Pasar al contenido principal

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 3
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

  • Klaus, Bettina
  • Klijn, Flip|||0000-0001-7255-6954
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples' preferences are 'responsive,' i.e., when Gale and Shapley's (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be manipulated by couples acting as singles.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

The incentive effects of affirmative action in a real-effort tournament

  • Calsamiglia, Caterina|||0000-0003-2079-7179
  • Franke, Jörg
  • Rey-Biel, Pedro|||0000-0002-1606-2631
Affirmative-action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for. Critics argue that they distort incentives, resulting in lower individual performance, and that the selected pool of tournament winners may be inefficient. In this paper, we study the empirical validity of such claims in a real-effort pair-wise tournament between children from two similar schools who systematically differ in how much training they received ex-ante in the task at hand. Our results show that performance was not reduced for either advantaged or disadvantaged subjects and that it was in fact enhanced. Additionally, while affirmative action balanced the proportion of disadvantaged individuals winning their respective tournament, the average performance of the pool of winners only decreased slightly.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Farsighted house allocation

  • Klaus, Bettina
  • Klijn, Flip|||0000-0001-7255-6954
  • Walzl, Markus
In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2008) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf., Wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of strong dominance (cf., Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) if no individual is indifferent between his endowment and the endowment of someone else.