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ANALISIS TEORICO Y EMPIRICO DEL COMPORTAMIENTO DE INDIVIDUOS Y EMPRESAS CON ESPECIAL ENFASIS EN INNOVACION, SALUD Y EL MERCADO DIGITAL

PGC2018-094348-B-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento y Fortalecimiento Científico y Tecnológico del Sistema de I+D+i
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2018
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 5
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

An axiomatic approach to the law of small numbers

  • Noor, Jawwad
  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
With beliefs over the outcomes of coin-tosses as our primitive, we formalize the Law of Small Numbers (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) by an axiom that expresses a belief that the sample mean of any sequence will tend towards the coin's perceived bias along the entire path. The agent is represented by a belief that the bias of the coin is path-dependent and self-correcting. The model is consistent with the evidence used to support the Law of Small Numbers, such as the Gambler's Fallacy. In the setting of Bayesian inference, we show how learning is affected by the interplay between two potentially opposing forces: a belief in the absence of streaks and a belief that the sample mean will tend to the true bias. We show that, unlike other learning results in the literature (Rabin (2002), Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni (2010)), the latter force ensures that the agent at least admits the true parameter as possible in the limit, if not learn with certainty that it is true. In an evolutionary setting, we show that agents who believe in the Law of Small Numbers are never pushed out of the evolutionary race by "standard" agents who correctly understand randomness.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Mixture-dependent preference for commitment

  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
The literature on temptation and self-control is motivated by evidence of a preference for commitment. This literature has typically put forth models for preferences over menus of lotteries that satisfy the Independence axiom. Independence requires that the ranking of two menus is not affected if each is mixed (probabilistically) with a common third menu. In particular, the preference for commitment is invariant under Independence. We argue that intuitive behavior may require that the preference for commitment be affected by such mixing, and hence be mixture-dependent. To capture such behavior, we generalize Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) by replacing their Independence axiom with a suitably adapted version of the Mixture-Betweenness axiom of Chew (1989)- Dekel (1986). Axiomatizing the model involves a novel extension of the Mixture Space Theorem to preferences that satisfy Mixture-Betweenness.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Does the winner take it all?, redistributive policies and political extremism

  • Daniele, Gianmarco
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Sas, Willem
The impact of federal policies often depends on fixed regional differences (economic, historical, geographical). Certain regions can therefore be seen as permanently benefiting from the federation and others as losing. We show that this distorts voting behaviour in two ways. First, voters strategically elect federal representatives that are extremely protective of regional interests. Second, they suboptimally invest in locally funded goods. This distortion is U-shaped in expected federal benefits. Lastly, we do not observe the usual race to be included in the federal coalition, which would reduce the distortion. We test these predictions on national and European Parliamentary elections since 1990, and find that extreme voting is indeed U-shaped: winning and losing states distort more than those in the middle. We conclude that federal political structures foment political polarisation, especially when federal decisions require large consensus. Loosening the ties between representatives and their constituency may mitigate this problem.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Information vs competition, how platform design affects profits and surplus

  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Schuett, Florian
We study the design of online platforms that aggregate information and facilitate transactions. Two different designs can be observed in the market: revealing platforms that disclose the identity of transaction partners (e.g. Booking) and anonymous platforms that do not (e.g. Hotwire). To analyse the implications of this design choice for profits and surplus, we develop a model in which consumers differ in their location as well as their preferred product variety. Sellers offer their products for sale both directly ('offline') and indirectly via the platform ('online') but are unable to credibly disclose the product variety they offer when selling offline. The model gives rise to a novel trade-off associated with the anonymous platform design: offline, consumers observe location but not variety; online, they observe variety but not location. While the revealing design leads to more informed consumers and better matches, the anonymous design allows sellers to price discriminate and introduces competition between sellers whose markets would otherwise be segmented. We show that the comparison between the designs depends crucially on the relative importance of information about location vis-à-vis information about variety. For an intermediate range, the anonymous design outperforms the revealing design in terms of both profits and welfare.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Updating under imprecise information

  • Lin, Yi-Hsuan
  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
This paper models an agent that ranks actions with uncertain payoffs after observing a signal that could have been generated by multiple objective information structures. Under the assumption that the agent's preferences conform to the multiple priors model (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), we show that a simple behavioral axiom characterizes a generalization of Bayesian Updating. Our axiom requires that whenever all possible sources of information agree that it is more 'likely' for an action with uncertain payoffs to be better than one with certain payoffs, the agent prefers the former. We also provide axiomatizations for several special cases. Finally, we consider the situation where the informational content of a signal is purely subjective. We characterize the existence of a subjective set of information structures under full Bayesian updating for two extreme cases: (i) No ex-ante state ambiguity, and (ii) No signal ambiguity.