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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Contractual design and PPPs for hospitals, lessons for the Portuguese model

  • Pita Barros, Pedro
  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
Recently the Portuguese Government announced the launching of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to build hospitals with the distinctive feature that infrastructure construction and clinical activities management will be awarded to separate private parties. Also, one of the parties will be in charge of providing soft facilities. We explore alternative configurations of contracts and assess whether the equilibrium allocations attain the first-best solution.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On international cost-sharing of pharmaceutical R&D

  • Barros, Pedro Pita|||0000-0002-0881-4928
  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
Ramsey pricing has been proposed in the pharmaceutical industry as a principle to price discriminate among markets while allowing to recover the (fixed) R&D cost. However, such analyses neglect the presence of insurance or the fund raising costs for most of drug reimbursement. By incorporating these new elements, we aim at providing some building blocks towards an economic theory incorporating Ramsey pricing and insurance coverage. We show how coinsurance affects the optimal prices to pay for the R&D investment. We also show that under certain conditions, there is no strategic incentive by governments to set coinsurance rates in order to shift the financial burden of R&D. This will have important implications to the application of Ramsey pricing principles to pharmaceutical products across countries.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Selecting health care providers, "any willing provider" vs. negotiation

  • Barros, Pedro Pita|||0000-0002-0881-4928
  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
We study how a third-party payer decides what providers to contract with. Two mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists of the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The second mechanism is a bargaining procedure with the providers set up by the third-party payer. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high (low) the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system (negotiated solution).