Skip to main content

CONEXIONES META-NORMATIVAS: LA RELEVANCIA DE LA TEORIA META-NORMATIVA EN LA DELIBERACION

PID2023-152006NA-I00

•
Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal para Impulsar la Investigación Científico-Técnica y su Transferencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Call year 2023
State Plan 2021-2023 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Anchoring, grounding and explanatory laws

  • Chilovi, Samuele
Brian Epstein has advanced a powerful and influential argument for the introduction of a novel relation of metaphysical determination called ‘anchoring’ and, correlatively, against identifying anchoring with metaphysical grounding (Epstein, B. 2015. The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford University Press). The argument aims to establish this by showing that they have different modal properties: anchoring is a ‘universal tool’, in that it allows for an anchored kind to be instantiated at worlds where its anchors are absent, whereas grounding does not, as it is ‘world-bound’. In this paper, I provide a novel diagnosis of where the argument goes wrong. Contrary to extant responses in the literature, I argue that anchoring can be a form of grounding even if we grant all of Epstein’s key (if controversial) insights. Moreover, I show that Epstein’s reasoning has stronger dialectical force against the related but distinct view that social facts are grounded in rules. Even in this respect, however, I argue that there are good reasons to resist this negative conclusion., This publication has been supported by the Ramón y Cajal fellowship ‘The Metaphysical Structure of Normative Explanation’ (grant RYC2021-032064-I funded by MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by the European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR), and by the project ‘MetaCon – Metanormative Connectedness: On the Relevance of Metanormative Theory for All-Things-Considered Deliberation’ (grant PID2023-152006NA-I00 funded by MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by FEDER/UE) based at the Institute of Philosophy (IFS) of the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Otros (Other)

The Metaphysics of Legal Facts

  • Chilovi, Samuele
This Element tackles the question of how – in what way, and in virtue of what – facts about the legal properties and relations of particulars (such as their rights, duties, powers, etc.) are metaphysically explained. This question is divided into two separate issues. First, the Element focuses on the nature of the explanatory relation connecting legal facts to their metaphysical determinants. Second, it looks into the kinds of entities that figure in the explanation of legal facts. In doing so, it pays special attention to the role that laws, or legal norms, play in such explanations. As it turns out, there are different ways in which legal facts might be explained, all of which have something to be said in their favor, and none of which is immune from problems. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core., This publication has been supported by the Ramón y Cajal fellowship “The Metaphysical Structure of Normative Explanation” (grant RYC2021-032064-I funded by MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by the European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR) and by the project “MetaCon – Metanormative Connectedness: On the Relevance of Metanormative Theory for All-Things-Considered Deliberation” (grant PID2023-152006NA-I00 funded by MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by FEDER/UE) based at the Institute of Philosophy (IFS) of the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC)., Peer reviewed