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MECANISMOS, DECISIONES COLECTIVAS Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS

PID2020-114309GB-I00

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Call Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Call year 2020
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD DE MALAGA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 4
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow's and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
  • Nicolò, Antonio|||0000-0001-5405-4889
We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow's impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders (also for strict).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability under variable agendas

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
  • Nicolò, Antonio|||0000-0001-5405-4889
We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, the single-peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Implementing direct democracy via representation

  • Correa Lopera, Guadalupe
Today, several social movements in western democracies argue that traditional representative democracy has failed to adequately represent the will of the 'people', and instead support direct democracy as the only political system to restore the will of the majority. We analyze under what conditions the policy - a vector of decisions on every issue - implemented by the winner of a bipartisan electoral competition coincides with the policy that citizens would choose by means of direct democracy. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for this equivalence to hold, implying that, as long as at least one of them is not fulfilled, a divergence of outcomes between direct and representative democracy arises. The first condition requires that the outcome of majority voting issue-by-issue is the Condorcet winner relative to the voters' preference profile over the set of policies. The second requires that either that outcome is the preferred policy for at least one of the candidates, or that candidates¿ preferred policies differ on every single issue. We reinterpret some findings in the literature in the light of our model and present them as potential reasons why the equivalence between direct and representative democracy may fail., Funding text 1: Financial support through the Grant PID2020-114309GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, the Grant PID2 021-127119NB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by \u201CERDF A way of making Europe\u201D, and the Grant PJUPNA2023-11403 funded by Universidad Pública de Navarra is gratefully acknowledged. Open access funding provided by Universidad Pública de Navarra.; Funding text 2: Financial support through the Grant PID2020-114309GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 , the Grant PID2021-127119NB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI / 10.13039/501100011033 and by \u201C ERDF A way of making Europe \u201D, and the Grant PJUPNA2023-11403 funded by Universidad Pública de Navarra is gratefully acknowledged.
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Voting equilibria and public funding of political parties

  • Correa Lopera, Guadalupe
  • Moreno, Bernardo
Direct public funding to political parties exists in most OECD countries and its allocation is executed on the basis of two principles: (i) proportional to the votes (or alternatively the number of seats), and (ii) equal distribution. We consider a situation in which there are two scenarios and two policies, where the optimal policy for each scenario is different. We study which policy is implemented when public political funding is introduced and voters are uncertain about the realized scenario. First, when the goal is to implement the optimal policy, we find that direct public funding to political parties is necessary if voters are more likely to be right than wrong about the scenario. Second, we characterize all equilibria based on voters' beliefs, the amount of money proportionally allocated, and the parties' preferences over the pairs scenario-policy and being in office., G. Correa-Lopera and B. Moreno acknowledge the Grant PID2020-114309GB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. G. Correa-Lopera also thanks the Grant PID2021-127119NB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by 'CERDF A way of making Europe', and the Grant PJUPNA2023-11403 funded by Universidad Pública de Navarra. Open Access funding provided by Universidad Pública de Navarra.