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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?

  • Olivella, Pau|||0000-0002-0150-5903
  • Vera-Hernández, Marcos
When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Testing for asymmetric information in private health insurance

  • Olivella, Pau|||0000-0002-0150-5903
  • Vera-Hernández, Marcos
We test for asymmetric information in the UK private health insurance (PHI) market. In contrast to earlier research that considers either a purely private system or one where private insurance is complementary to public insurance, PHI is substitutive of the public system in the UK. Using a theoretical model of competition among insurers incorporating this characteristic, we link the type of selection (adverse or propitious) with the existence of risk-related information asymmetries. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we find evidence that adverse selection is present in the PHI market, which leads us to conclude that such information asymmetries exist.