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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mixture-betweenness, uncertainty and commitment

  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
This paper develops axiomatic models of preference under uncertainty and preference for commitment that satisfy Mixture-Betweenness, a weakening of the Independence axiom originally proposed by Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986). A central contribution of the paper is a general representation theorem that can be applied across a wide range of domains.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value

  • Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel|||0000-0002-8457-4647
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We introduce the family of games with intertemporal externalities, where two disjoint sets of players play sequentially. Coalitions formed by the present players create worth today, but the way these players organize also affects the future: their partition imposes externalities that influence the worth of coalitions formed by future players. We adapt the classic Shapley axioms and explore their implications. They are not sufficient to uniquely determine a value. We propose two solution concepts based on interpreting the Shapley value as the players' expected contributions to coalitions: the one-coalition externality value and the naive value. Our main results show that adding a single axiom to the classical Shapley axioms yields a unique value: the one-coalition externality value arises adding a principle of equal treatment of direct and indirect contributions or an axiom on necessary players, while the naive value is characterized adding equal treatment of externalities.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences

  • Fioravanti, Federico
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to choose a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues, or alike). We assume that voters' preferences over subsets of objects are separable: adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof if no voter benefits by not revealing its preferences truthfully and it is false-name-proof if no voter benefits by submitting several votes under other identities. We characterize all voting rules that satisfy false-name-proofness, strategy-proofness, and ontoness as the class of voting rules in which an object is chosen if it has either at least one vote in every society or a unanimous vote in every society. To do this, we first prove that if a voting rule is false-name-proof, strategy-proof, and onto, then the identities of the voters are not important.