projects PID2019–105118GB–I00 and PID2019–104987GB–I00 funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities and FEDER, “A way to make Europe” and by the Catalan government [2021 SGR01419 ALBCOM]., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (published version)
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Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An extension and an alternative characterization of May’s theorem

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
  • Pons Vallès, Montserrat
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Annals of Operations Research. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04044-w., The context of this work is a voting scenario in which each voter expresses his/her level of affinity about a proposal, by choosing a value in the set J={-j,…,-1,0,1,…,j}, and these individual votes produce a collective result, in the same set J, through a decision function. The simple majority, defined for j=1, is a widely used example of such a decision function. In this paper, a set of independent axioms is proved to uniquely characterize the j-majority decision function. The j-majority decision is defined for any positive integer j, and it coincides with the simple majority decision when j=1. In this way, this axiomatic characterization meets two goals: it gives a new characterization of the simple majority decision when j=1 and it extends May’s theorem to this broader context., This research has been partially supported by funds from the Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2019-104987GB-I00., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Typeface recognition and legibility metrics

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier
  • Tàpias Anton, Montserrat
  • Balius Planelles, Andreu
  • Salvadó Arqués, Francisco María
In the digital age, people prefer digital content, but screen-related health concerns like eye strain and blue light emerge. Legibility gains importance in digital text, especially in fields like optometry and for those with low vision. Therefore, having good letter recognition ensures better readability of words and written language in general. This work focuses on defining three typeface legibility indices from the judgements of a group of 31 observers. Those indices are based on statistics, confusion matrices, and power indices from game theory. As far as we know, this is the first time that typeface legibility indices have been defined using game theory. These indices help us to globally assess how legible is a typeface. We apply them to three commonly used typefaces (Roboto, Helvetica and Georgia), and to a new one developed for the authors (Optotipica 5 v2022). This comparison helps us understand which typefaces are more legible according to the defined indices on digital screens. The major conclusions are: (1) The three indices are highly consistent pairwise; (2) Helvetica is the most legible typeface for uppercase letters, whilst Optotipica is the most legible for lowercase; (3) the two cases of Helvetica exhibit uniform high legibility metrics, ensuring optimal recognition regardless of letter case., X. Molinero was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and the European Union (FEDER funds) [PID2019-104987GB-I00, JUVOCO], the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación [PID-2020-112581GB-C21, MOTION] and the Catalan government [2021 SGR 01419 ALBCOM], Peer Reviewed, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::1 - Fi de la Pobresa, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::3 - Salut i Benestar, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::10 - Reducció de les Desigualtats, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::11 - Ciutats i Comunitats Sostenibles, Postprint (author's final draft)
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Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Multidimension: a dimensionality extension of simple games

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier
  • Riquelme Csori, Fabian Rolando
  • Roura Ferret, Salvador
  • Serna Iglesias, María José
In voting theory and social choice theory, decision systems can be represented as simple games, i.e., cooperative games defined through their players or voters and their set of winning coalitions. The weighted voting games form a well-known strict subclass of simple games, where each player has a voting weight so that a coalition wins if the sum of weights of their members exceeds a given quota. Since the number of winning coalitions can be exponential in the number of players, simple games can be represented much more compactly as intersections or unions of weighted voting games. A simple game’s dimension (codimension) is the minimum number of weighted voting games such that their intersection (union) is the given game. It is known there are voting systems with a high (co)dimension. This work introduces the multidimension as the minimum size of an expression with intersections and unions on weighted voting games necessary to obtain the considered simple game. We generalize this notion to subclasses of weighted voting games and analyze the generative properties of these subclasses. We also characterize the simple games with finite generalized multidimension over the set of weighted voting games without dummy players. We provide a comprehensive classification for simple games up to a certain number of players. These results complement similar classification results for generalized (co)dimensions. Our results show how generalized multidimension allows representing more simple games and more compactly, even for a small number of players and for subclasses., "Xavier Molinero was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and the European Union (FEDER funds) [PID2019-104987GB-I00, JUVOCO]. Fabián Riquelme was supported by the Fondecyt de Iniciación 11200113 from ANID, Chile. Maria Serna was partially supported by the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación [PID-2020-112581GB-C21, MOTION]. Xavier Molinero, Salvador Roura, and Maria Serna were also partially supported by the Catalan government [2021 SGR 01419 ALBCOM]", Peer Reviewed, Postprint (published version)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Extremal coalitions for influence games through swarm intelligence-based methods

  • Riquelme Csori, Fabian Rolando
  • Olivares Ordenes, Rodrigo
  • Muñoz Peña, Francisco
  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier
  • Serna Iglesias, María José
An influence game is a simple game represented over an influence graph (i.e., a labeled, weighted graph) on which the influence spread phenomenon is exerted. Influence games allow applying different properties and parameters coming from cooperative game theory to the contexts of social network analysis, decision-systems, voting systems, and collective behavior. The exact calculation of several of these properties and parameters is computationally hard, even for a small number of players. Two examples of these parameters are the length and the width of a game. The length of a game is the size of its smaller winning coalition, while the width of a game is the size of its larger losing coalition. Both parameters are relevant to know the levels of difficulty in reaching agreements in collective decision-making systems. Despite the above, new bio-inspired metaheuristic algorithms have recently been developed to solve the NP-hard influence maximization problem in an efficient and approximate way, being able to find small winning coalitions that maximize the influence spread within an influence graph. In this article, we apply some variations of this solution to find extreme winning and losing coalitions, and thus efficient approximate solutions for the length and the width of influence games. As a case study, we consider two real social networks, one formed by the 58 members of the European Union Council under nice voting rules, and the other formed by the 705 members of the European Parliament, connected by political affinity. Results are promising and show that it is feasible to generate approximate solutions for the length and width parameters of influence games, in reduced solving time, "Funding Statement: F. Riquelme has been partially supported by Fondecyt de Iniciación 11200113, Chile, and by the SEGIB scholarship of Fundación Carolina, Spain; X. Molinero under grants PID2019-104987GB-I00 (JUVOCO); M. Serna under grants PID2020-112581GB-C21 (MOTION) and 2017-SGR-786 (ALBCOM)", Peer Reviewed, Postprint (published version)
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Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Some characterizations of resolute majority rules

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
  • Samaniego Vidal, Daniel
The version of record of this article, first published in Annals of Operations Research, is available online at Publisher’s website: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05621-x, In this paper we consider decision functions in which voters have three options and one of them is abstention or indifference and the output is a binary decision between two alternatives so that a tie is not possible. These resolute decision functions appear frequently in grading, in some sport competitions, in voting situations in which the status quo is put to the vote, etc. It is a more restricted case of the voting context considered in the seminal article by Kenneth May on decision functions, published in Econometrica in 1952, because the output set does not admit a tie. Among these resolute decision functions we focus on the study of majority functions, in which the number of favorable votes to an alternative must be strictly greater than the number of votes against it. This work provides an axiomatic characterization for the set of majority functions and for the relative majority function with status quo bias. Both characterizations are based on weaker versions of neutrality. Other complementary characterizations are also provided., Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. This research is part of the I+D+i project PID2019-104987GB-I00 supported by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (published version)
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Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier
  • Serna Iglesias, María José
  • Taberner Ortiz, Marc
In this paper, we analyze the frequency distributions of weights and quotas in weighted majority voting games (WMVG) up to eight players. We also show different procedures that allow us to obtain some minimum or minimum sum representations of WMVG, for any desired number of players, starting from a minimum or minimum sum representation. We also provide closed formulas for the number of WMVG with n players having a minimum representation with quota up to three, and some subclasses of this family of games. Finally, we complement these results with some upper bounds related to weights and quotas., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (published version)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues

  • Domènech Blázquez, Margarita
  • Giménez Pradales, José Miguel
  • Puente del Campo, María Albina
We focus on bicooperative games, a variation of the classic cooperative games and, in particular, on the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues defined on these games. We consider three special classes of players: weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players. By introducing new properties related to this kind of players, we provide new axiomatic characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues giving, in both cases, a set of independent properties that univocally determine them. We also provide a computational procedure to calculate the allocations given by the Shapley bisemivalue in terms of the generalized multilinear extension of the game., This research project was partially supported by funds from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2019-104987GB-I00., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the Felsenthal power index

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
  • Samaniego Vidal, Daniel
The paper that introduces the Felsenthal index is titled: ‘A well-behaved index of a priori P-Power for simple n-person games.’ In 2016, Felsenthal introduced his index for simple games. His definition does not base on the axiomatic approach. Then, Felsenthal regarded some properties and proved that his index satisfies a list of six reasonable and compelling postulates. Three of the properties that he regarded refer to the weighted games, but this fact does not reduce the definition of his index to weighted games. He proves that none of seven well-known efficient power indices proposed to date satisfies the list of postulates, indicating for each of them which of the six postulates violate. In this paper we extend some of his postulates, originally defined for weighted games, to simple games. The main objective of the article is to answer three open questions motivated in his article. In particular, we prove that his index may not be the unique one fulfilling the six proposed postulates, provide an axiomatic characterization for his index and, propose an impossibility result, which is obtained by adding a new postulate to a sublist of the postulates he considered. We also remark the existence of some alternative compelling postulates which are not satisfied for the index., This research is part of the I+D+i project PID2019-104987GB-I00 supported by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/. We thank José María Alonso-Meijide for his comments and suggestions, which helped us to improve the manuscript. We greatly appreciate the comments of two referees that have contributed to improve this work., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (published version)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An aggregation rule based on the binomial distribution

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
Many decision-making situations require the evaluation of several voters or agents. In a situation where voters evaluate candidates, the question arises of how best to aggregate evaluations so as to compare the candidates. The aim of this work is to propose a method of aggregating the evaluations of the voters, which has outstanding properties and serve as a potential evaluative tool in many contexts. Ordered weighted averages is a family of rules appropriate for studying this problem. In this paper, I propose as a solution an ordered weighted average that satisfies compelling properties and whose weights are derived from the binomial distribution., This research is part of the I+D+i project PID2019-104987GB-I00 supported by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (published version)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Social disruption games in signed networks

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier
  • Riquelme Csori, Fabian Rolando
  • Serna Iglesias, María José
Signed networks describe many real-world relations among users. Positive connections between two users or vertices generally mean good feelings between them, but negative connections mean bad feelings. A disruptor cycle in a graph is a cycle containing only one negative edge. A signed graph is known to be clusterable if and only if it does not contain a disruptor cycle. In this paper, we study the clusterability of a signed graph from the point of view of game theory introducing social disruption games on signed graphs. In these games, a coalition wins if the subgraph induced by the coalition is non-clusterable, i.e., it contains a disruptor cycle. Moreover, we study parameters and properties of players and compare them to other subclasses of simple games. In addition, we give some complexity results. In particular, we show that, unlike other subclasses of simple games, given a social disruption game, computing its length, deciding whether it is proper, or deciding whether it has a dummy player can be done in polynomial time. However, other problems, such as deciding whether the game is strong, or computing known power indices, remain computationally hard., "X. Molinero was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and the European Union (FEDER funds) [PID2019-104987GB-I00, JUVOCO] and the Catalan government [2021 SGR 01419 ALBCOM]. F. Riquelme was supported by the Fondecyt de Iniciación 11200113 from ANID, Chile. M. Serna was partially supported by the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación [PID-2020-112581GB-C21, MOTION] and the Catalan government [2021 SGR 01419 ALBCOM].", Peer Reviewed, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::17 - Aliança per a Aconseguir els Objetius, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::11 - Ciutats i Comunitats Sostenibles, Postprint (author's final draft)
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Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A new potential concept for bisemivalues

  • Domènech Blázquez, Margarita
  • Giménez Pradales, José Miguel
  • Jiménez Losada, Andrés
  • Puente del Campo, María Albina
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Optimization on 26 Dec 2024, available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/02331934.2024.2444626.”, In this paper, we study the concept of potential function for bicooperative games. Following the definition of potential given for cooperative games with a fixed set of players we obtain a formulation of this potential for the family of semivalues. This formulation allows for its extension to define a potential concept for the solutions provided by the family of bisemivalues in bicooperative games. This extension to the bicooperative case is achieved by introducing a potential pair for each member of the bisemivalue family., This research project was partially supported by funds from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033), grants PID2019-104987GB-I00 and PID2022-138956NB-100., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A characterization of weighted simple games based on pseudoweightings

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Optimization letters. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11590-020-01647-3, The paper provides a new characterization of weighted games within the class of simple games. It is based on a stronger form of the point-set-additive pseudoweighting property of simple games. The characterization obtained is of interest in various research fields such as game theory, coherent structures, logic gates, operations research and Boolean algebra. A (monotonic) simple game corresponds to an inequivalent (monotonic) function in Boolean algebra and a weighted game corresponds to a threshold function. The characterization obtained provides a better understanding of these mathematical structures while opening new prospects for solving numerous open problems in these areas., This research was partially supported by funds from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and from the European Union (FEDER funds) under grant MTM2015–66818-P(MINECO/FEDER)., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On anonymous and weighted voting systems

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
  • Pons Vallès, Montserrat
Many bodies around the world make their decisions through voting systems in which voters have several options and the collective result also has several options. Many of these voting systems are anonymous, i.e., all voters have an identical role in voting. Anonymous simple voting games, a binary vote for voters and a binary collective decision, can be represented by an easy weighted game, i.e., by means of a quota and an identical weight for the voters. Widely used voting systems of this type are the majority and the unanimity decision rules. In this article, we analyze the case in which voters have two or more voting options and the collective result of the vote has also two or more options. We prove that anonymity implies being representable through a weighted game if and only if the voting options for voters are binary. As a consequence of this result, several significant enumerations are obtained., This research was partially supported by funds from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2019-I04987GB-I00. We are grateful to the associate editor and two anonymous referees whose interesting comments allowed us to improve the paper., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
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Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Legibilidad y letras, Readability and letters

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier
  • Laamiri, Arm
© 2022 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works., In the present, there are different indices that measure the difficulty level of reading a text, i.e. the readability of a text. Different studies have been made on the frequency of occurrence of letters in several languages, but as we know there are not thorough studies on the occurrence of letters according to the readability of a text. The main objective of the present work is to study the frequency of occurrence of letters in a text according to its legibility. This occurrence will be approached from two points of view. First, through the so-called power indices of game theory. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that a game is associated with a text and the influence or power of each letter will be analysed by means of the so-called power indices of the game theory. Thus, we present a new application of game theory. Second, by means of basic statistics to study relative frequency of letters in a text., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
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Decay of waves in strain gradient porous elasticity with Moore-Gibson-Thompson dissipation

  • Fernández García, José Ramon
  • Magaña Nieto, Antonio
  • Quintanilla de Latorre, Ramón
We study a one-dimensional problem arising in strain gradient porous-elasticity. Three different Moore–Gibson–Thompson dissipation mechanisms are considered: viscosity and hyperviscosity on the displacements, and weak viscoporosity. The existence and uniqueness of solutions are proved. The energy decay is also shown, being polynomial for the two first situations, unless a particular choice of the constitutive parameters is made in the hyperviscosity case. Finally, for the weak viscoporosity, only the slow decay can be expected, Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
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An appropriate way to extend the Banzhaf index for multiple levels of approval

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
  • Pons Vallès, Montserrat
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Group decision and negotiation. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09718-7., The Banzhaf power index for games admits several extensions if the players have more than two ordered voting options. In this paper we prove that the most intu-itive and recognized extension of the index fails to preserve the desirability rela-tion for games with more than three ordered input levels of approval, a failure that undermines the index to be a good measure of power. This leads us to think of an alternative to the Banzhaf index for several input levels of approval. We propose a candidate for which it is proved that: (1) coincides with the Banzhaf index for sim-ple games, (2) it is proportional to its known extension for three levels of approval, and (3) preserves the desirability relation regardless of the number of input levels of approval. This new index is based on measuring the total capacity the player has to alter the outcome. In addition, it can be expressed through a very appropriate mathematical formulation that greatly facilitates its computation. Defining exten-sions of well-established notions in a wider context requires a careful analysis. Dif-ferent extensions can provide complementary nuances and, when this occurs, none of them can be considered to be ‘the’ extension. As shown in this paper, this situa-tion applies when trying to extend the Banzhaf power index from simple games to the broader context of games with several ordered input levels of approval., This research was partially supported by funds from: the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and from the European Union (FEDER funds) under grant MTM2015-66818-P (MINECO/FEDER), and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2019-I04987GB-I00., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Analytical study on typeface visual identification

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier
  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
  • Tàpias Anton, Montserrat
In this study, our objective is to explore methodologies for the identification of diverse typefaces. Utilizing the gathered data, we conducted a thorough analysis of the outcomes, distinguishing between successes and failures for both uppercase and lowercase letters within each typeface. The analytical framework is anchored in three distinct recognition measures. The initial measure draws upon the relative frequency of accurate responses, providing insights into the overall performance of each typeface. The second measure is constructed around the F-score derived from confusion matrices, offering a comprehensive evaluation of recognition precision and recall. Lastly, the third measure is formulated on the well-established Shapley-Shubik index, extensively scrutinized and endorsed within the realm of classical game theory. This multifaceted approach allows us to comprehensively assess the distinct aspects of typ.eface recognition, contributing to a nuanced under- standing of their effectiveness and characteristics, J. Freixas and X. Molinero has been partially supported by funds from the Ministry of Science and Innovation grant PID2019-104987GB-I00 (JUVOCO) and the Catalan government [2021 SGR 01419 ALBCOM]., Peer Reviewed, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::5 - Igualtat de Gènere, Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible::10 - Reducció de les Desigualtats, Postprint (published version)
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Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Enumeration of simple games with two equivalence classes of players

  • Kurz, Sascha
  • Samaniego Vidal, Daniel
© 2023. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/, Many real-world voting systems consist of voters that occur in just two different types. Indeed, each voting system with a “House” and a “Senate” is of that type. Here we present structural characterizations and an explicit enumeration formula for these so-called bipartite simple games. This formula extends some partial enumerations of simple games related to completeness or the number of minimal winning coalitions., This paper is part of the project PID2019-104987GB-I00 financed by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/ 501100011033., Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication

The decline of the Buchholz tiebreaker system: a preferable alternative

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
We propose a simple method of undoing tiebreaks in sport competitions with a large number of competitors and relatively small number of rounds of competition. Such methods are common in many games including Chess, Go, Bridge or Scrabble, among others. Tie-breaking methods decide in strict order the prizes to be received. One of the most commonly used methods is the well-known Buchholz method, based on the arithmetic mean of the scores obtained by the opponents. The alternative method that we propose in this paper, which is quite close to the median of the scores obtained by the opponents, is also a weighted average of the opponents’ scores, whose weights are based on the binomial distribution. The main objective of the article is to compare the proposed method with that of Buchholz, highlighting the many advantages over it. Unfortunately, even today Buchholz’s method and its variants are routinely used as the first and second tiebreaker criteria. It is the used as a first and second criteria in the rapid and blitz chess world championships that took place in December 2021. We believe that Buchholz’s method should be replaced by the one proposed here as soon as possible., This research is part of the I+D+i project PID2019-104987GB-I00 supported by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/, Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Markov chains applied to Parrondo’s paradox: the coin tossing problem

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier
  • Mégnien, Camille
Parrondo’s paradox was introduced by Juan Parrondo in 1996. In game theory, this paradox is described as: A combination of losing strategies becomes a winning strategy. At first glance, this paradox is quite surprising, but we can easily explain it by using simulations and mathematical arguments. Indeed, we first consider some examples with the Parrondo’s paradox and, using the software R, we simulate one of them, the coin tossing. Actually, we see that specific combinations of losing games become a winning game. Moreover, even a random combination of these two losing games leads to a winning game. Later, we introduce the major definitions and theorems over Markov chains to study our Parrondo’s paradox applied to the coin tossing problem. In particular, we represent our Parrondo’s game as a Markov chain and we find its stationary distribution. In that way, we exhibit that our combination of two losing games is truly a winning combination. We also deliberate possible applications of the paradox in some fields such as ecology, biology, finance or reliability theory., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (published version)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the enumeration of some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Optimization on 13 Dec 2022, available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/02331934.2022.2154126., This paper considers inequivalent monotone Boolean functions of an arbitrary number of variables, two monotone Boolean functions are equivalent if one can be obtained from the other by permuting the variables. It focuses on some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions with three and four types of equivalent variables, where the variables are either dominant or dominated. The paper provides closed formulas for their enumeration as a function of the number of variables. The problem we deal with is very versatile since inequivalent monotone Boolean functions are monotonic simple games, structures that are used in many fields such as game theory, neural networks, artificial intelligence, reliability or multiple-criteria decision-making., This publication is part of the I+D+i project/PID2019-104987GB-I00, financed by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/; Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the enumeration of Boolean functions with distinguished variables

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Soft computing. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00500-020-05422-5, Boolean functions have a fundamental role in neural networks and machine learning. Enumerating these functions and significant subclasses is a highly complex problem. Therefore, it is of interest to study subclasses that escape this limitation and can be enumerated by means of sequences depending on the number of variables. In this article, we obtain seven new formulas corresponding to enumerations of some subclasses of Boolean functions. The versatility of these functions does the problem interesting to several different fields as game theory, hypergraphs, reliability, cryptography or logic gates., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the generalized dimension and codimension of simple games

  • Molinero Albareda, Xavier
  • Riquelme Csori, Fabian Rolando
  • Roura Ferret, Salvador
  • Serna Iglesias, María José
Weighted voting games are simple games that can be represented by a collection of integer weights for each player so that a coalition wins if the sum of the player weights matches or exceeds a given quota. It is known that a simple game can be expressed as the intersection or the union of weighted voting games. The dimension (codimension) of a simple game is the minimum number of weighted voting games such that their intersection (union) is the given game. In this work, we analyze some subclasses of weighted voting games and their closure under intersection or union. We introduce generalized notions of dimension and codimension regarding some subclasses of weighted voting games. In particular, we show that not all simple games can be expressed as intersection (union) of pure weighted voting games (those in which dummy players are not allowed) and we provide a characterization of such simple games. Finally, we experimentally study the generalized dimension (codimension) for some subclasses defined by establishing restrictions on the representations of weighted voting games, Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the enumeration of bipartite simple games

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep
  • Samaniego Vidal, Daniel
© 2021. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/, This paper provides a classification of all monotonic bipartite simple games. The problem we deal with is very versatile since simple games are inequivalent monotonic Boolean functions, functions that are used in many fields such as game theory, neural networks, artificial intelligence, reliability or multiple-criteria decision-making. The obtained classification can be implemented in an algorithm able to enumerate bipartite simple games. These numbers provide some light on enumerations of several subclasses of bipartite simple games, for which we find formulas. Complete simple games, a subclass of all simple games for which the desirability relation is a complete preordering, were already classified by means of two parameters: a vector and a matrix fulfilling some conditions. Complete simple games are inequivalent monotonic regular Boolean functions. In this paper, we deduce a procedure for bipartite non-complete games, which allows enumerating the number of bipartite simple games. Several formulas are obtained, in particular polynomial expressions for the number of bicameral meet games and the number of bicameral join games, two types of voting systems widely used in practice., This research has been partially supported by funds from the Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities grant PID2019-104987GB-I00., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)