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EL NUDGING APLICADO A LA MEJORA DE LA REGULACION: DERECHO Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS CONDUCTUALES

RED2018-102761-T

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Call Redes Investigación /Redes Excelencia
Call year 2018
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD DE BARCELONA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 5
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Chain Restaurant Calorie Posting Laws, Obesity, and Consumer Welfare

  • Courtemanche, Charles
  • Frisvold, David
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David
  • Ouayogodé, Mariétou H.
  • Price, Michael K.
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David|||/items/7663de5f-4f7b-4e4e-9e2b-1d4f80a76704
This paper investigates whether and why laws requiring chain restaurants to post calories on menus and menu boards work. We develop a model of calories consumed that highlights multiple potential channels through which these laws influence choice and that outlines an empirical strategy to disentangle these alternatives. We test the predictions of our model using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System on body mass index (BMI) and consumer well-being, as well as our own surveys on how the law influences where people eat and how randomized exposure to calorie information affects feelings towards menu items. Viewed in its totality, our results are consistent with an economic model in which calorie labels influence consumers both by providing salient information and by imposing a welfare-reducing moral cost (or feelings of guilt) on unhealthy eating.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Nudges y la pandemia: un análisis desde la economía y el derecho conductual. Informe SESPAS 2022, Nudges and the pandemic: An analysis from economics and behavioural law. SESPAS Report 2022

  • Abellán, José María
  • Cierco Seira, César
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David|||/items/7663de5f-4f7b-4e4e-9e2b-1d4f80a76704
La economía del comportamiento (que aúna economía y psicología) ofrece claves para entender las decisiones tomadas por dirigentes políticos y por la ciudadanía durante la pandemia de COVID-19 a través de los llamados sesgos cognitivos. Estos sesgos pueden ser contrarrestados mediante intervenciones conductuales, denominadas nudges, para promocionar conductas responsables en la «nueva normalidad». Además de repasar, desde la óptica de la economía del comportamiento, el pasado, el presente y el futuro de los elementos conductuales que rodean a la pandemia y su gestión, este artículo propone la formalización jurídica de los nudges, para lo cual deben cumplirse tres estándares mínimos: la exigencia de transparencia, la proscripción de la arbitrariedad y la puesta en valor de su eficiencia. Sugerimos, de igual forma, diseñar protocolos para futuras pandemias, de suerte que los nudges y las medidas legislativas duras puedan complementarse de una manera armónica y escalonada. Los nudges se prestan a una implementación rápida y poco coercitiva, por lo que resultan especialmente apropiados en orden al encauzamiento de las conductas más leves, pudiendo así reservarse otras medidas, como las sanciones, para las situaciones más graves.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Loss-Framed Incentives and Employee (Mis-)Behavior

  • Czibor, Eszter
  • Hsu, Danny
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David
  • Neckermann, Susanne
  • Subasi, Burcu
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David|||/items/7663de5f-4f7b-4e4e-9e2b-1d4f80a76704
This paper explores how loss-framed incentives affect behavior in a multitasking environment in which participants have more than one way of recovering (expected) losses. In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we offer participants task incentives that are framed as either a reward (gain) or penalty (loss). We study their responses along three dimensions: performance in the incentivized task, theft, and voluntary provision of help. We find that framing incentives as a penalty rather than as a reward does not significantly improve task performance, but it increases theft and leads to a small and insignificant reduction in the share of participants willing to help the experimenter. Secondary analyses based on our theoretical framework help us pin down the mechanism at play and suggest that loss aversion drives participants’ response. Our findings have important implications for incentive design in practice.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Behavioral Economics in the Epidemiology of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Theory and Simulations

  • Marín-López, Blas Ángel
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David
  • Abellán, José María
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David|||/items/7663de5f-4f7b-4e4e-9e2b-1d4f80a76704
We provide a game-theoretical epidemiological model for the COVID-19 pandemic that takes into account that: (1) asymptomatic individuals can be contagious, (2) contagion is behavior-dependent, (3) behavior is determined by a game that depends on beliefs and social interactions, (4) there can be systematic biases in the perceptions and beliefs about the pandemic. We incorporate lockdown decisions by the government into the model. The citizens’ and government’s beliefs can exhibit several biases that we discuss from the point of view of behavioral economics. We provide simulations to understand the effect of lockdown decisions and the possibility of “nudging” citizens in the right direction by improving the accuracy of their beliefs.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Cooperative and competitive reasoning: From games to revolutions

  • Jimenez-Gomez, David
  • Jimenez-Gomez, David|||/items/7663de5f-4f7b-4e4e-9e2b-1d4f80a76704
I introduce a novel solution concept, team level-k, in games of incomplete information. The model generalizes level-k and team reasoning models, and provides a unified explanation for several important phenomena in social dilemmas. In Rubinstein’s Email Game, players successfully coordinate upon receiving sufficient messages. In coordination games, the model explains several experimental facts that cannot be accounted for by global games, particularly the fact that there is greater coordination between people with public rather than private information, which has important policy implications. A generalization of the model relaxes the epistemic requirements for cooperative behavior, which I apply to study collective action and revolutions. Although the government attempts to manipulate citizen perceptions of the fundamentals, they might be able to coordinate if the fundamentals are sufficiently in their favor.