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MERCADOS: POLITICA Y ESTRATEGIA

PID2019-109377GB-I00

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Call Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Call year 2019
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA CCT

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Denial of interoperability and future first-party entry

  • Motta, Massimo
  • Peitz, Martin
Data de publicació electrònica: 14-04-2024, Motivated by a recent antitrust case involving Google, we develop a rationale for foreclosure when the owner of an essential input is not yet integrated downstream. Our theory rests on data-enabled network effects across periods. If a platform considers offering a first-party app in the future, by not allowing a third-party app to be hosted on its platform, it ensures that the third-party app would be a weaker competitor to its own app in the future. This makes denial of access attractive as a full or partial foreclosure strategy, which is costly in the short term but may be beneficial in the long term. We also study the effects of policies such as compulsory access or data-sharing, showing under which conditions they might be beneficial to consumers or backfire., Motta acknowledges financial aid from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) (project AEI-PID2019-109377GB-I00) and from the AEI through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S). Peitz acknowledges support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through CRC TR 224 (Project B05).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Common ownership patterns in the European banking sector—the impact of the financial crisis

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Boot, Nuria
  • Seldeslachts, Jo
We provide a description of ownership patterns in the top 25 European banks for the period 2003–2015, where we especially focus on the global financial crisis. Investment managers, such as Blackrock, are dominant in terms of number of blockholdings in different banks, maintaining fairly stable “common ownership” networks throughout our sample. However, the financial crisis led to capital injections by governments in several banks in trouble, which in turn led to a jump in holdings by governments, which typically are “non-common owners” (i.e., they hold only shares in only one bank). This jump translated into these investors temporarily being the top investor with a large share, and non-common owners being the majority among large shareholders. A brief comparison with US banks uncovers large ownership differences between the European and US banking sectors. We briefly discuss what these ownership patterns might imply for competition, stability and performance in the banking industry., We thank the editor of this journal,Martin Peitz, and an anonymous referee for their feedback; and participants of the Dec 7, 2020 JCLE Conference on Common Ownership, Interlocking Directorates & Competition for their comments. Banal-Estanol gratefully acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad and Feder (PID2019-109377GB-I00) and the Severo Ochoa programme (CEX2019-000915-S).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Similar-to-me effects in the grant application process: applicants, panellists, and the likelihood of obtaining funds

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Liu, Qianshuo
  • Macho-Stadler, Inés
  • Pérez Castrillo, David
We analyse if and how the characteristics of grant research panels affect the applicants' likelihood of obtaining funding and, especially, if particular types of panels favour particular types of applicants. We use the UK's Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) award decisions to test the similar-to-me hypothesis for the first time in the grant context. Our main results indicate that panel members tend to favour more (or penalise less) applicants with similar characteristics to them, as the similar-to-me hypothesis suggests. We show, for instance, that the quality of the applicants is more critical for panels of high quality than for panels of relatively lower quality, that basic-oriented panels tend to penalise applied-oriented applicants, and that panels with fewer female members tend to penalise teams with more female applicants. As a whole, we show that similar-to-me effects are simultaneously at work for a wide variety of functional, job-related research characteristics as well as for more well-known demographic attributes., We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad and Feder (PGC2018-094348-B-I00, PID2019-109377GB-I00, and PID2021-122403NB-I00), Generalitat de Catalunya (2021 SGR 00194), Fellowship PRE2018-084457, Severo Ochoa programme (CEX2019-000915-S), and ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Similar-to-me effects in the grant application process: applicants, panellists, and the likelihood of obtaining funds

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Liu, Qianshuo
  • Macho-Stadler, Inés
  • Pérez Castrillo, David
We analyse if and how the characteristics of grant research panels affect the applicants' likelihood of obtaining funding and, especially, if particular types of panels favour particular types of applicants. We use the UK's Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) award decisions to test the similar-to-me hypothesis for the first time in the grant context. Our main results indicate that panel members tend to favour more (or penalise less) applicants with similar characteristics to them, as the similar-to-me hypothesis suggests. We show, for instance, that the quality of the applicants is more critical for panels of high quality than for panels of relatively lower quality, that basic-oriented panels tend to penalise applied-oriented applicants, and that panels with fewer female members tend to penalise teams with more female applicants. As a whole, we show that similar-to-me effects are simultaneously at work for a wide variety of functional, job-related research characteristics as well as for more well-known demographic attributes., We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad and Feder (PGC2018-094348-B-I00, PID2019-109377GB-I00, and PID2021-122403NB-I00), Generalitat de Catalunya (2021 SGR 00194), Fellowship PRE2018-084457, Severo Ochoa programme (CEX2019-000915-S), and ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Denial of interoperability and future first-party entry

  • Motta, Massimo
  • Peitz, Martin
Data de publicació electrònica: 14-04-2024, Motivated by a recent antitrust case involving Google, we develop a rationale for foreclosure when the owner of an essential input is not yet integrated downstream. Our theory rests on data-enabled network effects across periods. If a platform considers offering a first-party app in the future, by not allowing a third-party app to be hosted on its platform, it ensures that the third-party app would be a weaker competitor to its own app in the future. This makes denial of access attractive as a full or partial foreclosure strategy, which is costly in the short term but may be beneficial in the long term. We also study the effects of policies such as compulsory access or data-sharing, showing under which conditions they might be beneficial to consumers or backfire., Motta acknowledges financial aid from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) (project AEI-PID2019-109377GB-I00) and from the AEI through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S). Peitz acknowledges support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through CRC TR 224 (Project B05).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Common ownership patterns in the European banking sector—the impact of the financial crisis

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Boot, Nuria
  • Seldeslachts, Jo
We provide a description of ownership patterns in the top 25 European banks for the period 2003–2015, where we especially focus on the global financial crisis. Investment managers, such as Blackrock, are dominant in terms of number of blockholdings in different banks, maintaining fairly stable “common ownership” networks throughout our sample. However, the financial crisis led to capital injections by governments in several banks in trouble, which in turn led to a jump in holdings by governments, which typically are “non-common owners” (i.e., they hold only shares in only one bank). This jump translated into these investors temporarily being the top investor with a large share, and non-common owners being the majority among large shareholders. A brief comparison with US banks uncovers large ownership differences between the European and US banking sectors. We briefly discuss what these ownership patterns might imply for competition, stability and performance in the banking industry., We thank the editor of this journal,Martin Peitz, and an anonymous referee for their feedback; and participants of the Dec 7, 2020 JCLE Conference on Common Ownership, Interlocking Directorates & Competition for their comments. Banal-Estanol gratefully acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad and Feder (PID2019-109377GB-I00) and the Severo Ochoa programme (CEX2019-000915-S).