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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 9
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e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Costs and benefits of dynamic trading in a lemons market

  • Fuchs, William
  • Skrzypaczc, Andrzej
We study a dynamic market with asymmetric information that creates the lemons problem. We compare efficiency of the market under different assumptions about the timing of trade. We identify positive and negative aspects of dynamic trading, describe the optimal market design under regularity conditions and show that continuous-time trading can always be improved upon if sellers are present at . Instead, continuous trading is optimal if sellers arrive stochastically over time., Fuchs gratefully acknowledges support from the ERC Grant #681575.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Information spillovers in asset markets with correlated values

  • Asriyan, Vladimir
  • Fuchs, William
  • Green, Brett
We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with correlated assets owned by privately informed sellers. In the model, a trade of one asset can provide information about the value of other assets. Importantly, the information content of trading behavior is endogenously determined. We show that this endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria when assets are sufficiently correlated. The equilibria are ranked in terms of both trade volume and efficiency. The model has implications for policies targeting post-trade transparency. We show that introducing post-trade transparency can increase or decrease welfare and trading volume depending on the asset correlation, equilibrium being played, and the composition of market participants., Asriyan acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant (ECO2014-54430-P) and the Barcelona GSE Seed Grant. Fuchs gratefully acknowledges support from the ERC Grant 681575.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

From equals to despots: The dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information

  • Carrasco, Vinicius
  • Fuchs, William
  • Fukuda, Satoshi
This paper considers an optimal renegotiation-proof dynamic Bayesian mechanism in which two privately informed players repeatedly have to take a joint action without resorting to side-payments. We provide a general framework which accommodates as special cases committee decision and collective insurance problems. Thus, we formally connect these separate strands of literature. We show: (i) first-best values can be arbitrarily approximated (but not achieved) when the players are sufficiently patient; (ii) our main result, the provision of intertemporal incentives necessarily leads to a dictatorial mechanism: in the long run the optimal scheme converges to the adoption of one player's favorite action. This can entail one agent becoming a permanent dictator or a possibility of having sporadic "regime shifts", Fuchs gratefully acknowledges support from the ERC Grant 681575.
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection

  • Asriyan, Vladimir
  • Fuchs, William
  • Green, Brett
How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting where sellers have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state. In any equilibrium, each seller's trading behavior provides an informative and conditionally independent signal about the aggregate state. We ask whether the state is revealed as the number of informed traders grows large. Surprisingly, the answer is no; we provide conditions under which information aggregation necessarily fails. In another region of the parameter space, aggregating and non-aggregating equilibria coexist. We solve for the optimal information policy of a social planner who observes trading behavior. We show that non-aggregating equilibria are always constrained inefficient. The optimal information policy Pareto improves upon the laissez-faire outcome by concealing information about trading volume when it is sufficiently high, Asriyan acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and Juan de la Cierva (IJCI-201731808), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya AGAUR Grant (SGR 2017-1393). Fuchs acknowledges support from the ERC Grant 681575. We thank Piero Gottardi, Stephan Lauermann, Victoria Vanasco, Venky Venkateswaran and seminar/conference participants at CREi-UPF, EIEF, EUI, HEC Paris, Imperial College London, TSE, UC3M, AEA meetings in Atlanta, Advances in Information Economics Conference in Como, FTG meetings in London, SAET Meetings in Ischia, SED meetings in Edinburgh and in Saint Louis, and 2nd Catalan Economic Society Meetings in Barcelona for helpful discussions and feedback. Joon Sup Park, Gerard Martín and Mark Whitmeyer provided excellent research assistance
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Self-enforcing contracts with persistence

  • Dumav, Martin
  • Fuchs Schuarzberg, William Martin
  • Lee, Jangwoo
We show theoretically that, in the presence of persistent productivity shocks, the reliance on self-enforcing contracts due to limited legal enforcement may provide a possible rationale why countries with the worse rule of law might exhibit: (i) higher aggregate TFP volatilities, (ii) larger dispersion of firm-level productivity, and (iii) greater wage inequality. We also provide suggestive empirical evidence consistent with the model's aggregate implications. Finally, we relate the model's firm-level implications to existing empirical findings., Dumav gratefully acknowledges support from from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant # 896463, and the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) through grants ECO2017-86261-P and MDM 2014-0431. Fuchs gratefully acknowledges support from the ERC Grant # 681575, Ministerio Ciencia Innovacion y Universidades (Spain), Grants PGC2018-09615 and MDM2014-0431, and from the Comunidad de Madrid, Grant H2019/HUM-5891.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection

  • Asriyan, Vladimir
  • Fuchs, William
  • Green, Brett
How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting where sellers have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state. In any equilibrium, each seller's trading behavior provides an informative and conditionally independent signal about the aggregate state. We ask whether the state is revealed as the number of informed traders grows large. Surprisingly, the answer is no; we provide conditions under which information aggregation necessarily fails. In another region of the parameter space, aggregating and non-aggregating equilibria coexist. We solve for the optimal information policy of a social planner who observes trading behavior. We show that non-aggregating equilibria are always constrained inefficient. The optimal information policy Pareto improves upon the laissez-faire outcome by concealing information about trading volume when it is sufficiently high., Asriyan acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and Juan de la Cierva (IJCI-2017-31808), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya AGAUR Grant (SGR 2017-1393). Fuchs acknowledges support from the ERC Grant 681575.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Liquidity sentiments

  • Asriyan, Vladimir
  • Fuchs, William
  • Green, Brett
We develop a rational theory of liquidity sentiments in which the market outcome in any given period depends on agents' expectations about market conditions in future periods. Our theory is based on the interaction between adverse selection and resale considerations giving rise to an intertemporal coordination problem that yields multiple self-fulfilling equilibria. We construct "sentiment" equilibria in which sunspots generate fluctuations in prices, volume, and welfare, all of which are positively correlated. The intertemporal nature of the coordination problem disciplines the set of possible sentiment dynamics. In particular, sentiments must be sufficiently persistent and transitions must be stochastic. We consider an extension with production in which asset quality is endogenously determined and provide conditions under which sentiments are a necessary feature of any equilibrium. A testable implication is that assets produced in good times are of lower average quality than those produced in bad times., Asriyan acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). Fuchs gratefully acknowledges support from the ERC grant 681575.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Liquidity sentiments

  • Asriyan, Vladimir
  • Fuchs, William
  • Green, Brett
We develop a rational theory of liquidity sentiments in which the market outcome in any given period depends on agents' expectations about market conditions in future periods. Our theory is based on the interaction between adverse selection and resale considerations giving rise to an intertemporal coordination problem that yields multiple self-fulfilling equilibria. We construct "sentiment" equilibria in which sunspots generate fluctuations in prices, volume, and welfare, all of which are positively correlated. The intertemporal nature of the coordination problem disciplines the set of possible sentiment dynamics. In particular, sentiments must be sufficiently persistent and transitions must be stochastic. We consider an extension with production in which asset quality is endogenously determined and provide conditions under which sentiments are a necessary feature of any equilibrium. A testable implication is that assets produced in good times are of lower average quality than those produced in bad times., Asriyan acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). Fuchs gratefully acknowledges support from the ERC grant 681575.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection

  • Asriyan, Vladimir
  • Fuchs, William
  • Green, Brett
How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting where sellers have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state. In any equilibrium, each seller's trading behavior provides an informative and conditionally independent signal about the aggregate state. We ask whether the state is revealed as the number of informed traders grows large. Surprisingly, the answer is no; we provide conditions under which information aggregation necessarily fails. In another region of the parameter space, aggregating and non-aggregating equilibria coexist. We solve for the optimal information policy of a social planner who observes trading behavior. We show that non-aggregating equilibria are always constrained inefficient. The optimal information policy Pareto improves upon the laissez-faire outcome by concealing information about trading volume when it is sufficiently high., Asriyan acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and Juan de la Cierva (IJCI-2017-31808), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya AGAUR Grant (SGR 2017-1393). Fuchs acknowledges support from the ERC Grant 681575.