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Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Fast and Scalable Global Convergence in Single-Optimum Decentralized Coordination Problems

  • Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
  • Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
  • Rodríguez, Javier
Over the past few years, the scientific community has been studying the usefulness of evolutionary game theory to solve distributed control problems. In this paper we analyze a simple version of the Best Experienced Payoff (BEP) algorithm, a revision protocol recently proposed in the evolutionary game theory literature. This revision protocol is simple, completely decentralized and has minimum information requirements. Here we prove that adding some noise to this protocol can lead to efficient results in single-optimum coordination problems in little time, even in large populations of agents. We also test the algorithm under a wide range of different conditions using computer simulation. In particular, we consider different numbers of agents and of strategies, and we analyze the robustness of the algorithm to different updating schemes (e.g. synchronous vs asynchronous) and to different types of interaction networks (e.g. ring, preferential attachment, small world and complete). In all cases, using the noisy version of BEP, the agents quickly approach a small neighborhood of the optimal state from every initial condition, and spend most of the time in that neighborhood., Financial support from the Spanish State Research Agency (PID2020-118906GBI00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033), from the Regional Government of Castilla y Leon and the EU-FEDER program (CLU-2019-04), from the ´ Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, and from the Fulbright Program (PRX19/00113, PRX21/00295), is gratefully acknowledged.
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stability of Strict Equilibria in Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics: Simple Formulas and Applications

  • Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
  • Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points of these dynamics, but need not be stable. We provide some simple formulas and algorithms to determine the stability or instability of strict Nash equilibria., Spanish State Research Agency (PID2020-118906GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033), from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PRX19/00113, PRX21/00295), and from the Fulbright Program (PRX19/00113, PRX21/00295), is gratefully acknowledged. Luis R. Izquierdo is grateful to the Center for Control, Dynamical Systems, and Computation at UC Santa Barbara, where part of this work was done, for their hospitality.
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

"Test two, choose the better" leads to high cooperation in the Centipede game

  • Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
  • Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
Explaining cooperative experimental evidence in the Centipede game constitutes a challenge for rational game theory. Traditional analyses of Centipede based on backward induction predict uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, analyses based on learning or adaptation under the assumption that those strategies that are more successful in a population tend to spread at a higher rate usually make the same prediction. In this paper we consider an adaptation model in which agents in a finite population do adopt those strategies that turn out to be most successful, according to their own experience. However, this behavior leads to an equilibrium with high levels of cooperation and whose qualitative features are consistent with experimental evidence., Financial support from the Spanish State Research Agency (PID2020-118906GB-I00 / AEI / 10.13039/501100011033), from “Junta de Castilla y León - Consejería de Educación” through BDNS 425389, from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PRX18-00182, PRX19/00113), and from the Fulbright Program (PRX19/00113), is gratefully acknowledged.
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling

  • Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
  • Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
We consider population games played by procedurally rational players who, when revising their current strategy, test each of their available strategies independently in a series of random matches –i.e., a battery of tests–, and then choose the strategy that performed best in this battery of tests. This revision protocol leads to the so-called payoff-sampling dynamics (aka test-all Best Experienced Payoff dynamics). In this paper we characterize the support of all the rest points of these dynamics in any game and analyze the asymptotic stability of the faces to which they belong. We do this by defining strategy sets closed under payoff sampling, and by proving that the identification of these sets can be made in terms of simple comparisons between some of the payoffs of the game., Financial support from the Spanish State Research Agency (PID2020-118906GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033), from the Regional Government of Castilla y León with the EU-FEDER program (CLU-2019-04), and from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities with the Fulbright Program (PRX19/00113, PRX21/00295) is gratefully acknowledged.