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e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Self-enforcing contracts with persistence

  • Dumav, Martin
  • Fuchs Schuarzberg, William Martin
  • Lee, Jangwoo
We show theoretically that, in the presence of persistent productivity shocks, the reliance on self-enforcing contracts due to limited legal enforcement may provide a possible rationale why countries with the worse rule of law might exhibit: (i) higher aggregate TFP volatilities, (ii) larger dispersion of firm-level productivity, and (iii) greater wage inequality. We also provide suggestive empirical evidence consistent with the model's aggregate implications. Finally, we relate the model's firm-level implications to existing empirical findings., Dumav gratefully acknowledges support from from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant # 896463, and the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) through grants ECO2017-86261-P and MDM 2014-0431. Fuchs gratefully acknowledges support from the ERC Grant # 681575, Ministerio Ciencia Innovacion y Universidades (Spain), Grants PGC2018-09615 and MDM2014-0431, and from the Comunidad de Madrid, Grant H2019/HUM-5891.