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DISTRIBUCION EQUITATIVA EN PROBLEMAS DE REPARTO, COALICIONES, REDES Y MERCADOS

PID2020-113110GB-I00

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Call Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Call year 2020
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD DE BARCELONA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Two families of values for global cooperative games

  • Alonso Meijide, J.M.
  • Álvarez-Mozos, M.
  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
  • Jiménez-Losada, A.
A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (Int J Game Theory 20:129–147, 1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of point valued solutions that contain the Gilboa–Lehrer value. We characterize each family by means of reasonable properties, which are related to the ones used by Gilboa and Lehrer., Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca | Ref. 2021-SGR-00306, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2020- 113110GB-I00, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C32, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2022- 138956NB-100, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2021/24, Generalitat de Catalunya | Ref. 2021-SGR-00306
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stable cores in information graph games

  • Núñez, Marina
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
In an information graph situation, a finite set of agents and a source are the set of nodes of an undirected graph with the property that two adjacent nodes can share information at no cost. The source has some information (or technology), and agents in the same component as the source can reach this information for free. In other components, some agent must pay a unitary cost to obtain the information. We prove that the core of the derived information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if the information graph is cycle-complete, or equivalently if the game is concave. Otherwise, whether there always exists a stable set is an open question. If the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, a stable set always exists and it is the core of a related situation where one edge has been deleted., Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34, Generalitat de Catalunya | Ref. 2017SGR778, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2020-113110GB-I00