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RELATIVIDAD LINGUISTICA Y FILOSOFIA EXPERIMENTAL

PID2019-105746GB-I00

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Call Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Call year 2019
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 8
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Docta Complutense
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Neoclassical logic, cloisonnist vagueness, nonobjectual truth

  • Zardini, Elia
In a series of works, Alan Weir has suggested that the paradoxes are due not so much to the operational principles of classical logic, but to some of its structural principles. Weir’s insightful suggestion has opened up the programme of developing a system that, while validating the principles of naive truth (or of naive vagueness), preserves the classical essence of the logical operations and remains coherent by denying instead, in a philosophically motivated way, some of the classical structural principles. This paper first presents Weir’s logical system and argues that it does not adequately preserve operational classicism. The paper then presents Weir’s nontransitive system of vagueness and argues that it does not adequately preserve naive vagueness. The paper finally presents Weir’s nontransitive system of truth and argues that it does not adequately preserve naive truth. As a contrast, the paper mentions how these shortcomings are overcome by my favoured nontransitive system of vagueness and by my favoured noncontractive system of truth.
Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Epidemiology of fallacies

  • Duarte Calvo, Antonio Jaime
In this paper I apply the epidemiological model of the spread of beliefs and how they become cultural representations to the field of fallacies. The model suggests that beliefs tend to replicate as a virus does in a potential epidemic, and those strains that are dominant in a given socio-cultural sphere become cultural representations. My ultimate aim is to denounce the fact that some presumptive argumentation schemes are widely applied as definitive arguments, but turn out to be instances of common and traditional fallacies. Moreover, some such fallacies have managed to colonise the human mind and become cultural representations in society today. Adopting the approach I advocate here, we could say that the fallacy has become a belief, which has then managed to replicate like a virus, and finally the fallacy has become a cultural representation. One of the great harms that results from this process is that it is very difficult to open up effective lines of argument that expose the fallacious nature of these new and perverse cultural representations.
Docta Complutense
Publication Libro o Monografía (Book)

Argumentando sin piedad. Una introducción cinematográfica a la teoría de la argumentación, Arguing mercilessly. A cinematographic introduction to the theory of argumentation

  • Martínez García, Marcia
  • Alhambra Delgado, José
  • Duarte Calvo, Antonio Jaime
  • Vilanova Arias, Javier
Este libro es el resultado y culminación de una experiencia docente de varios años en la que se ha puesto en práctica y testado cada uno de sus contenidos en diversas asignaturas de grado y máster en la UCM y la UAM. Pretende ser una obra introductoria que posibilite la aproximación del gran público al interesante, a la par que escurridizo, fenómeno argumentativo. Para ello, los autores han decidido presentar los conceptos y escuelas fundamentales de la teoría de la argumentación empleando como recurso ilustrativo fundamental el filme 12 Angry Men de Sidney Lumet (1957). No han pretendido crear un manual académico sino, más bien, proponer un pequeño viaje, a medio camino entre la ficción y la teoría, a través del cual cualquier interesado pueda adentrarse en el terreno de la argumentación de la forma más amena posible. En este viaje se realizan cinco paradas. En el primer capítulo el lector encontrará el “equipaje” indispensable para el trayecto, es decir, nociones básicas sobre: qué es un argumento y de qué está compuesto; cómo podemos combinarlos y en qué contextos los utilizamos; o qué diferencia un buen argumento de uno malo. El resto de los capítulos están dedicados a las propuestas que, de un modo u otro, han marcado la historia de la moderna teoría de la argumentación. En el Capítulo 2 se explica el famoso Modelo de Toulmin, propuesto por S. Toulmin en Los Usos de la Argumentación (1957). El Capítulo 3 está dedicado a la teoría pragmadialéctica de la argumentación, una de las corrientes más influyentes en los estudios actuales sobre argumentación. En el Capítulo 4 se presenta otra de las escuelas pioneras, la lógica informal canadiense, a través de la obra de Douglas N. Walton. Y, finalmente, en el Capítulo 5 se repasa la aproximación formalista o clásica a la argumentación.
Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Las variedades de la experiencia abductiva

  • Duarte Calvo, Antonio Jaime
Siguiendo la propuesta de Peirce en su Argumento Olvidado, en este artículo trataremos de observar la equivalencia generativa y metodológica de lo que llamaremos las experiencias abductivas religiosas y científicas. Para articular estas conexiones, nos apoyaremos también en las conferencias Gifford de William James (1901-1902) reunidas bajo el título Las variedades de la experiencia religiosa. Estudiaremos ampliamente, además, la universalidad de los procesos mentales que llevan a la generación de las abducciones más creativas y que Peirce denominó Musement; para finalizar, trataremos de justificar esta universalidad por un descubrimiento muy reciente de la neurociencia, la red neural por defecto.
Docta Complutense
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Verdict exclusion, higher-order vagueness, cross-order vagueness and borderlineness. Reflections on footnote 41 of Crispin Wright’s ‘On being in a quandary'

  • Zardini, Elia
The paper explores an argument offered by C. Wright against the “verdict-exclusion” view (according to which we can knowledgeably rule out that, in the presence of a borderline case of Fness, that case is either feasibly knowably ~F or feasibly knowably ). The view is shared by otherwise very different theories of vagueness, such as the “third-possibility” view (according to which an object’s being a borderline case of Fness is a state which is incompatible both with F’s applying to it and with ~F ’s applying to it) and “pessimistic classical epistemicism” (according to which not only we are not in a position to rule out the possibility that, after all, ~F does apply to the case in question nor the possibility that, after all, ~F does apply to it, we also know that either F or ~F applies to it, and we just cannot know which). After presenting Wright’s original argument against the verdict-exclusion view and proposing a strengthening thereof, the paper considers and eventually rejects a restriction of the verdict-exclusion view, restriction which could be proposed in order to block the argument against it. The paper then identifies a first fundamental problem with the argument, concerning a slide from something’s being a mere consequence to its being a full-blooded characterization. Further, the paper distinguishes two different kinds of vagueness other than first-order vagueness (higher-order vagueness proper and what will be called ‘cross-order vagueness’), and shows that the idea behind the argument against the verdict-exclusion view can be used to build an argument against the definiteness of instances of cross-order borderlineness in the first place, thereby making it clear both that the new argument actually undermines a crucial assumption of Wright’s argument against the verdict-exclusion view and that, anyway, the issue has nothing to do in particular with the verdict-exclusion view. The paper then inquires what the verdict-exclusion view should make of such a result, and argues that both third-possibility theorists and pessimistic classical epistemicists face the novel explanatory challenge of giving a principled answer to the question as to why they are not, after all, committed to the definiteness of some instances of cross-order borderlineness. The paper concludes by generalizing the challenge to all extant theories of vagueness and considering possible avenues of reply.
Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Retraction in public settings

  • Almagro Holgado, Manuel
  • Bordonaba Plou, David
  • Villauneva Fernández, Neftalí
Several recent studies (see Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo, 2015; Marques, 2018; Kneer, 2021a) address linguistic retraction from an experimental perspective. In these studies, speakers’ intuitions regarding the mandatory nature of retraction are tested. Pace MacFarlane, competent speakers (of English) do not consider retraction to be obligatory. This paper examines two methodological features of the above-mentioned studies: they do not take into consideration the difference between public and private contexts; neither do they incorporate the distinction between evaluative and descriptive statements. In this paper, we report the results of two studies conducted to empirically test the hypothesis that retraction is, above all, a public phenomenon. Our findings show that context exerts a significant effect on speakers’ attitudes toward retraction.
Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Musement: The activity of the brain’s default mode network, Musement: la actividad de la red de modo predeterminado del cerebro

  • Duarte Calvo, Antonio Jaime
The main purpose of this article is to identify the inner human activity Peirce calls musement with the mental processes that arise through the workings of the brain’s default mode network. This network is a specific, recently anatomically defined brain system, which is most active when individuals are not focused on the external environment. In doing so, musement, which was defined by Peirce over a hundred years ago, will finally be situated within what today we understand as its neurobiological origin.</jats:p>
Docta Complutense
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Argumentative Abduction in the Interpretation Process: A Pragma-Dialectical Study of an Ironic Utterance, Abducción argumentativa en el proceso de interpretación: un estudio pragma-dialéctico de un enunciado irónico

  • Duarte Calvo, Antonio Jaime
In deviations of intent, from that expressed by the standard or ordinary use of language, abductive reasoning necessarily plays an important role. In such cases, to cause the desired effect in the audience, the speaker usually utters some “mysterious” words and relies on the hearer’s abductive ability to solve the enigma. This abductive ability is mostly based on the interlocutors’ knowledge of the common dialogic framework, and both speaker and listener have to apply this reasoning to arrive at successful communication. Understanding this exchange as an argumentative process, this kind of “guessing” can be evaluated in a reasoned way. As a practical case, in this contribution, I analyze an ironic utterance from a pragma-dialectical perspective. By doing so, I propose that these kinds of hypotheses that are drawn up in the interpretation process could be evaluated in an argumentative way, as answering certain critical questions regarding the theoretical norms of extended pragma-dialectics.