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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Commercial incentives in R&D, research versus development

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
This paper proposes a framework to analyze the effects of scientific and commercial incentives in R&D organizations. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable of obtaining innovative ideas. Although they reduce the time spent on research, we show that commercialization incentives also affect the choice of research projects. Commercial rewards induce a more intensive search for (ex post) path-breaking innovations, which are more likely to be generated through (ex ante) riskier research programs. We derive the organization's optimal incentive scheme in terms of the researcher's characteristics. We show that organizations should use a high level of commercial incentives for scientists who have strong or weak intrinsic preferences for research. For those with strong preferences, the organization needs to induce development, whereas for those with weak ones, it needs to induce effort.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Optimal monitoring to implement a clean technology when emissions are random

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We consider a model of polluting firms subject to tax on emissions, monitoring, and penalties in case of underreporting and which face a choice between a more expensive clean and a less expensive dirty technology. Moreover, emissions are subject to random events. We show that the optimal monitoring is a cut-off policy, where all reports below a threshold are inspected with the same probability, while reports above the threshold are not monitored. If the adoption of the technology is firms' private information, too few firms will adopt the clean technology under the optimal monitoring policy. However, when the environmental agency can check the technology adopted by the firms, the optimal policy may induce overswitching or underswitching to the clean technology.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Contractual design and PPPs for hospitals, lessons for the Portuguese model

  • Pita Barros, Pedro
  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
Recently the Portuguese Government announced the launching of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to build hospitals with the distinctive feature that infrastructure construction and clinical activities management will be awarded to separate private parties. Also, one of the parties will be in charge of providing soft facilities. We explore alternative configurations of contracts and assess whether the equilibrium allocations attain the first-best solution.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?

  • Olivella, Pau|||0000-0002-0150-5903
  • Vera-Hernández, Marcos
When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On international cost-sharing of pharmaceutical R&D

  • Barros, Pedro Pita|||0000-0002-0881-4928
  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
Ramsey pricing has been proposed in the pharmaceutical industry as a principle to price discriminate among markets while allowing to recover the (fixed) R&D cost. However, such analyses neglect the presence of insurance or the fund raising costs for most of drug reimbursement. By incorporating these new elements, we aim at providing some building blocks towards an economic theory incorporating Ramsey pricing and insurance coverage. We show how coinsurance affects the optimal prices to pay for the R&D investment. We also show that under certain conditions, there is no strategic incentive by governments to set coinsurance rates in order to shift the financial burden of R&D. This will have important implications to the application of Ramsey pricing principles to pharmaceutical products across countries.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Selecting health care providers, "any willing provider" vs. negotiation

  • Barros, Pedro Pita|||0000-0002-0881-4928
  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
We study how a third-party payer decides what providers to contract with. Two mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists of the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The second mechanism is a bargaining procedure with the providers set up by the third-party payer. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high (low) the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system (negotiated solution).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

The incentive effects of affirmative action in a real-effort tournament

  • Calsamiglia, Caterina|||0000-0003-2079-7179
  • Franke, Jörg
  • Rey-Biel, Pedro|||0000-0002-1606-2631
Affirmative-action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for. Critics argue that they distort incentives, resulting in lower individual performance, and that the selected pool of tournament winners may be inefficient. In this paper, we study the empirical validity of such claims in a real-effort pair-wise tournament between children from two similar schools who systematically differ in how much training they received ex-ante in the task at hand. Our results show that performance was not reduced for either advantaged or disadvantaged subjects and that it was in fact enhanced. Additionally, while affirmative action balanced the proportion of disadvantaged individuals winning their respective tournament, the average performance of the pool of winners only decreased slightly.