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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?

  • Olivella, Pau|||0000-0002-0150-5903
  • Vera-Hernández, Marcos
When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Testing for asymmetric information in private health insurance

  • Olivella, Pau|||0000-0002-0150-5903
  • Vera-Hernández, Marcos
We test for asymmetric information in the UK private health insurance (PHI) market. In contrast to earlier research that considers either a purely private system or one where private insurance is complementary to public insurance, PHI is substitutive of the public system in the UK. Using a theoretical model of competition among insurers incorporating this characteristic, we link the type of selection (adverse or propitious) with the existence of risk-related information asymmetries. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we find evidence that adverse selection is present in the PHI market, which leads us to conclude that such information asymmetries exist.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Hospitals, Teaming Up

  • Barros, Pedro Pita|||0000-0002-0881-4928
  • Olivella, Pau|||0000-0002-0150-5903
This article describes the economics literature on the operation of hospitals using a framework based on the notion of "teams". It presents two distinctive features. The first one is the separation of ownership and control in hospitals and the other is to look at hospitals through the lens of teams. It addresses technology issues like output measurement, as well as economies of scale and scope and gives a brief overview of different theories on how the ruling body of the hospital chooses between the different technologically feasible options. It shows that the idea of team interactions can be extended beyond the limits of the hospital in two main areas. It addresses the relationship of hospitals with third-party payers as well as notices that patients arrive at hospital referred there by other agents, namely general practitioners. It further discusses and proposes challenges for future research.