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ELECCION SOCIAL Y VALORES INDIVIDUALES: FUNDAMENTOS Y APLICACIONES

ECO2012-34202

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprograma Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2012
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD PUBLICA DE NAVARRA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 3
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Incentives to give up resource extraction and avoid the tragedy of the commons

  • Benito Ostolaza, Juan Miguel
  • Osés Eraso, Nuria
This paper develops a general model of common resource extraction where we introduce payments for environmental services to encourage resource users to give up extraction. The goal is to reach a balance between resource use and conservation. As the essence of conservation is dynamic, we use a dynamic model to study the implementation of the compensation scheme. A stable heterogeneous equilibrium can be reached where both extractors and non-extractors live together. We analyze how the success of the compensation depends on factors such as the elasticity of demand and the biological characteristics of the resource., Financial support from projects ECO2009-12836 and ECO2012-34202 of the Spanish Minister of Science and Innovation.
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Identity, incentives and motivational capital in public organizations

  • Berdud García-López, Mikel
  • Cabasés Hita, Juan Manuel
  • Nieto Vázquez, Jorge
This paper explores optimality of contracts and incentives when the principal (public organization) can undertake investments to change agents’ (public workers) identity. In the model, workers within the organization can have different identities. We develop a principal-agent dynamical model with moral hazard, which captures the possibility of affecting this workers’ identity through contracts offered by the firm. In the model, identity is a motivation source which reduces agents’ disutility from effort. We use the term identity to refer to a situation in which the worker shares the organizational objectives and views herself as a part of the organization. Contrary, we use the term conflict to refer to a situation in which workers behave self-interested and frequently in the opposite way of the organisation. We assume that the principal can include investments to foster identity in contracts. Think for instance in developing a single culture that is shared by all the members of an organization. We discuss the conditions under which spending resources in changing workers’ identity and invest in this kind of motivational capital is optimal for organizations. Our results may help to inform public firms’ managers about the optimal design of incentive schemes and policies. For instance, we conclude that investing in motivational capital is the best option in the long run whereas pure monetary incentives works better in the short run., The authors would like to thank the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation for financial support of these projects (ECO2009-12836, ECO2012-34202).
Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Negative externalities in cropping decisions: private versus common land

  • Benito Ostolaza, Juan Miguel
  • Ezcurra Orayen, Roberto
  • Osés Eraso, Nuria
This paper analyzes to what extent the definition of property rights affects cropping decisions when these decisions generate negative externalities. To that end, we implement an experimental study where agents make cropping decisions in two different treatments: private and common land. The results show that there are no statistically significant differences between the two treatments in the contribution to the negative externality, thus revealing that the definition of property rights does not affect cropping decision in this context. Furthermore, our findings indicate that the implication of the agents in activities generating negative externalities tends to increase over time, thus amplifying its adverse consequences., Financial support from projects ECO2009-12836, ECO2012-34202 and ECO2011-29314-C02-01.